The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is one of the eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognized as building blocks of the Africa Union’s (AU) envisaged African Economic Community. It was established in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda to coordinate collective responses to drought, famine, and desertification in the Horn of Africa. Eritrea joined the organization as its seventh member at the Fourth Summit of Heads of State and Government following its independence in 1993, while South Sudan acceded in 2012 after its secession from Sudan.
By the mid-1990’s, IGADD member states recognized that sustainable economic development and regional integration were unattainable without durable peace and security. Accordingly, the organization was revitalized and reconstituted in 1996 as IGAD, marking a deliberate shift from a narrowly defined environmental and developmental mandate toward a broader regional framework encompassing peace and security, political cooperation, economic integration, and development. This paradigm shift positioned IGAD as a full-fledged regional organization comparable in scope and ambition to other African RECs such as ECOWAS and SADC.
Eritrea remained a member of IGAD until 2007, when it unilaterally withdrew following the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and IGAD’s support for regional peace initiatives in Somalia, including the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) and the subsequent AU-led mission, AMISOM (2007-2022). During this period, IGAD also condemned Eritrea’s involvement in the internal affairs of Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti, and endorsed requests by Ethiopia for AU and UN sanctions in response to Eritrea’s documented support for armed and terrorist groups, including Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda affiliates.
After nearly two decades of absence, Eritrea rejoined IGAD in June 2023 following the Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Agreement, facilitated largely through Ethiopia’s initiative and the political goodwill of other IGAD member states. The readmission was justified on the basis of inclusivity, regional cooperation, and solidarity. However, this return proved short-lived. On December 12, 2025, Eritrea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs transmitted a diplomatic note verbale to the IGAD Secretariat announcing its withdrawal from the organization.
In the note, Eritrea alleged that IGAD had failed to advance regional aspirations since 2007, had evolved into a platform hostile to Eritrea, and had ignored Eritrean calls for institutional reform. It further claimed that IGAD no longer functioned as a neutral regional body and no longer served Eritrea’s national interests. IGAD responded promptly, expressing regret over the decision and refuting factual inaccuracies in Eritrea’s claims. The Secretariat noted that Eritrea had not meaningfully participated in IGAD activities for nearly two decades, had submitted no reform proposals following its 2023 readmission, and had undertaken no prior consultations before announcing its withdrawal. Nevertheless, IGAD reiterated its readiness to engage Eritrea in constructive dialogue.
Eritrea’s withdrawal is not an isolated incident but part of a recurring pattern in its engagement with regional, continental, and global institutions. It must be understood within the broader context of Eritrea’s foreign policy orientation, characterized by isolationism, a highly securitized conception of sovereignty, and resistance to regional and international accountability mechanisms. Unlike most African states, which regard regional organizations as indispensable platforms for cooperation and collective problem-solving, Eritrea has consistently adopted a selective and instrumental approach to multilateral engagement. The Asmara regime has tended to participate in regional mechanisms only to the extent that they align with narrowly defined security objectives; where institutions impose constraints or demand accountability, Eritrea has responded through non-cooperation, obstruction, or outright withdrawal.
In a region as volatile as the Horn of Africa, the withdrawal of a member state from an AU recognized RECs carries detrimental political and security implications. Eritrea’s decision therefore warrants examination through the lens of its statehood practices, foreign policy behavior, and historical engagement with regional institutions. A central driver of its withdrawal is the perception that IGAD no longer tolerates or legitimizes Eritrea’s long-standing strategy of regional destabilization through proxy engagement. Over the past two decades, multiple UN Security Council Monitoring Group reports, as well as AU Peace and Security Council briefings, documented Eritrea’s support for armed groups operating in Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti. In response, IGAD consistently condemned these actions and supported UN sanctions.
IGAD’s mandate to promote regional peace, security, and conflict prevention stands in direct contradiction to Eritrea’s reliance on militarized influence and proxy warfare. This structural incompatibility has rendered sustained and genuine cooperation between IGAD and the Eritrean regime untenable.
Of particular concern is the parallel effort by Eritrean political elites and affiliates to lobby and encourage other member states to disengage from IGAD, most notably Sudan, whose government unilaterally suspended its membership on January 20, 2024, amid an ongoing civil war between SAF and RSF. Such actions suggest a coordinated attempt to weaken IGAD at a critical moment, especially as its mediation role in Sudan remains indispensable.
Eritrea’s limited institutional capacity and the decay of its state apparatuses have further undermined its ability to engage constructively with IGAD. Its highly militarized political economy, domination by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), indefinite national conscription, extensive human capital depletion, and shrinking diplomatic footprint have severely constrained meaningful participation in regional initiatives. Eritrea has remained absent from major IGAD programs, including the Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), climate adaptation and resilience strategies, and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which require routine data sharing, inter-agency coordination, and technical engagement.
Eritrea has similarly refused to engage in regional migration governance frameworks despite being one of the largest sources of forced migrants in the Horn of Africa. UNHCR and IOM data consistently indicate that Eritreans represent a disproportionately large share of asylum seekers across the IGAD region, the Middle East, and Europe, primarily driven by indefinite conscription and pervasive political repression. This ongoing outflow of people directly undermines regional efforts to manage displacement and migration collaboratively and imposes disproportionate humanitarian and administrative burdens on neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia.
Eritrea’s disengagement also extends to regional economic and trade facilitation mechanisms, intra-regional trade, transport infrastructure development, customs harmonization, and regional value-chain programs promoted under IGAD. Its restrictive trade regime, limited private sector activity, and absence from these initiatives have hindered the development of economic interdependence, a critical pillar of functional regionalism. Moreover, Eritrea’s closed-door policy regarding the Port of the Red Sea and Massawa, coupled with a lack of transparency in port governance and maritime cooperation, has constrained its integration into regional maritime security, logistics, and trade frameworks. This inward-looking posture contrasts sharply with IGAD’s growing emphasis on Red Sea security, blue economy cooperation, and coordinated responses to geopolitical competition in the corridor.
Against this backdrop, Eritrea’s assertion that it played a central role in revitalizing IGAD is untenable. IGAD’s institutional architecture is built on cooperative burden-sharing among member states, with subsidiary organs and specialized programs distributed across the region to ensure functional specialization and collective responsibility. The IGAD Secretariat is headquartered in Djibouti and serves as the executive body responsible for coordinating regional projects and programs. Several specialized institutions and programs operate in other member states; the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and the Security Sector Program (ISSP) are hosted in Ethiopia; the Climate Predication and Applications Centre (ICPAC) and the Centre for Pastoral Area and Livestock Development (ICPALD) are based in Kenya; and other offices, such as the IGAD South Sudan Office, support priority processes in Juba. Additionally, IGAD maintains field presences relevant to its regional mandate, including engagement related to the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Somalia (RESGAS) Mission, with operational activities coordinated in Somalia, and the Sheikh Technical Veterinary Schools.
Eritrea, by contrast, has not hosted any significant regional or continental organization beyond routine bilateral diplomatic missions. Its political engagement with IGAD has been minimal; it has frequently sent low-level delegations, abstained from meetings, and even after its readmission in 2023, demonstrated poor attendance. Moreover, Eritrea has repeatedly failed to meet its financial obligations under IGAD’s legal framework, reflecting a consistent pattern of non-compliance.
Eritrea’s purported justification for withdrawal on the grounds of institutional reform is equally unconvincing. Eritrea neither participated meaningfully in negotiations to replace the 1996 Agreement with the 2023 Treaty Establishing IGAD nor ratified the new treaty. It submitted no reform proposals during the negotiation process, undermining any claim of good faith engagement and exposing its reform narratives as politically expedient rather than substantive.
Procedurally speaking, Eritrea’s withdrawal is legally defective under IGAD legal framework. Article 54(1) of the Treaty Establishing IGAD requires a written notice of withdrawal at least one year in advance to the Executive Secretary. Eritrea’s unilateral announcement through a note verbale fails to meet this legal requirement. Historically, IGAD has exercised restraint and institutional goodwill toward Eritrea to preserve regional cohesion; Eritrea has now exploited that goodwill to portray IGAD as illegitimate and captured, as stated in its December 12, 2025 communique.
In sum, Eritrea’s withdrawal from IGAD depicts not institutional failure, but a deliberate state policy rejecting regional cooperation, legal accountability, and collective security. By prioritizing isolation, coercion, and unilateralism, Eritrea imposes significant risks on the stability of the Horn of Africa, undermining regional peace and cooperation.
As a recommendation, to safeguard IGAD’s institutional integrity and regional stability, member states must unequivocally reaffirm their commitment to the organization’s core objectives, ensuring timely financial contributions and proactive participation in all initiatives and programs. IGAD should rigorously enforce its treaty provisions, enhance operational resilience through diversified programs hosting and advancing digital coordination, and maintain full transparency through regular reporting on institutional achievements, while sustaining impartial dialogue with all members. Coordinated diplomatic measures are imperative to counter any attempts by withdrawing or non-compliant states to weaken the organization. Simultaneously, advancing intra-regional trade, transport infrastructure, port governance, and economic integration will strengthen mutual interdependence and reduce incentives for unilateral withdrawal.
Member states must present a unified stance in continental and global forums to protect IGAD’s legitimacy and credibility as the principal platform for collective peace, security, and development in the Horn of Africa. In this parlance, Eritrea’s withdrawal and its destabilizing activities must be publicly condemned, with clear diplomatic and political messaging that such actions are incompatible with regional cooperation. Member states should also demonstrate their readiness to stand firmly with IGAD, sending an unambiguous signal that attempts to undermine the organization will not be tolerated and that collective action in defense of regional stability remains a shared and binding responsibility.
Amanuel Tadesse is an expert in International Law and Foreign Relations, with professional interests spanning international law, peace and security, international organizations, foreign policy, political affairs, transboundary and water law.
Contributed by Amanuel Tadesse
