The Red Sea has long been one of the world’s most consequential waterways—a narrow, warm corridor linking the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and connecting Africa to the Middle East. Its significance predates the opening of the Suez Canal, but the canal transformed the Red Sea into a global artery of trade, security, and geopolitics.
Within this landscape, Ethiopia occupies a uniquely pivotal position. The Ethiopian highlands supply nearly 100 billion cubic meters of water each year to Sudan, Egypt, and Somalia. These rivers sustain populations far beyond Ethiopia’s borders, even as Ethiopia itself relies heavily on rainfall and remains highly vulnerable to climate variability. Water, more than oil or minerals, is the region’s most contested resource, and this reality shapes the strategic calculations of states across the Horn of Africa and the wider Middle East.
The Horn of Africa does not exist in isolation. It is tightly linked—economically, culturally, and politically—to the Middle East. Demographic pressures and limited arable land, coupled with declining oil revenues, have driven Middle Eastern countries to invest heavily in African land and water resources. At the same time, security concerns—ranging from terrorism to competition over the Red Sea—ensure that political developments on one shore reverberate across the other. Any weakening of African presence in this space risks shifting the balance of power in ways that could undermine long-term regional stability.
In this context, Ethiopia—due to its population, geography, historical presence, and natural resources—remains central to the future of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
Unlike many Red Sea–adjacent states, Ethiopia is not an arid region. Its temperate highlands, abundant water, and elevated terrain make it a natural vantage point over the region’s most strategic sea lanes. Its large and growing population, coupled with its role as an economic powerhouse of the region, provides Ethiopia with a geopolitical influence that extends far beyond its borders. This combination enables Ethiopia not only to project regional stability but also to offer security guarantees in the Horn of Africa. Historically, these attributes have drawn the interest of global powers and ensured Ethiopia’s centrality in regional affairs.
During the 19th century, colonial powers, along with others driven by various ambitions, have long sought influence in the Horn—sometimes through political pressure, sometimes through internal interference, and at times through military confrontation. Ethiopia’s enduring independence, despite these pressures, stands out in African history.
The question now is not whether Ethiopia has been resilient, but how it can leverage that resilience to shape its future strategic posture in the Red Sea.
Ethiopia’s history offers a clear lesson: control of coastal access has always been linked to national strength, economic vitality, and cultural flourishing.
The Axumite Empire—recognized in antiquity as one of the world’s great powers—prospered because of its Red Sea port at Adulis. Its extensive coinage, international trade networks, and diplomatic presence across the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean testify to what Ethiopia achieved with maritime access. When Axum was pushed away from the coast, economic decline followed, and the minting of currency ceased for nearly a millennium. Centuries later, Ethiopian leaders repeatedly sought to restore coastal control. Among them, Amda Seyon I (r. 1314–1344) strengthened authority around Zeila to protect trade and stabilize the corridor, Zera Yacob (r. 1434–1468) built an administrative system reaching towards Massawa and revived commercial activity in the northern region, and successive emperors risked—and sometimes lost—their lives to secure the coastline.
Following Ethiopia’s resistance and defeat of Fascist Italy’s aggression, Tsehafi Taezaz Aklilu Habte-Wold (Foreign Minister of Ethiopia from 1947 to 1958 and Prime Minister from 1961 to 1974) and other leaders worked tirelessly to restore Ethiopian access to the Red Sea, fully recognizing the consequences of losing it. These efforts were not driven by expansionism but by recognition of a simple truth: maritime access was essential for national survival and development.
Modern economic research confirms what Ethiopian history long ago revealed. Landlocked countries face steep challenges: high import and export costs, dependence on transit states, and limited ability to integrate into global markets. Even with abundant resources or an industrious population, geography imposes constraints that can slow growth and undermine political autonomy.
Across Africa and Asia, landlocked nations—from Mali to Nepal—have experienced embargoes, transit restrictions, and economic coercion by neighbors who control their routes to the sea. Political vulnerability follows economic dependence.
Ethiopia has not been immune to this dynamic. During the 1936 aggression by Fascist Italy, when Ethiopia was fighting to defend its sovereignty, French authorities controlling Djibouti blocked vital arms shipments purchased by Ethiopia. This episode reflected how external control over maritime access can directly shape Ethiopia’s security at decisive moments.
A Strategic Question for Ethiopia’s Future
For Ethiopia, access to the sea is not an abstract debate. It is a question that touches on economic resilience, national unity, and long-term sovereignty.
Shared interests, shared futures, and shared assets are essential elements to bind a diverse nation together. Maritime access is one such asset. When nations possess vital infrastructure or economic lifelines, they have stronger incentives to preserve unity. When those assets are absent—or externally controlled—fragmentation becomes easier.
Thus, Ethiopia’s pursuit of assured maritime access is neither aggression nor expansion. It is a legitimate strategic priority rooted in geography, history, and economic necessity.
It is also not a demand directed against Eritrea as a people or a nation. Ethiopia and Eritrea share deep historical, cultural, and social ties. Their futures are intertwined. The question is how both countries—within a framework of mutual respect and sovereign equality—can build a stable Red Sea region that serves their common interests. Ethiopia stands at a critical juncture. Its economy is growing, its regional role is expanding, and the geopolitical value of the Red Sea is rising.
Regional and Global Strategic Benefits of Ethiopia’s Quest to Regain Sea Access
Ethiopia’s geographical location in the Horn of Africa positions it as a key geostrategic hub connecting the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. The region borders the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, serving as a vital global trade route, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which a significant portion of world shipping passes. As the historical cradle of early human civilization and a region with deep ties to the three Abrahamic religions, it has long faced multifaceted security challenges.
These include terrorism (such as from groups like al-Shabaab), piracy in the Gulf of Aden, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking. Ethiopia stands as a major anchor state in the Horn, contributing significantly to regional stability through its involvement in peacekeeping missions and counterterrorism efforts alongside major powers like the US and other middle powers with a presence in the region.
For over three decades, Ethiopia’s security contributions have primarily been land- and air-based, as the country became landlocked following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. For Ethiopia, securing reliable sea access could enhance its monitoring and response to regional threats in the Red Sea, potentially bolstering international security efforts against piracy and terrorism.
Additionally, it would foster economic growth for Africa’s second-most populous nation, which has over 120 million people, and promote regional integration.
To secure its future, Ethiopia must develop a strategy that recognizes the strategic weight of the Red Sea corridor, the geopolitical pressures of the Middle East and Nile basin, the vulnerabilities inherent in its landlocked position, the opportunities that come from regional cooperation grounded in mutual benefit, and the imperative to convince the international community that Ethiopia’s access to the sea is existential and vital for protecting global maritime security, supporting regional peace, and fostering economic integration.
The Red Sea is not simply a body of water. For Ethiopia, it represents economic lifelines, national cohesion, and long-term security. History makes one point unmistakably clear: Ethiopia has flourished when connected to the sea and faltered when cut off from it.
Silabat Manaye is an international relations professional based in Addis Ababa. His research interests include water politics, geopolitics in the Horn of Africa, and war journalism. He authored two books on Nile geopolitics.
Contributed by Silabat Manaye






