In the volatile geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, history is rarely just a record of the past; it is a weapon wielded to justify current political entrenchments. This dynamic was vividly displayed recently in an article titled “Eritrea’s Sovereignty and the Myth of Ethiopia’s ‘Lost Coast’.” Authored by Abdu Osman and published on the Red Sea Beacon, it was explicitly endorsed and shared on X (formerly Twitter) by Eritrean Information Minister Yemane G. Meskel.
The article serves as a scathing critique of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s recent discourse regarding Red Sea access. Osman argues that Ethiopia’s search for legal avenues to the sea is a “bizarre campaign” rooted in historical distortion. He posits that Eritrea’s independence is a closed case of decolonization, akin to the liberation of Angola or Mozambique, and that Ethiopia has no legal or moral standing to question the status quo.
However, while Osman’s article effectively articulates the official position of the State of Eritrea, it relies on a selective reading of history and a rigid interpretation of international law that ignores the complex, shared heritage of the two nations. By framing the relationship solely as one of “colonizer and colonized,” the article attempts to shut down a necessary conversation about regional integration, economic equity, and the legitimate security interests of a landlocked nation of 120 million people.
This rebuttal seeks to dismantle the “colonial” fallacy and argue that acknowledging Ethiopia’s legitimate interests in the Red Sea is not a call for war, but a prerequisite for sustainable peace.
The Fallacy of the “Colonial” Frame
The central pillar of Osman’s argument is that the Eritrean struggle was, “by any standards, a decolonization process”. He asserts that Ethiopia was merely a “surrogate partner” of US geopolitical interests, implying that the Ethiopian presence in Eritrea was identical to European colonial rule. This narrative is politically convenient for the Asmara regime, but historically reductive.
To categorize Ethiopia strictly as a colonial power is to ignore thousands of years of intertwined history, culture, and demographics that predate the Italian colonization of 1890. Unlike the relationship between Italy and Eritrea – which was purely extractive and foreign – the relationship between the peoples of the Ethiopian interior and the Red Sea coast was one of organic fluidity, shared linguistic roots, and common polities (such as the Aksumite Empire).
Osman dismisses the Federation period (1952–1962) as a “bogus” arrangement imposed solely by global powers. This revisionist view erases the significant portion of the Eritrean population – the Unionists – who actively sought unity with Ethiopia during the 1940s and 50s. While it is true that the subsequent annexation in 1962 violated the UN mandate, characterizing the entire relationship as foreign occupation ignores the internal political diversity of Eritrea at the time.
By painting the history solely as “Ethiopia vs. Eritrea,” Osman obscures the reality that the region’s destiny was always a complex interplay of internal Horn of Africa dynamics, not just an “illegal occupation” by a foreign alien power.
The “Consent” Paradox
A significant portion of Osman’s text is dedicated to proving that Ethiopia’s consent was never required for Eritrea’s independence. He argues that “decolonization is not contingent upon approval from the occupying power” and that the 1993 referendum merely confirmed a military victory achieved in 1991. He notes that “no document or blessing was required for Ethiopia to forfeit something it never possessed”.
This argument seeks to rewrite the specific political context of 1991. While the military defeat of the Derg regime is an undeniable fact, the legal transition to statehood was heavily reliant on the cooperation of the new government in Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by TPLF actively facilitated the referendum and extended immediate recognition – a “consent” that was crucial for Eritrea’s swift admission to the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.
Comparing this to Somaliland offers a stark counter-example; Somaliland achieved a similar military victory against the Siad Barre regime but, lacking the “document” or consent from Mogadishu, remains unrecognized internationally. Osman’s claim that “no consent statement… was required” is legally romantic but diplomatically inaccurate. The current debate in Ethiopia is not about revoking independence, but about questioning the terms of that separation. The critique raised by Ethiopian analysts is that the transitional government of 1991 failed to negotiate a post-secession framework that could have protected Ethiopia’s vital maritime interests, a failure that current generations are paying for.
International Law: A Bridge, Not a Wall
Osman utilizes international law as a shield to deflect any Ethiopian concern, stating that sovereignty cannot be “lost” and that Ethiopia cannot “dictate Red Sea security arrangements”. He cites the UN Charter to argue that bilateral transit agreements cannot override sovereign rights.
However, this is a restrictive reading of international norms. While sovereignty is indeed a foundational principle, international law – specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – also recognizes the rights of landlocked states to access the sea and participate in the benefits of maritime resources. The concept of “Right of Access” suggests that transit states and landlocked states should cooperate to ensure the free flow of goods.
Furthermore, Osman’s assertion that Ethiopia has no right to address “regional stability” or maritime security is geopolitically untenable. Ethiopia is the demographic and economic hegemon of the Horn. To suggest that the security of the Red Sea – a chokepoint through which Ethiopia’s entire economic lifeline flows – is none of Ethiopia’s business is absurd. Security in the Horn of Africa is indivisible. A rigid insistence on absolute sovereignty that ignores the existential economic anxieties of a giant neighbour is a recipe for perpetual conflict, not stability. The “Red Sea security” cannot be safeguarded by Eritrea alone while ignoring the security needs of the hinterland.
The Economic Imperative vs Political Dogma
The article endorsed by Minister Yemane G. Meskel frames the discussion of ports as a “gimmick” and a “toxic narrative”. It dismisses Ethiopia’s economic ambitions as secondary to the rigid principles of territorial integrity.
This stance ignores the material reality of the 21st Century. Ethiopia’s population is exploding, and its reliance on a single port (Djibouti) creates a strategic vulnerability that no responsible government can ignore. When Osman writes that “discussions about Ethiopia’s trade limitations… must be grounded in… recognition of Eritrea’s independence”, he creates a straw man. Ethiopia does recognize Eritrea’s independence. The current discourse is about moving beyond the antagonistic separation of 1993 toward a model of economic integration.
By strictly adhering to the “colonial” narrative, the Eritrean leadership justifies a state of permanent mobilization and isolation. If Ethiopia is the “colonizer,” then Eritrea must remain a fortress. This narrative serves the internal control mechanisms of the Eritrean government but starves the region of the economic prosperity that could come from a cooperative “port-for-power” or “port-for-equity” arrangement.
Conclusion
Abdu Osman’s article, while clearly articulates the position of the regime in Asmara, ultimately offers a vision of the past that imprisons the future. By insisting that the separation of the two countries was a clean, absolute instance of decolonization, it attempts to delegitimize any current Ethiopian grievances regarding access to the sea.
However, the “myth” is not Ethiopia’s claim to the sea, but the idea that two nations with such deeply integrated histories and economies can succeed while turning their backs on one another. The endorsement of this hardline stance by Minister Yemane G. Meskel suggests that Asmara is not yet ready to engage in the creative diplomacy required to solve the Horn’s paradox. Ethiopia does not need to “reclaim” Eritrea to assert that the Red Sea is a shared vital interest.
The path forward lies not in hiding behind the rigid walls of 1993, but in acknowledging that geography has bound the fates of these two nations together. Until the “colonial” lens is discarded for a lens of regional integration, the peoples of both nations will remain trapped in a cycle of mutual suspicion.
Contributed by Yonas Tesfa Sisay (PhD)
