The legitimacy of any election rests on the extent to which the environment it is held under is free, fair and democratic. An enabling environment presupposes the existence of conditions where political parties can organize freely, candidates can campaign without fear, voters can access information and polling stations safely, the media can operate independently, and civil society can observe and participate without obstruction. In Ethiopia today, these conditions cannot be assumed; they must be carefully examined and honestly reported. Ongoing armed conflicts, restrictions on political activity in some regions, and persistent allegations of arbitrary detention and intimidation raise serious questions about electoral readiness.

As the constitutionally mandated body responsible for administering elections, NEBE has both a legal obligation and a moral responsibility to assess these realities and communicate its findings to the public. Silence or ambiguity would not be neutral acts; they would risk eroding public confidence and inviting speculation, polarization, and mistrust. Ethiopians deserve to know whether the circumstances allow them to exercise their democratic rights meaningfully, or whether extraordinary measures—including postponement or phased elections—may be necessary to preserve the integrity of the process.

Crucially, such an assessment must be credible. This means it cannot be confined to internal deliberations or selective consultations. NEBE must engage widely with political parties across the spectrum, regional electoral offices, civil society organizations, media institutions, security bodies, traditional and religious leaders, women’s and youth groups, and communities in conflict-affected areas. An assessment that excludes dissenting voices or marginalized regions would be fundamentally flawed and would fail to capture the lived realities of millions of voters.

Transparency is equally essential. The methodology, criteria, and findings of the assessment should be made public. Ethiopians should understand what benchmarks NEBE uses to define an enabling environment, how data is collected, and what risks have been identified. Transparency does not weaken institutions; it strengthens them by inviting scrutiny and building trust. In a deeply polarized political climate, openness is one of the few tools available to counter misinformation and conspiracy narratives that thrive in the absence of credible information.

Informing the public is also a matter of institutional independence. NEBE’s credibility depends on its ability to act—and be seen to act—free from political pressure. Publicly communicating its assessment is essential to enable the Board convey the message that electoral integrity, not political expediency, guides its decisions. This is particularly important in Ethiopia’s context, where past elections have been marred by boycotts, uneven participation, and disputes over fairness. A forthright assessment would signal a break from past practices and demonstrate a commitment to democratic norms.

There are also important preventive benefits to public disclosure. A clear-eyed assessment can serve as an early warning system, identifying gaps that can still be addressed before election day. If certain regions lack security, targeted interventions can be planned. If legal or administrative barriers are restricting political competition, reforms can be prioritized. If trust deficits are identified, confidence-building measures can be undertaken. Concealing or downplaying problems, by contrast, ensures that they will surface later in more destabilizing forms.

Some may argue that publicly acknowledging an insufficient enabling environment could undermine confidence or embolden spoilers. This concern misunderstands the source of legitimacy. Confidence does not come from optimistic declarations detached from reality; it comes from honesty and accountability. Pretending conditions are adequate when they are not would only guarantee that the election’s outcome is contested and its legitimacy questioned. In fragile democracies, flawed elections are often more destabilizing than delayed ones.

International partners and observers are also watching closely. Ethiopia’s electoral process carries implications beyond its borders, influencing diplomatic relations, development cooperation, and regional stability. A transparent assessment by NEBE would not signal weakness; it would demonstrate maturity and responsibility. It would also provide a factual basis for international engagement that respects Ethiopia’s sovereignty while supporting democratic standards.

Ultimately, the question is not whether elections should be held at all costs, but whether they should be held with integrity. NEBE’s duty is not to the electoral calendar alone, but to the Ethiopian people and their constitutional right to genuine political participation. If the Board is to make a meaningful contribution towards ensuring that the 7th general elections, whenever and however they are held, contribute to peace, legitimacy, and democratic renewal rather than deepening division, it has no option but to undertake a credible, inclusive, and transparent assessment and by informing the public of its conclusions.

In a moment of national uncertainty, honesty is not a risk; it is a necessity.

The incidents have been reported along the route stretching from Edna Mall to the area commonly known as Haya Hulet, where telecom cables including used plastic tubes and metal parts embedded in concrete pipes have been removed from construction sites.

Observers say the looting has become a regular occurrence since road works began, intensifying over the past month.

Eyewitnesses described groups of organized youths, homeless children, and garbage collectors working together to remove and transport the materials, often without interruption. According to residents, the activity occurs from morning until late at night, sometimes while construction work is ongoing.

A resident familiar with the area told The Reporter that some security officers have allegedly facilitated the practice by negotiating with looters, particularly during nighttime hours.

“The bargaining mostly happens at night,” the resident said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “There are security officers who have received bribes ranging from 30,000 to 280,000 Birr.”

The same source said sections of the copper cables and plastic tubes are sold at prices ranging between 800 to 1,000 Birr, depending on size and condition. The Reporter also observed young people and destitute children breaking concrete pipes on-site to extract metal components while construction crews continued their work nearby.

Local business owners say the theft has become a daily sight along the corridor.

“It looks like no one cares enough to stop it or even question what is happening,” said a shop owner who operates near the construction area. “Construction workers dig the ground, looters collect the cables and damaged plastic tubes, and security forces look the other way as if nothing is happening.”

A source told The Reporter that Ethio telecom initially transported heavy copper cables in four rounds at the start of the road construction. According to the source, the company later halted the transportation.

When contacted to verify the incident, Ethio telecom Chief Communication Officer, Mesay Woubshet, said the institution was not aware of the reported theft. He stated that, given the scale of the corridor projects underway across the city, the incident could be an “isolated case”.

Mesay added that Ethio telecom works through a joint committee with the project owner and the City Administration during ongoing projects to prevent related problems.

“We have a committee working with the City Administration and the project executor to avoid related issues, as similar incidents have always been a threat, even before the start of the corridor project,” he told The Reporter.

He added that incidents involving the theft of the company’s materials are not new.

“Looting of our materials is not new. In some cases, we have found ourselves in the middle of shootings while trying to protect our assets,” he said.

Mesay noted that his office does not have clear information about the specific incident reported in the area, adding that the company usually deploys security personnel in locations where such risks are anticipated.

While the organization maintains that it lacks sufficient details about the incident, observers say similar cases have been reported in different parts of the city during the implementation of the corridor project.

The Ethiopian corridor project has been underway for three years, with the Addis Ababa City Corridor Project launched in December 2022. The project aims to upgrade key routes and improve connectivity in the capital.

The first phase was completed in September 2024, while the second phase began in October 2024, covering 132 kilometers and 2,817 hectares of urban development to enhance infrastructure and public spaces.

Tackling the core challenges of access to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) is no one man show. What ought to be a basic human right is a far-fetched reality for so many communities in Ethiopia. The 2023 Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) report indicates that in Ethiopia only 56% of the population has access to clean water, while just 10% have basic sanitation and 6% hygiene services.

Despite the progress attained over the years, Ethiopia continues to face a critical gap in WASH service delivery. Poor WASH management systems, lack of appropriate technologies, limited technical capacity, and rising climate impacts continue to worsen the provision as well as sustainability of WASH services. The country faces a 55% funding gap in the sector requiring US$2.2 billion annually to meet Sustainable Development Goal 6 by 2030.

Established in 1981 and operational in Ethiopia since 1983, WaterAid Ethiopia has been one of the international Non-Government Organizations working towards ending the water, sanitation and hygiene crisis in the country.  The organization has so far reached more than six million people in the country with WASH services.

Building on the gains and excellences, the Country Programme, has chosen two priorities for the strategy period of 2023-2028.   

1. Achieving universal, sustainable WASH services in targeted geographic areas and strengthening communities’ resilience to climate change to influence wider change
2. Strengthen the resilience of WASH to climate change

For effective achievement of these priorities/aims, WaterAid Ethiopia employs system strengthening as a core approach with five key aspects that cut across the Aims: service delivery and capacity strengthening, influencing, partnership and alliances, gender equality and social inclusion, and evidence, learning and innovation. The organization also uses evidence from projects to inform national policy discussions and influence broader sector reforms.

Our Presence in the Amhara Region

The Amhara Regional State of Ethiopia is no exception in facing the dire challenges of access to WASH services and climate impacts. WaterAid Ethiopia maintains a strong presence in the region, implementing several rural and urban WASH projects for decades. Among WaterAid’s notable interventions:

• The WASH for small scale coffee producing farmers project, aimed at improving the lives of small-scale coffee growers in Jabi Tehnan Woreda, was funded by the Allegra Foundation and OKF. The project has improved access to WASH services for more than 32,000 people while also incorporating climate resilience into WASH systems.
• With the funding obtained from Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, WaterAid Ethiopia in partnership with Millennium Water Alliance (MWA), has also implemented the project ‘Sustainable Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Program’ (SWP) from 2019 to 2024 in North Mecha, Dera, and Farta Woredas.

“I don’t have children to help me with fetching water, and having a tap water means the world to me and I am beyond grateful.”

Worknesh Gebre Yohannes

Resident of Ambo Mesk

The country Programme has intensified its efforts to strengthen climate-resilient WASH services across the region.

WaterAid recently completed a watershed management project in Kurt Bahir Kebele of North Mecha Woreda. The ‘Implement watershed management and restoration to improve water supply and livelihoods in a degraded watershed in the Tana sub-basin, project was funded by the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation through Millenium Water Alliance (MWA) and the World Resources Institute (WRI).

The project rehabilitated degraded land in the kebele, restored water sources, and improved local livelihoods through natural-resource conservation and community engagement.

“You can see a very vivid and big change in the land, the environment feels refreshing and in the downstream areas, wetlands have reemerged, and the community are now accessing surface water.”

Molla Arega

Farmer/Chair of Watershed Committee

From Taps to Policy

WaterAid Ethiopia is currently implementing a new project titled “From Taps to Policy: A Multifaceted Approach for Sustainable Water Service Delivery” in North Mecha and South Achefer woredas. The project aims to strengthen the resilience of community water supply systems against climate impacts through infrastructure enhancements, water quality monitoring, stakeholder capacity building, and greater inclusion of women and youth in leadership roles in water schemes management. The project seeks to improve national policies, prioritize WASH investment, and promote system-wide approaches for sustainable water management through evidence-based advocacy. 

‘From Taps to Policy’ aligns closely with the government’s safe water strategy, which focuses on community ownership, capacity building, and sustainable water management practices. Using a system change approach to increase access to WASH services, the project promotes sustainable water management by strengthening climate resilience, mainstreaming climate resilient water safety planning and inclusivity across communities, in due course informing policies for dedicated financing.

Targeted utilities were provided with training on Water Safety Plan (WSP) development, climate smart agriculture to boost productivity, climate change resilience and adaptation mechanisms, and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

As part of the project’s goal, WaterAid has also supported the formation of a Women’s Solidarity Group in both woredas, equipping them with all the necessary skills and resources to take leadership roles in planning, oversight, and maintenance of community water services.

Tirualem Agumas, 23, is a resident of Lalibela Kebele, South Achefer Woreda and a Facilitator of the Women’s Solidarity Group and WASH Committee. She has been serving as an Operator for the last 3 years.

“I was selected to lead the Women’s Solidarity Group by the WaterAid Ethiopia based on the selection criteria in my kebele. We took trainings on gender and social inclusion, waste management, safe water collection, storage and latrine management. After these trainings, we were able to explore what challenges us as women to take a meaningful part in WASH management and later we drafted the Women Solidarity Group guideline. Even though breaking the cultural and other barriers is hard, most women are willing to take the chance if the opportunity is provided. I have completed all the 8 sessions, and now I am providing the training to 14 other women in my kebele.”  

Tirualem Agumas, facilitator/leader of the Women’s Solidarity Group and WASH Committee

Lalibela Kebele, South Achefer Woreda

Bridging the Finance and Policy Gaps

Ethiopia’s national efforts to integrate climate resilience into WASH and other development initiatives including the Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy, the National Adaptation Plan (NAP), and the National Determinant Contributors (NDC) underline the country’s commitment to addressing climate shocks. However, WASH financing remains a bottleneck. The Ethiopian WASH Finance Strategy aims to mobilize between US$ 0.5 to 1.27 billion per annum to help close the significant funding gap in the sector.

WaterAid has been playing a critical role in resolving the WASH policy and finance gaps through

• Evidence generation
• Strengthening government capacity in planning, executing and budgeting of CR-WASH initiatives
• Mobilizing local communities
• Actively engaging in national and global advocacy platforms such as the Conference of the Parties (COP), Regional Climate Weeks, One WASH National Program and TESDU Ethiopia
• Maintaining high-level policy engagement, creating media and public awareness and fostering strong sector coordination.

Call for Strategic Collaboration

WaterAid calls for strategic collaboration among government, development partners, and civil society organizations to urge increased financing, sector prioritization, and improved service management to ensure sustainable and climate-resilient WASH services for communities across the country.

WaterAid Ethiopia remains committed to expanding its impact in Amhara, Oromia regions and beyond, with the aim of achieving Universal access to safe and sustainable WASH services in North Mecha and Gimbuchu Woredas to replicate proven models nationwide.

Gambella’s fragility can be traced to a long history of marginalization. Despite its strategic location along the South Sudan border and its immense agricultural and ecological potential, the region has remained one of Ethiopia’s least developed. Infrastructure is limited, access to education and health services is uneven, and employment opportunities are scarce. This chronic underdevelopment has created fertile ground for resentment, particularly among youth who see little stake in the political or economic order. When violence erupts, it is often an expression of accumulated grievances rather than spontaneous hostility. Ethiopia’s ethno-centric federalism, while designed to empower local communities, has also arguably contributed to Gambella’s instability. The region is home to diverse groups, most notably the Anuak and Nuer, whose relationships have been shaped by historical competition over land, political representation, and access to resources. Administrative boundaries and power-sharing arrangements have sometimes hardened ethnic identities, turning political competition into zero-sum contests. When institutions fail to manage these tensions fairly, disputes over governance quickly take on an ethnic dimension, escalating local disagreements into broader communal confrontations.

The proximity of Gambella to South Sudan adds another layer of complexity. Decades of conflict across the border have produced massive refugee flows, arms proliferation, and cross-border ethnic ties that blur the line between domestic and regional insecurity. While Ethiopia has shown remarkable generosity in hosting refugees, the strain on local resources and services has been significant. In the absence of robust integration and support mechanisms, competition over land, water, and livelihoods have predictably spilled into violence. The circulation of small arms and the militarization of local actors have further increased the lethality of conflicts that might otherwise have been contained.

State presence in Gambella has often been inconsistent and overly securitized. Periods of neglect have alternated with heavy-handed interventions that focus on short-term control over long-term trust-building. Security forces are frequently deployed after violence has already erupted, rather than as part of a sustained preventive strategy. This reactive approach undermines public confidence and reinforces perceptions that the state is either absent or biased. When communities believe that justice will not be delivered through formal institutions, they turn to self-defense and retaliation, perpetuating cycles of violence. Land policy has further played a critical role in shaping tensions. The region’s fertile land has attracted large-scale agricultural investments, often implemented without adequate consultation with local communities. Displacement, loss of customary land rights, and environmental degradation has intensified feelings of dispossession. For communities whose livelihoods and identities are closely tied to land, such disruptions are not merely economic but existential. Without transparent and inclusive land governance. development initiatives risk becoming drivers of conflict rather than engines of stability.

Addressing the conflict in Gambella therefore requires a fundamental shift in approach. Though ramping up security measures may be necessary to stop immediate violence, they are incapable of supplanting political solutions. The long-term answer lies in rebuilding trust between communities and the state, and among communities themselves. This begins with inclusive dialogue that acknowledges historical grievances and creates space for locally grounded conflict-resolution mechanisms. Traditional elders, women, youth, and religious leaders must be meaningfully involved, not treated as symbolic participants in externally driven processes. Equally important is institutional reform. Regional governance structures must be strengthened to ensure fair representation, accountability, and the rule of law. Disputes over political power should be resolved through transparent processes as opposed to informal bargains or coercion. Law enforcement and judicial institutions need capacity-building and oversight so that justice is not only done but seen to be done, regardless of ethnic affiliation.

Economic development must also be reimagined. Investment in Gambella should prioritize local livelihoods, sustainable agriculture, and job creation, particularly for youth. Land policies must respect customary rights and ensure that communities benefit directly from development projects. When people see tangible improvements in their daily lives, the appeal of violence diminishes.

Gambella’s challenges cannot be separated from regional dynamics. Coordinated cross-border cooperation with South Sudan, focusing on arms control, refugee support, and conflict prevention, is essential. As such Ethiopia’s federal government must work closely with regional authorities and international partners to ensure that Gambella is treated as a central component of national stability, not as a peripheral concern.

The conflict in Gambella is a warning; it should not be viewed as an inevitability. It reflects the costs of neglect, exclusion, and reactive governance. A durable peace will not come from the barrel of a gun or from temporary calm imposed by force. It will come from addressing the systemic factors that have long undermined trust and cohesion. If everyone who has the welfare of Ethiopia and its people is serious about building a stable and inclusive future, Gambella must be understood not as a remote frontier, but as a test of the country’s commitment to justice, equity, and shared citizenship.

Seven years later, however, the optimism that defined the premier’s first months in office has been tempered, if not eclipsed, by a troubling reversal. A December 2025 report by The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, a joint initiative of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), as well successive reports by the state-appointed Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and other human rights advocates capture the starkness of this transformation. The reports document a sustained crackdown on activists, journalists, and civil society organizations, painting a picture that contrasts sharply with the reformist narrative that once earned global praise for the Prime Minister’s administration.

The story of Ethiopia’s human rights landscape since 2018 is not linear. It is a story of two radically different trajectories: one of early expansion of freedoms, and another of painful contraction as conflict and political fragmentation reshaped the state’s calculus of power. Understanding this duality is essential to charting a path forward. Prime Minister Abiy’s initial reforms were not superficial. They were sweeping and transformative enough to earn him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize. Prisons were opened. Exiled opposition figures returned. Media outlets flourished. Civil society organizations began to breathe after years of suffocation under a restrictive legal regime. The digital space exploded with new voices, activism, and political engagement.

But beneath the surface, Ethiopia remained a nation layered with unresolved structural tensions characterized by ethno-centric federalism without consensus, competing nationalisms, deep historical grievances, and a security apparatus long accustomed to impunity. Though the opening of political space engendered hopes, it also unleashed rivalries that the state was ill-prepared to mediate peacefully. The outbreak of the Tigray conflict in November 2020 marked a definitive turning point. During the two-year war Ethiopia witnessed some of the gravest human rights violations in its modern history. Reports by international and local human rights organizations—detailing mass atrocities, sexual violence, forced displacement, and arbitrary detention, among others—have left deep scars on the national conscience. Other regions, from Oromia to Amhara to Benishangul Gumuz, have endured cycles of violence that continue to claim lives and displace communities.

It is in this volatile political environment that the crackdown on human rights defenders intensified. Despite the government’s strenuous denial, its actions reveal a pattern of harassment, surveillance, arbitrary arrests, digital intimidation, and administrative restrictions targeting those who document abuses or challenge official narratives. The country that once applauded dissent as part of its democratic rebirth has increasingly framed criticism as a threat to stability or sovereignty. Journalists have been detained on allegations of disinformation or terrorism. Civil society organizations reporting on conflict-related abuses face bureaucratic stonewalling or threats. Regional authorities, empowered by emergency measures, have arrested activists with little or no legal process. Once a space for vibrant debate, social media have increasingly become a battleground of state monitoring and aggressive content manipulation.

This deterioration cannot be divorced from Ethiopia’s broader crisis of governance. The state is confronted with enormous challenges: rebuilding communities shattered by war, managing deep-seated political fractures, stabilizing an economy strained by inflation and debt, and navigating a volatile regional environment. Yet none of these challenges justify the suppression of human rights defenders. On the contrary, their work is indispensable to rebuilding trust, exposing truth, and preventing future abuses. Human rights are not luxuries to be suspended during instability; they are the foundation of any path back to stability. Ethiopia’s recent history is itself proof of this. Where civic space shrinks, conflict thrives. Where voices are silenced, grievances harden. Where accountability evaporates, the seeds of future violence are sown.

As Human Rights Day is observed across the world, the government has an opportunity and indeed an obligation to reaffirm its early promises by resetting its relationship with civil society and human rights defenders. This requires concrete steps: ending arbitrary detentions; ensuring due process; protecting journalists; enabling independent investigations into wartime and peacetime abuses; reforming security institutions; and creating political space for dissent, advocacy, and dialogue. International partners, for their part, must support—not supplant—domestic efforts for justice and political reconciliation, while consistently insisting that human rights remain non-negotiable.

Ethiopia is not condemned to repeat the cycles of its past. The aspirations that the 2018 reforms gave rise to have not disappeared; they have merely been overshadowed. They can be rekindled if the country recommits to a human rights agenda grounded in accountability, openness, and the protection of those courageous enough to defend the dignity of others. The celebration of Human Rights Day should serve not as a symbolic gesture, but as a reminder that if Ethiopia’s future is to be peaceful, democratic, and united it depends on safeguarding the very freedoms that once inspired a nation and the world.

Askari is one half of a joint venture with Hong Kong Xingxu Mining International Investment Co. Ltd undertaking exploration work for a copper and gold project in western Ethiopia. Hong Kong Xingxu, through its parent company Shining Star, was also involved in a USD 300 million copper mining project in Angola.

With their combined technical expertise, capital, and skill leverages, the two companies envisage the rapid realization of the Nejo Gold and Copper Project in the Oromia region, which D’Anna says can serve as an example for Ethiopia’s commercial-scale mining ambitions.

Askari is also interested in lithium, tin, tantalum, rubidium, rare earth metal pegmatites, and D’Anna argues Ethiopia should responsibly exploit its mineral wealth as a pillar of development. He notes that global mining giants are eyeing Ethiopia as the government moves ahead with its liberalization efforts, particularly in banking.

In an interview with The Reporter, D’Anna observes immense potential and argues that Ethiopia’s mining sector is at the beginning of a transition that he says hinges on reconciling gaps between federal and regional governments, nurturing investors, and installing certified refining and  smelting plants to grow local employment, skills transition and curb illicit outflow. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Could you give us an overview of your projects in Ethiopia and Namibia?

Gino D’Anna: We have been operational in Namibia for three years now. Our project is 400 square kilometers of continuous tenure, adjacent to an operating tin mine. It has prospects for lithium, tin, tantalum, rubidium, and rare metal pegmatites. We have done extensive drilling, trenching, geophysics and soil surveys. We are looking to finalize our next phase of drilling as we seek to declare our maiden JORC (2012) mineral resource in the next 12 months.

In Ethiopia, our focus here is the Nejo project. It is on the same greenstone belt as Kurmuk mine, which is 3.4 million ounces. It surrounds the Tulu Kapi mine, which is 1.7 million ounces. For us, it is a flagship project as it contains high-grade gold and copper. There has been a lot of drilling, trenching and geophysics work done there. But these works are close to three decades old in some cases; there is no modern exploration done for the area. So we’ve deployed modern techniques and expertise for the Nejo project. It is 1,200 square kilometers. We are approaching it with multiple exploration disciplines technically in parallel with each other. We are currently focused on drilling on southern mineralised corridor zones, extensional trenching, as well as magnetic geophysical surveys, particularly on our copper targets. We are utilizing drone technology to map variations in mineralization, and also using spectral satellite imagery to advance target generation. We are also bringing in the expertise of what we have been doing in Namibia to Ethiopia in terms of modern exploration.

When do you expect to finalize exploration and proceed to the mining development stage?

This is the first modern exploration work at Nejo, since the last exploration was done for Nejo over two decades ago. We expect to reach preliminary results within 12 months by declaring our maiden JORC (2012) mineral resource. There will then be technical and economic feasibility works, as well as environmental feasibility assessments. In terms of finalizing the exploration works and beginning mining development works, we estimate anywhere between 12 to 24 months. After finalizing exploration, identifying operational environment constraints and studying the different landscapes, going operational will take three to four years from there.

We will also work on copper reserves in the northern zone of the license area; antimony, platinum, palladium and rare earth mineral potentials in the area also exist which haven’t been followed up. There is also the historical Yubdo platinum, palladium reserve. Askari is investing to uncover and refine all the data and information for these minerals.

Several foreign mining companies, including others from Australia and Canada, have acquired licenses and concessions in Ethiopia. However, none have managed to go operational despite trying for several years and extending their license terms. This can be attributed to a number of factors, but how do you plan to maneuver these challenges?

Fundamentally and historically, Ethiopia has struggled to attract FDI, manage the expectations of western companies, and maintain FDI operations. There has been an extensive period of unrest and political instability in Ethiopia, which has actually now been dealt with under the current government operating with a regime that values the crucial role of mining in Ethiopia’s economic development.

The government is also opening up the economy, including opening up the banking sector. So there is a much easier flow of forex in the economy now. While Ethiopia’s mining industry is in its infancy, the government understands the crucial need for commercial-scale mining in Ethiopia. The government is also balancing the needs of local communities and artisanal operators. As mining areas in Ethiopia have historically undergone extensive artisanal mining, the government is now ensuring employment and financial benefits for them. Artisanal mining is good for locals as a short-term source of finance. But it is also full of danger. It is large-scale commercial mining which will highly benefit the economy.

Over the past weeks, Askari management has been discussing with high-ranking officials from federal and regional governments. Large-scale commercial mining has multi-generational benefits, and has potential to transform the economy, create more jobs, and generate revenue streams for government and community. Even after the mining is over, the company will redevelop the land and make it productive for the society.

Exploration takes capital and needs patience. It needs government protection. For Ethiopia, mining is not about gold and precious metals. Take GERD, which is a huge source of renewable energy power, but you need significant copper inventories to ensure the transmissions of the power. Ethiopia needs to explore more of its minerals that is necessitated by its developing economic sectors. That is why we are also working on copper production, to feed into the great economic initiatives of Ethiopia’s green initiatives.

Of course, there is a lot of work to be done to realize the fruits of the economic reforms underway at macro, structural, and sectoral levels. Especially once investment bankers start coming to Ethiopia following the banking sector open-up, that will be a powerful turning point in terms of unlocking huge finance for development. Once that powerful pillar trenches to Ethiopia’s economic standard, we will see a lot more western companies coming in. Government protection of FDI and mining investments is also crucial.

What are the terms of Askari’s joint venture with Hong Kong Xingxu, and what is the size of the investment?
We benefit from the partnership with Hong Kong. Askari brings modern technical skill, financial feasibility and expertise to the table. The parent company of Hong Kong, which is Shining Star, commissioned Angola’s only commercial-scale copper mine. They have been producing copper for about two months now. That is a USD 300 million dollar investment on their part. That is substantial.

On top of the strong relationship between Hong Kong and Shining Star, Askari has strong skills and expertise in gold exploration. Once Askari finalizes the technical exploration works, that is when Shining Star brings in the capital required for the gold and copper production stage, to construct, commission and start mining. That is where the importance of the partnership is. For the exploration work, we will spend around five million dollars on Nejo over the next twelve months. This initial exploration is crucial for the next stages of investment. Then tens of millions of dollars will be invested.

How do you view regulatory frameworks in Ethiopia and what kind of support does your company enjoy?

Our Nejo project is located in the Oromia Regional State. So you need a strong relationship with the Oromia Mineral Development Authority as well as the Oromia Mining Group. We have been developing this relationship for sometime now. We have also got support from the federal government in terms of the licensing process.

Part of a successful mining development in any country is cooperation among relevant stakeholders and discharging social responsibilities so as to manage the expectations of the community.

In Ethiopia, we are seeing there is a lot of crossover between the federal and regional, although there is a need for the establishment of a clear line between. Directors at the federal level, including the prime minister’s office, promote commercial-scale mining. This also needs to be reconciled with regions’ tendency to promote small-scale and artisanal mining. The boundaries can be strengthened through cooperation. But at the end of the day, as a foreign company operating in another jurisdiction, my view is that you have to seamlessly align and operate with federal and regional officials, and local communities. So you have to earn a high level of respect and collaboration across all stakeholders at federal, regional, and local. The project must benefit the government and also local communities.

Askari recently acquired all of Hong Kong Xingxu’s issued capital for the Nejo project. How do you compare Ethiopian legal frameworks with other countries, in terms of the legal procedures surrounding share swapping agreements?

The structure of the agreement is called a share-swapping joint venture. Askari enjoys the benefits of the operational, technical, and financial leverages it brings to the Nejo project. At the same time, we get the exposure to what Hong Kong did successfully in Angola through Shining Star. In turn, Hong Kong and Shining Star get the skills and expertise of what we have done in Namibia and Tanzania. So it is pretty much a symbiotic relationship where each party relies on each other for different skills and leverages.

As far as corporate legal issues are concerned, there was a misunderstanding of the relationship. This joint venture means a lot for the realization of the Nejo project. I have been here for weeks, meeting with high-level officials at federal and regional levels, and different department heads from different areas.

It enabled all stakeholders to be on the same page on how the Askari-Hong Kong joint venture has elevated the leverage to realize the exploration and mining potential of the Nejo project. As a CEO and founder of the company, I have also connected well with the officials and stakeholders across the board. I have briefed everyone on the leverages Askari brings, our aspirations and the kind of collaborations we are looking for—not only for this project but in a broader sense for future strategies.

Historically, the Nejo project has been overshadowed because of the absence of personal efforts, and also due to the disconnection between federal and regional governments and the original Hong Kong. Now, under the share swap joint venture agreement, Askari has been able to step into the shoes. So, the government at all levels now knows who is responsible for the work at each step to realize the Nejo project. So now everybody is comfortable to finalize the works to realize the project.

Initially, it was challenging because some stakeholders did not well understand the type of joint venture between Hong Kong and Askari. Now everyone is on the same page. The level of knowledge sharing, understanding and commitment between the companies and government is encouraging.

Australia is a global leader in mining in terms of output, skill, and technology. What can developing economies like Ethiopia learn from the likes of Australia and Canada?

I don’t think there is anything differently done in those countries. In countries like Australia and Canada, the role of mining in economic development is high on the agenda, and these countries have been practicing professional mining for decades. Mining in these countries offers huge opportunities, generates huge revenues, and contributes hugely to the general industry. That is where African countries can also look and extract lessons. African countries also need to look at each other, to learn what does not work. Ethiopia is pretty much at the beginning of transitioning to harvesting or strengthening its utilization of its mineral endowments. It has to look at the experiences of Australia. Look at Tanzania, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, and understand what worked in their jurisdictions and what did not, and what needs to be avoided.

My recommendation for developing countries is: learn from the experiences of neighboring countries. Learn what works and what does not, and balance between immediate benefits and multi-generational benefits. Also learn how the government protects investments at all levels.

The Ethiopian government also needs to make sure investors are getting the support required to succeed. There is huge untapped mineral wealth in Ethiopia. It is not just gold; it is copper, platinum, silver, lithium, tantalum, antimony, palladium, and rare earth. Ethiopia has got everything. It just needs a safe way, and what works for everybody to come and invest. And ensure their investments are secure. For any investor to invest in foreign jurisdiction, securing the administrative support at all levels is crucial, not only operational support but also protection from losing your opportunities. Any failure is going to be very pronounced.

As Ethiopia continues to develop with an economy under reform, there are more opportunities and investment opportunities attracting western companies, and Ethiopia is open to these investments and opportunities.

Much of the minerals extracted from Ethiopia and its neighboring countries are smuggled out informally. The region also remains embroiled in conflict. How does illicit mining affect formally licensed investors, and how do you view the intertwined relationship between mining and protracted conflict?

Infrastructure is key here. The reason gold is smuggled often is because it is a high price environment. Smuggling is also visible in copper. This is because these minerals are also easily identifiable. The market is instant. Gold or copper smugglers get instant payment. The smugglers don’t pay tax. So illicit mining remains lucrative for many.

But if there are infrastructures like smelting plants, and proper incentives for all, all miners will be encouraged to do mining through the proper legal channels. If there are gold refining infrastructures, provision of technology and working capital; then everyone would be willing to sell their minerals though the proper channels. So, having certified and legal gold processing plants is crucial for countries like Ethiopia, Sudan and others, to curb gold smuggling. Then the certified gold from documented legal miners can be sold in the global market. Only having certified, documented gold can enable countries in conflict to export gold legally. Otherwise, it is labeled as conflict gold, which cannot enter the global market legally. Due to the absence of certified and internationally recognized gold smelting and other minerals processing plants in countries like Ethiopia, illicit mining has risen as an alternative venue. If Ethiopia manages to have its own gold and other mineral processing facilities, that will change the whole thing. That will take some time now, but that is where the real challenge lies.

There will always be a black market. That is because there is always opportunity and somebody is taking advantage of it. But if the government manages to reduce the flow of the black market, by putting in place infrastructures, more investors, and more initiatives, then the curve of the black market will decline.

Do you think more mining investors will come to Ethiopia as the banking sector opens?

Definitely. More capable foreign investment banks will come to Ethiopia, followed by big mining companies. If Askari succeeds in Ethiopia, then other companies will be encouraged—this is how investment works. Success stories matter to attract more FDI, which will hugely benefit the economy. That is sort of the thing the Ethiopian government is actively looking at the moment. Success stories matter for the global market, to showcase Ethiopia is open for business.

The conference reviewed the first strategy, which participants praised for its success and exemplary implementation.

Among those in attendance was OswellKahonde, who heads the Africa division for the Better Cash Alliance—a UN body tasked with supporting developing countries in transitioning from a cash-based economy to a digital financial system.

The Reporter caught up with Kahonde to get his thoughts on Ethiopia’s growing affinity for digital transactions, the Better Cash Alliance’s work in the country, and the dangers of digitalization without infrastructure. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Tell us about the Better Cash Alliance.

OswellKahonde: The Better Than Cash Alliance is a partnership of governments, corporates, and international organizations that have come together to accelerate the transition from cash to digital payments. We call it responsible digital payment.

Ethiopia is one of the members of the alliance. We are the secretariat of the alliance, which provides support to our members. We provide advisory, advocacy, and research support. The goal is digitizing the financial sector. Ethiopia joined the Better Than Cash Alliance in 2016. We partnered with NBE, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Innovation and Technology.

We helped Ethiopia to develop the first National Payment Strategy, which was launched in 2021 and finalized this year. We also supported its implementation. We are behind digital payment transitions across many countries. When we heard the NBE report on Ethiopia’s progress in digital payment, we were proud. For instance, during the implementation of the first strategy, we provided our experts who are seconded and working at NBE. We also continued to provide technical support.

We supported the design and implementation of regulatory and licensing frameworks for digital financial services and provided strategic advisory support to relevant stakeholders.

Reforming the financial sector is a national vision for the country. And the country is a member of the alliance. So we are employees of the UN, and governments have formed the UN. So we are employed by the governments.

Ethiopia just launched its second National Digital Payment Strategy. How do you evaluate Ethiopia’s progress and the challenges outstanding?

The Homegrown Economic Reform stipulates harnessing digital to accelerate economic reforms and realize development. For instance, the digital Ethiopia strategy talks about ecommerce. Then the digital payment strategy comes up with how we do it. So these strategies support the overall HGER agenda.

Digital is not just about technology. It is about everything. What Ethiopia demonstrated in the past years, is the importance of policy leadership. If you make the right policies, bring in the right regulations, innovative systems, and forge partnerships, that definitely leads to realizing your targets.

There were 32 actions stipulated in the first digital payment strategy. For the independent evaluation done, over 80 percent of the action targets are achieved. Some of them are at different stages but by and large, they are completed. So our task is to identify the gaps, and support the government to fill those gaps and bridge human capital needs. We also identify sectors that would drive change.

How do you assess the progress and contributions of digital payments on the economy as well as the downsides of digital transactions?

We have developed the UN principles to support digital payments. Member countries have to follow those principles to digitize their financial sectors. Once these principles are embedded in the digital journey, which is what Ethiopia is doing now, then solutions are developed, whether it is merchants, traders, or consumers. We design them in a way it benefits different brackets, but overall it aims to drive the overall economy.

Without digital payments, even if you roll out fancy policies, you cannot see progress. It has huge economic benefits. For example Africa’s youth population is estimated to be around 60 percent. The youth wants tech, so you need to deploy digital systems. So the youth can easily use the tech and digital systems to do business. For instance if you go to Rwanda, a lot of youth think out of the box and leverage digital systems. Efficiency, cost minimization, time-saving and productivity are just a few benefits of digital.

In 2018, people in Addis were lining up in queues to pay water bills. They try at the Lehulu centers. Today, the queues are gone. These are some of the conveniences digital payment is bringing in. People are now using the queue time for other business.

What are the potential downsides of digitization?

If it is not done with responsibility, digitization might have downsides. If it is not inclusive, it also divides. If you don’t have a phone, you cannot transact. If digital is made 100 percent mandatory, that would be irresponsible.

The digitization process in urban areas is on an uptick. But in rural areas, it is still at a nascent stage. So we need to invest more on the rural infrastructure so that we don’t leave the rural population behind. It also widens the gender gap, if digitization is implemented irresponsibly.

During the presentation today, the NBE governor mentioned women own phones less than men. The numbers are quite worrying. The financial inclusion says the gender gap in Ethiopia is widening; it is over 25pct and that is huge. If you compare it to countries like Ghana, it is around three or four percent.

We need to focus on those areas. We need to work on how to include the traditional banking system. How can informal economy operators be included in digitization? They are now out of the formal channels but they can be formalized through digital platforms, if we could put the right tools in place. Digitization is the perfect tool to formalize Ethiopia’s informal actors.

Africa has a large educated work force. Internet infrastructure has also been expanding. India built its economy capitalizing on its youth and digital entrepreneurship. They have a lot of fintechs and digital economy operators, with digital-oriented education and economic systems. Can African countries replicate this?

It is happening. Even here in Ethiopia, it is happening. Ethiopia has already started the journey. The journey started in 2020/1. Only a few years down the road, the progress in Ethiopia is really amazing. You do not see such fast progress in any other economy.

The digital payment transition that is happening in Ethiopia is so fast that is surprising every time for everyone. That is the evolution of the digital financial system. It is not instant, but it evolves.

Now there are over 50 million accounts for mobile money. That is huge. Ethiopia’s digital innovation also needs to target where there is large cash circulation on a daily basis. Digital payment infrastructures are crucial. If digital payment is not better than the cash-based system, nobody should be forced to use digital payment. For instance, if somebody has a mobile account but there is no connection, then cash is better for that context.

The Horn of Africa is among the world’s most geopolitically sensitive regions—straddling the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and crucial maritime chokepoints that carry a significant share of global trade. The global contest among major powers is increasingly manifested through port access, security partnerships, and economic influence across countries like Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern states, motivated by food security, trade corridors, and political influence, have deepened their involvement. For Ethiopia—Africa’s second-most populous country and a historic anchor of the continent—these shifts create both opportunities and vulnerabilities. Its geographic position offers possibilities to diversify partnerships and strengthen regional integration. Yet, it also exposes the country to heightened competition for influence and sometimes conflicting external agendas.

Historically, Ethiopia has been a pillar of collective security in Africa. From hosting the African Union headquarters to leading peacekeeping missions, its diplomatic identity has long been intertwined with multilateral engagement. Revitalizing this tradition is essential. Accordingly, it is incumbent on it to utilize such institutions as the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) as platforms through which it advances its vision for stability. While these institutions are imperfect, they nonetheless provide structured mechanisms for conflict prevention, dialogue, and cooperation, reducing the chances of disputes spiraling into open confrontation. Multilateralism also helps Ethiopia avoid overreliance on any single external actor. Maintaining equidistance among competing powers—whether in the Gulf, Europe, Asia, or the West—is instrumental in enabling the country preserve policy autonomy and widen its room for maneuver.

The region’s evolving landscape demands that Ethiopia ground its actions in strategic restraint and proactive diplomacy. Issues such as access to the sea—an understandable and legitimate national interest—must be pursued through patient negotiation, multilateral frameworks, and cooperative arrangements rather than through any bellicose rhetoric or initiatives that risk escalating tensions. With the Red Sea corridor already strained by the war in Yemen and the security vacuum in parts of Somalia, the expansion of foreign military bases, and fluctuating political alliances, even small missteps can lead to outsized consequences. A measured and predictable foreign policy is essential to prevent misunderstandings, reassure neighbors, and maintain Ethiopia’s credibility as a responsible regional actor. This does not mean though that Ethiopia should shirk from asserting its interests. Rather, assertion must be coupled with respect for international norms and a clear articulation of long-term objectives—especially regarding sea access and regional security cooperation.

The foundation of any sustainable geopolitical strategy must be economic strength. Ethiopia’s ability to influence regional dynamics rests foremost on stabilizing its domestic economy, attracting investment, and rebuilding vital infrastructure. Advancing regional trade integration, expanding cross-border energy and transportation networks, and developing shared economic corridors can create mutually reinforcing incentives for cooperation. At the same time, Ethiopia must continue working to ease internal political tensions and restore national coherence. Stability at home is not only a prerequisite for development; it is also a signal to regional partners that Ethiopia remains a predictable and constructive actor. Above all, Ethiopia must articulate a consistent and coherent national strategy that transcends momentary pressures and political fluctuations. The past decade has seen shifting foreign policy signals that sometimes undermined clarity. A stable strategy rooted in long-term interests, non-interference, balanced partnerships, regional integration, and strategic patience would allow it to better navigate an increasingly complex environment. Such clarity would reassure neighbors, mitigate external suspicion, and strengthen its negotiating position on all fronts.

Ultimately, Ethiopia’s future—and much of East Africa’s—will depend on decisions made today. In a region marked by heightened geopolitical competition and fragile political landscapes, Ethiopia has the opportunity to position itself as a steadying force. Grounding its policies in diplomatic wisdom, economic pragmatism, and renewed multilateral engagement will go a long way towards allowing the country to protect its national interests while contributing to a more stable and cooperative regional order. Prudence, not pressure, should define Ethiopia’s path forward, ensuring that its leadership reflects both its historical stature and its aspirations for a peaceful and prosperous East Africa.

The National Dialogue Commission (NDC) has conceded it cannot see out its mandate in the three months it has left, with its officials pointing to the failure to include Tigray and several opposition political parties as the primary reason for the shortcoming.

The Commission was established in late 2021 with the mandate to finalize the national dialogue process within a three-year period. The initial deadline passed last year, and Parliament voted to extend the period by a year.

Today, with less than three months to go, the Commission’s officials say that despite the extension and preparations, they have been unable to launch a full-fledged dialogue as hoped.

They cited the absence of representatives from the Tigray region and several opposition parties as a major flaw during an event this week which saw CSOs, religious institutions, and other stakeholders gather for an overview of the Commission’s progress.

Deputy Commissioner Hirut Gebreselassie told participants that a nationwide dialogue cannot take place within the remaining three months.

She stated that while the Commission has held talks and collected input from the TPLF, university professors in Tigray, CSOs, and human rights bodies, attempts to approach the current and previous interim administrations in Tigray for dialogue have been unsuccessful.

The initial deadline extension was granted by lawmakers under the assumption that the Commission’s work in Tigray would wrap up, but this has not transpired. Commission officials say conducting the dialogue with the public in Tigray remains impossible, making it difficult to launch the overarching national dialogue.

Professor Mesfin Araya, NDC commissioner, said “We have finalized collecting inputs from different communities and representatives across the country. We are also in the final stages of our preparations and ready to launch the greater national dialogue. However, we are unable to do that because Tigray, some political parties, and armed groups are not included. Including them is critical.”

“We have been communicating with the Red Cross, embassies and the international community to provide trust and guarantees for armed groups to participate in the national dialogue. The foundation has been laid so they can participate without repercussions. This will start when the government approves it,” said Mohammed Drir (Amb.), deputy commissioner.

Direct dialogue with any of the armed groups has not yet begun, according to him.

During this week’s discussion, participants asked the commissioners why the national dialogue is underway while the country is mired in political uncertainty and insecurity. They also asked how the dialogue and the upcoming elections will proceed simultaneously, and wanted to know which had more priority.

The Commission is set to present its progress to Parliament at the end of the three-month period, after which lawmakers can vote to prolong its existence for a second time.

For years, Ethiopians have watched public resources meant for education, health, infrastructure, and agriculture diverted into private pockets. What should have been a state that wields economic and political clout has been hollowed out from within by networks of patronage, opaque procurement systems, and a culture of impunity that shields those with connections. The result is a state where rules on paper bear little relation to practices on the ground—where it is often easier to pay a bribe than to obtain a legally entitled service, and where public office becomes less a vehicle for serving citizens and more an instrument for personal accumulation.

Corruption strikes hardest at ordinary people. Every stolen birr means a hospital or road that is never built, textbooks that never reach classrooms, or fertilizer that arrives late, overpriced, or adulterated. Petty corruption, meanwhile, forces citizens to navigate daily indignities and expenses: illegal payments for ID cards, school placements, or utility connections. The poor, who can least afford these hidden taxes, shoulder the heaviest burden. Corruption thus entrenches inequality and fuels social resentment, leaving citizens feeling alienated from a state they increasingly feel they can no longer trust.

The damage is not merely economic. Corruption corrodes the moral fabric of society. It creates a culture where success is measured not by hard work or innovation, but by whom one knows, what one can manipulate, or what one can illicitly extract. It fosters cynicism and hopelessness, especially among young people who see corruption as the primary currency through which opportunity is allocated. Ethiopia cannot expect political stability or national unity when many believe the system is rigged.

For businesses, corruption is a hidden tax that inflates costs, discourages competition, and deters investment. Investors who face unpredictable rules, arbitrary fees, or predatory bureaucrats either abandon projects or demand unrealistic returns to offset their risks. Meanwhile, honest Ethiopian entrepreneurs find themselves undercut by competitors who obtain contracts or permits through bribes rather than merit. The result is an economy that grows more slowly, creates fewer jobs, and rewards the wrong behaviors.

Despite these dangers, corruption has often been treated as an unfortunate but tolerable phenomenon—something to be lamented, but rarely confronted. Though Ethiopia has no shortage of laws, anti-corruption agencies, and audit institutions, their influence has been weak, inconsistent, or constrained by political interference. In some cases, anti-corruption campaigns have been used selectively, targeting certain officials while leaving others untouched. Such selective enforcement only deepens public skepticism and reinforces the belief that accountability is a tool for internal political battles rather than genuine reform.

If Ethiopia is to break this cycle, the fight against corruption needs to be systematic, impartial, and rooted in structural reform rather than episodic prosecutions. This calls for strong, independent oversight institutions with real authority, resources, and political protection. Anti-corruption bodies should not merely react to scandals; they should exert greater effort to prevent them by scrutinizing, among others, areas susceptible to corruption—procurement, licensing, and public financial management systems. Expanding the digitalization of government services would go some way towards reducing opportunities for bribery by minimizing human discretion. Transparency, not secrecy, must become the default setting of governance.

But institutional reform alone is not enough. The political leadership must model the integrity it demands of others. Anti-corruption efforts collapse when officials preach accountability while protecting allies or shielding themselves from scrutiny. The message from the top must be unmistakable: no one is above the law, and public office is a public trust. This requires courage, because corruption networks often have powerful patrons. Absent such resolve, no reform will endure. Civil society, the media, and citizens themselves must also play active roles. Whistle-blowers need legal protection. Journalists must be free to investigate and expose abuses without fear. And citizens should be empowered to report corruption through safe and anonymous channels. Public oversight, when combined with institutional reform, creates a powerful deterrent. Most importantly, anti-corruption efforts must be linked to broader economic and political reforms. When systems are opaque, excessively centralized, or burdened by heavy bureaucracy, corruption flourishes. Simplifying regulations, devolving authority responsibly, strengthening local accountability, and promoting competitive markets are sure to reduce incentives for graft.

The imperative is clear: Ethiopia cannot achieve peace, prosperity, or national cohesion unless it confronts corruption head-on. The nation’s future depends on restoring public trust and ensuring that resources serve the many rather than enriching the few. Corruption is not merely a moral failing—it is a development emergency, a security threat, and a barrier to the aspirations of millions. The time for half-measures is over. The country must choose integrity over impunity, transparency over secrecy, and justice over convenience. Its progress hinges on this choice—and history will judge its leaders by whether they had the courage to make it.