The case was brought forward by Human Rights First Ethiopia, a local civil society organization, which is seeking court orders compelling the defendants to ensure the safe return, security, and sustainable reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In its petition, submitted to the Federal High Court, the civil society organization asked the court to order the defendants to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons to their places of origin, establish conditions that guarantee security and protection for returnees, take concrete measures to ensure the practical implementation of return processes and ensure that returnees recover their homes and receive sustainable resettlement support.

The lawsuit argues that the rights violations stem from the defendants’ failure to fulfill their constitutional and international obligations.

According to the case file, following the outbreak of war in the Tigray region on December 3, 2020, citizens of Tigrayan origin were displaced from Western Tigray Zone and Shehet Woreda of the Afar Region.

The petition states that more than one million people remain unable to return to their homes and are currently living in temporary shelters and host communities in locations including Shiraro, Shire, Axum, Adwa, Tembien, Adigrat, Mekelle, and other areas across Tigray.

The plaintiff further reported that nearly 520,000 IDPs from Oromia are sheltering in Debre Birhan city and the North Wollo Zone of the Amhara region. It also states that more than 84,000 IDPs within Oromia remain displaced in temporary shelters or host communities within the region itself.

The organization said many displaced people are living in overcrowded shelters, schools, and open spaces, without adequate food, water, sanitation, shelter, or health services, exposing them to severe hunger, poverty, and psychological distress.

The case file also cites various constitutional and international obligations the defendants are obligated to fulfill, including the African Union Kampala Convention, ratified by Ethiopia in 2009, and formally approved by Parliament in February 2020.

According to the filing, all defendants are legally bound to implement the Convention’s provisions, which require them to ensure the voluntary return of IDPs, provide adequate security, and facilitate reintegration assistance.

The lawsuit alleges that the Amhara regional government, which currently administers areas from which Western Tigray IDPs were displaced, has prevented their return in violation of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of movement and residence. The petition claims this has subjected displaced citizens to years of suffering and hardship.

It further argues that the Tigray Interim Administration, under the Pretoria Peace Agreement, is obligated to work with federal authorities to prioritize the return of displaced persons. However, the organization alleges that political considerations were prioritized over humanitarian responsibilities.

Similarly, the Oromia Regional Government is accused of failing to facilitate the return and resettlement of displaced persons, both those displaced from the region and those internally displaced within Oromia, despite constitutional and legal obligations.

The case was presented to the Federal High Court this week, and the bench has scheduled a hearing for January 2, 2026, where judges will rule on whether the defendants are required to formally respond to the claims raised in the lawsuit, The Reporter learnt.

In an interview with The Reporter in May 2025, Tesfalem Berhe, director of Human Rights First Ethiopia, stated that the organization was finalizing preparations to file a court case against the government over the plight of internally displaced persons.

The 2025 edition of the Digital Progress and Trends Report places Ethiopia at the bottom tier globally, highlighting deep structural gaps in connectivity, computing power, data availability, and digital skills that threaten to widen economic and social inequality.

The report classifies Ethiopia as a low-income country underperforming on both dimensions of AI readiness, meaning it lacks not only the market size and infrastructure to develop AI technologies, but also the per-capita capacity needed to adopt and use AI across public services, businesses, and daily life.

“Low income countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya underperform on both scale and intensity, highlighting the need to invest in foundational enablers such as affordable and high-quality broadband, digital literacy, and workforce skills,” the report states.

The World Bank warns that countries with limited AI foundations risk becoming permanent consumers of foreign AI platforms, rather than creators or shapers of technology suited to local needs. Ethiopia’s small and fragmented digital market, combined with limited computing infrastructure and skills shortages, places it firmly in this vulnerable category.

According to the report, countries that lack sufficient AI “intensity” often see adoption confined to elite institutions or a few urban centers, leaving most of the economy untouched by productivity gains. For Ethiopia, this means AI deployment risks deepening urban-rural and income divides rather than closing them.

A central barrier identified is Ethiopia’s limited access to compute, including both domestic data centers and affordable cloud services. The report notes that data centers are capital- and energy-intensive, requiring stable electricity and high-quality internet connectivity—conditions that remain unreliable in many low-income countries.

More than 60 percent of developing countries face serious energy security challenges, undermining the viability of infrastructure investment, the report adds, citing International Energy Agency data. Without stable power and predictable regulation, Ethiopia risks being locked out of large-scale AI deployment.

Even where infrastructure exists, Ethiopia faces a scarcity of advanced digital and AI skills, according to the report’s analysis of workforce competency. Limited access to advanced training, under-resourced educational institutions, and ongoing brain drain to higher-income countries further weaken the country’s capacity to manage and adapt AI systems.

The World Bank cautions that AI systems require specialized, often tacit expertise to operate effectively, and without domestic capacity, countries risk dependency on external providers.

The report also flags language and data gaps as major constraints for countries like Ethiopia, where many local languages are underrepresented in global AI training data. Without localized datasets and models adapted to national contexts, AI tools risk excluding large segments of the population, particularly in education, agriculture, and public services.

“Without dedicated investments in local language models and culturally relevant interfaces, AI risks replicating and even reinforcing existing inequities,” the report warns.

The World Bank concludes that Ethiopia’s pathway to benefiting from AI lies not in frontier innovation, but in urgent investment in foundational enablers—reliable connectivity, affordable compute, robust data governance, and large-scale digital skills development.

Ethiopia hosted the presidents of Somalia and Kenya within days of each other as tensions resurfaced along Somaliland’s northern coast near Zeila, while Sudan’s war deepened further into what humanitarian agencies now describe as the world’s gravest humanitarian catastrophe. At the same time, drought warnings returned across the eastern Horn, reviving fears of another cycle of displacement and food insecurity.

Taken separately, each development may be construed as another episode in a region long accustomed to instability. But, taken together? Analysts say they point to something more consequential, that Ethiopia’s unresolved quest for reliable access to the Red Sea is no longer a dormant geopolitical concern, rather it is actively reshaping diplomatic alignments, security calculations, and humanitarian risks across the Horn of Africa.

“What has changed is not Ethiopia’s geography, but the pressure surrounding it,” said a Horn of Africa analyst speaking with The Reporter anonymously, as this week also saw Egypt stepping into the Red Sea equation with what seems to be full commitment.

The clearest signal indicating the Horn is undergoing a reordering and of the intensifications of the simmering pressures came not from Addis Ababa but from Cairo.

On December 25, The National, the UAE’s state-run daily newspaper based in Abu Dhabi, reported that Egypt had quietly concluded agreements to develop and upgrade two strategically located ports on the Red Sea: Assab in Eritrea and Doraleh in Djibouti.

Both ports lie near the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the southern gateway to the Red Sea and one of the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoints. According to sources cited by the paper, the agreements go beyond commercial upgrades and include the creation of berths capable of hosting warships, provisions for re-fuelling and resupplying Egypt’s southern fleet, as well as the option to deploy small but elite military contingents.

Egyptian officials reportedly view the deals as legitimizing an expanded military presence in both countries. Egyptian warships, sources say, are already frequent visitors.

For Ethiopia, the implications are immediate and uncomfortable. More than 90 percent of its maritime trade passes through Djibouti, particularly via Doraleh port.

A policy brief paper published last month by Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and authored by Mohammed Seid (PhD), an expert on the Middle East, reiterates that Ethiopia’s transition from a littoral to a landlocked state witnessed a fundamental shift from strategic autonomy to survival and this according to the paper has left the country to economic vulnerability, structural dependency and national security risk.

Analysts also contend that Egypt’s move this week inserts a rival strategic actor into Ethiopia’s most critical commercial artery at a time when relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa remain frozen over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Egypt has repeatedly framed Ethiopia’s dam as an existential threat to its water security and Cairo has consistently opposed any scenario in which landlocked states gain a territorial foothold on the Red Sea. Experts note that with negotiations over the GERD stalled for more than two years now, Cairo’s expanding Red Sea footprint signals a shift away from bilateral dam diplomacy and toward regional leverage. This broader contest over access, influence, and chokepoints now frames nearly every diplomatic interaction in the Horn.

Further south, reports emerged on December 16 of renewed tensions around Zeila, a historic port town on Somaliland’s northern coast near the Djibouti border. Somaliland-based media and regional security analysts spoke of heightened alert levels and diplomatic unease. Even as no formal Ethiopian military or commercial presence was announced, the response from Mogadishu was swift and unequivocal.

Somali officials reiterated their rejection of any unilateral arrangements involving Somaliland’s coastline, warning against actions that could undermine Somalia’s territorial sovereignty. The statements were familiar, but the timing was not accidental.

As of now there are no official documents or statements indicating that Zeila is Ethiopia’s primary commercial objective. That distinction still belongs to Berbera, Somaliland’s most developed port and the centerpiece of Ethiopia’s earlier memorandum of understanding with Somaliland authorities.

Yet Zeila’s symbolism appears potent. It sits at the intersection of unresolved regional fault lines: Somalia’s fragmented sovereignty, Somaliland’s long-standing bid for recognition, Djibouti’s strategic sensitivities, and Ethiopia’s determination to reduce its reliance on a single maritime corridor.

For Addis Ababa, the issue is existential rather than opportunistic. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been landlocked, depending overwhelmingly on Djibouti for maritime access. Every disruption of any kind including political, logistical, or financial has reinforced a consensus within Ethiopia’s security and economic establishment that redundancy is no longer optional.

As Costantinos Berhe (PhD), a seasoned economic and political analyst, put it, “There is nothing definitive or conclusively established at this point. We have not heard that the Somaliland project has been cancelled.”

He notes that although Somaliland is not a formally recognized state, it has existed independently for over 30 years and has demonstrated a relatively strong democratic system.

“Moreover, it has remained separate from Somalia itself,” he told The Reporter. “Therefore, the understanding [MoU]  Ethiopia reached with Somaliland does not appear to have been annulled. Certainly, Somalia has repeatedly lodged objections, but we have seen Ethiopia and Somalia engage in negotiations, even mediated as far as Turkey, and return to more peaceful engagement. So, dialogue appears to be what is needed, and it seems the government is pursuing that path”.

Within days of the Zeila reports, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud arrived in Addis Ababa on December 22, marking his fourth visit to Ethiopia in less than two years. Official statements highlighted cooperation on counterterrorism, security coordination, and regional stability. Absent from the communiqués but believed to be central to the visit was the Red Sea question.

Since Ethiopia signed its memorandum of understanding with Somaliland authorities two years ago, Somalia has increasingly framed Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as a political and sovereignty challenge rather than a neutral economic pursuit. While Addis Ababa insists it seeks access through lawful and negotiated means, Mogadishu fears that any normalization of Ethiopian port access via Somaliland could weaken Somalia’s already fragile federal authority.

An HoA analyst speaking with The Reporter was blunt in his assessment of the balance of control. “As for Hassan Sheikh [Mohamud], he has repeatedly come forward on this issue. First of all, Somalia does not control Somaliland, nor has it been able to control even its own capital city. So, at that level, this is how the situation stands.”

Diplomats familiar with the Addis talks describe the visit less as a breakthrough than as containment diplomacy, an effort by both sides to prevent escalation while their core disagreements remain unresolved. Experts note that Somalia needs Ethiopian military cooperation against Al-Shabaab and Ethiopia needs Somalia calm while it continues to explore strategic alternatives to Djibouti and in the wider Horn.

Analysts contend that the relationship of the two countries is increasingly defined by necessity rather than trust.

Just two days ahead of Hassan Sheikh’s visit, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) hosted Kenyan President William Ruto in Addis Ababa. Unlike Somalia, Kenya does not see Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions as a direct sovereignty challenge. Instead, Nairobi has positioned itself as a stabilizing buffer, offering cooperation through regional corridors and multilateral forums while quietly expanding its diplomatic footprint in the Horn.

Kenya’s interests appear to be pragmatic. Descalating Ethiopia–Somalia tensions risk spillover into its own security environment, particularly along its Somali border. At the same time, Kenya sees an opportunity to assert itself as a regional broker at a moment when Sudan has collapsed and Eritrea remains largely isolated.

Projects such as the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, long delayed but never abandoned, regain relevance whenever Red Sea tensions intensify. While such corridors cannot replace direct maritime access, they provide Ethiopia with leverage—and Kenya with influence—in a region undergoing recalibration.

On the other hand If Somaliland represents Ethiopia’s most flexible maritime option, Eritrea remains its most sensitive one. Addis Ababa has openly stated its interest in access to the Assab port, a move that immediately raises historical and security alarms.

“A port is not merely about cargo transport,” Costantinos explained. “Ports involve industrial parks, special economic zones, and serve as hubs where we can produce and export significant volumes of goods.”

He added that the Red Sea’s volatility makes access a strategic insurance policy.

“Because the Red Sea region is perpetually volatile, such access would be something Ethiopia could use to safeguard its national interests,” said the expert.

Yet he stressed that there is no indication Ethiopia seeks this access through force.

“There is no indication at the governmental level that this would involve launching a war against the Eritrean government. Even now, it appears to be something Ethiopia seeks to pursue through peaceful means,” said Costantinos.

He stated that reports that Eritrea is mobilizing its population for war seem and remain unverified.

“But how true is that? That remains a questionable matter,” he asked.

Egypt’s decision to upgrade Assab, however, complicates the equation further, effectively inserting Cairo into a space Ethiopia once viewed as a potential bilateral negotiation.

Conversely, if Ethiopia’s eastern and southern diplomacy is driven by caution, its western frontier is shaped by absence. Sudan’s civil war has removed Khartoum as a regional actor altogether.

“Sudan is almost becoming among those referred to as a collapsed state,” said an analyst. “Because foreign powers have intervened there, I personally do not believe Sudan will return to peace anytime soon.”

He described a conflict sustained by external backing, looted gold, and an endless supply of weapons.

“As long as these two Sudanese warring parties continue to receive foreign support, they will not run out of weapons.”

For Ethiopia, the consequences extend beyond humanitarian concern. Sudan once represented a strategic counterweight, a neighbour with Red Sea access, agricultural potential, and diplomatic weight. According to the expert, that anchor is now gone, narrowing Ethiopia’s options just as its urgency grows.

Overlaying these geopolitical pressures is a worsening humanitarian reality. As diplomacy intensified in December, aid agencies warned of renewed drought conditions across eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern Kenya.

“Climate shocks do not create geopolitical conflict, but they accelerate it. States under humanitarian strain have less tolerance for diplomatic ambiguity,” said the expert. “Aid competition hardens political positions. Fragile societies become less forgiving of perceived external threats.”

Somalia, Costantinos noted, has endured more than three decades of crisis. Sudan now ranks first globally in displacement and food insecurity. South Sudan, too, is sliding back toward conflict following the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar and other senior government officials this year.

“In the East African region, something could erupt at any time,” he warned. “However, it appears that governments are aware of this risk and are giving it serious consideration.”

Experts and analysts alike agree that what emerges from the final weeks of December in the Horn region is not a single turning point, but a pattern. Ethiopia’s geography, unchanged for more than three decades, has become newly intolerable under modern pressures including global supply disruptions, Red Sea militarization, regional state collapse, and climate stress.

Neighbors are adjusting accordingly. Somalia engages defensively. Kenya mediates strategically. Sudan disappears. Somaliland advances cautiously. Egypt tightens its maritime grip. And Ethiopia presses forward, aware that delay carries its own risks.

“The African Union and the United Nations Security Council should also be involved,” Costantinos argued, pointing to the limits of sub-regional mechanisms. “IGAD should now play a major role in bringing these governments together. The African Union and the United Nations Security Council should also be involved, especially since Eritrea has withdrawn from IGAD membership. It is possible Eritrea believes IGAD is biased toward Ethiopia because its leadership is Ethiopian.”

Experts speaking with The Reporter contend that the Horn of Africa is not being reshaped by grand treaties or summits, rather it is being reordered by pressures of the economic, environmental, and strategic kind. The Red Sea sits at the center of that pressure, not as a destination, but as a question Ethiopia can no longer afford to leave unanswered.

IATA said a total of USD 1.2 billion in airline funds was blocked by governments as of the end of October 2025, despite a marginal improvement of USD 100 million since April.

Of the total amount, 93 percent is concentrated in Africa and the Middle East, reflecting persistent foreign exchange constraints across the region .

Ten countries across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia account for USD 1.08 billion or 89  percent of the overall blocked funds.

Ethiopia and Pakistan were each listed with USD 54 million, placing Ethiopia eighth among the countries named. Algeria topped the list with USD 307 million, followed by the XAF Zone (a group of six central and west African countries) at USD 179 million, and Lebanon at USD 138 million.

The Association says the blocked funds consist of revenues generated from ticket sales, cargo services, and other aviation-related activities carried out by airlines within the respective countries.

Under bilateral air service agreements, governments are required to allow these revenues to be repatriated in US dollars, a commitment IATA says is being undermined by currency shortages, approval delays, and central bank restrictions.

“Airlines need reliable access to their revenues in US dollars to keep operations running, pay their bills, and maintain vital air connectivity,” Willie Walsh, IATA’s director-general was cited as saying in the report. He urged governments to prioritize airline fund repatriation even when foreign currency is scarce .

In recent years, Ethiopian Airlines has faced similar challenges in managing to recover its own revenues from other African countries.

In July 2024, Mesfin Tasew, Ethiopian Airlines Group CEO, told The Reporter that at one point the carrier had more than USD 200 million in revenues blocked across several African states, adding that although the amount had declined, it remained a “serious concern” for the flag carrier.

Addressing questions on why Ethiopia has been unable to release the USD 54 million owed to foreign airlines, members of management at the airline told The Reporter that foreign currency payment decisions fall primarily under the authority of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE).

The NBE did not respond to The Reporter’s attempts to obtain clarification about the unreleased funds.

IATA on the other hand has warned that prolonged restrictions on airline fund repatriation risk undermining air connectivity and the wider economic benefits aviation provides, particularly for economies dependent on international trade, tourism, and cargo transport.

The Association reiterated its call for governments to lift foreign exchange controls affecting airlines and to honor bilateral and treaty obligations guaranteeing unrestricted repatriation of airline revenues.

Sources within EIH told The Reporter that the airline’s board has approved the renewed request and forwarded it to the EIH board, where it is currently under review.

The exact size of the capital increase being sought has not been disclosed, with officials declining to make the figure public.

People close to Ethiopian Airlines said the process is being handled at the highest levels of management, underscoring the strategic importance of the request for the state-owned carrier.

The airline group has previously submitted a similar request in October 2022, seeking to raise its paid-up capital from about 100 billion Birr to 300 billion Birr. At the time, Chief Executive Officer Mesfin Tasew had confirmed to The Reporter that the request had been submitted and that the company was awaiting a response.

The earlier proposal was justified by the rapid growth of the airline’s assets and business transaction volume, which officials said had outpaced the level of its paid-up capital.

Ethiopian Airlines has consistently reported strong financial performance in recent years, including record revenues of USD 7.6 billion in the 2024/2025 fiscal year, which ended on July 7, 2025.

The figure represents an eight percent increase from the previous fiscal year. However, the group’s 2023/24 annual financial report indicates that its paid-up capital stands at around 263 billion Birr.

The renewed capital request has also featured in parliamentary oversight discussions. During a review session held last month, the parliamentary Committee on Government Development Enterprises examined EIH’s first-quarter performance, including issues related to Ethiopian Airlines and capital increment requirements.

During the session, a member of Parliament described Ethiopian Airlines as one of the country’s most critical national brands, noting that the carrier contributes a significant share of EIH’s revenue and a large portion of Ethiopia’s foreign exchange earnings. The lawmaker questioned whether sufficient support was being extended to such strategically important enterprises, particularly given challenges in repatriating foreign-currency revenues earned in other African markets.

Responding to questions on capital demands, Melikte Sahlu, deputy head of EIH, told MPs that capital constraints remain a major challenge across many state-owned development enterprises. She said EIH must balance limited national resources, the need to ensure the sustainability of investments and business operations, and the obligation to generate dividends at the national level.

While acknowledging that EIH would prefer to increase capital for all of its development enterprises if resources allowed, the deputy CEO said priorities are set based on proposals submitted by each entity and assessments of which enterprises could face serious operational risks without timely capital support.

She added that, given the country’s limited resources, expectations around the pace and scale of capital increases must be realistic and based on broad consensus.

The EIH board is expected to determine whether and how the renewed capital request from Ethiopian Airlines will be accommodated within these constraints.

The memo, signed by CEO Robel Tsegaye, states that the review identified significant gaps in leadership performance and organizational management.

‎According to the document, the Board found that “project delivery performance has been consistently below expectation,” while key strategic decisions “have weakened the Corporation’s financial position.”

‎It further notes that critical governance systems and controls were not functioning as required, and that accountability and leadership alignment were “insufficient to support the Corporation’s mandate.”

‎In response to these findings, the Board decided to remove fourteen officials from their duties, effective immediately.

‎The memorandum describes the dismissals as a “necessary step” aimed at correcting leadership weaknesses and strengthening governance.

‎It further states that the changes are intended to ensure the leadership team is aligned with ECWC’s turnaround agenda, restore accountability and integrity, and improve project execution and financial performance.

‎An interim management team will be appointed, and the CEO indicated that further communication regarding their names and responsibilities will begin in the coming days.

‎The CEO’s memo concludes that the Corporation is “bigger than any individual,” and calls for renewed collective commitment to begin what it describes as “a new chapter of performance, accountability, and national service.”

‎Titled ‘The Illusion of Progress: Ethiopia’s Human Rights Defenders Under Attack’ published jointly with the World Organization Against Torture this month, the report paints a sweeping and alarming picture of escalating repression against human rights defenders (HRDs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and journalists across Ethiopia.

‎The 46-page document concludes that civic space has “alarmingly deteriorated” since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office, describing a “relentless persecution” of rights actors and “a stark reversal of earlier progress” once promised by the reform government.

‎”In a further demonstration of the oppressive climate, many human rights defenders have been forced into exile, while others have faced bans preventing their entry into the country. There is also a systemic culture of ‎intimidation directed at rights groups, often resulting in their suspension and silencing. The government has introduced repressive laws to legitimise these violations,” it reads.

‎The watchdog says that torture and other forms of ill-treatment against dissenting and critical actors remain entrenched tools of governance.

“The administration has failed to implement the substantive and structural changes repeatedly recommended by United Nations (UN) treaty bodies and investigative mechanisms, opting instead for superficial measures—such as the closure of certain notorious detention facilities—while leaving the underlying legal and institutional framework untouched,” the report reads.

‎The Federation argues that Ethiopian authorities have retained the capacity to resort to such practices whenever deemed expedient, particularly in relation to human rights defenders.

“Ethiopia is therefore marked by a profound contradiction. While reforms are advanced in certain areas, civic space continues to contract, underscoring the absence of genuine transformation in the protection of fundamental rights,” it reads.

‎The document states that Ethiopia’s political trajectory shifted dramatically over the past five years, as a result of “a troubling intensification of political unrest” marked by ethnically motivated attacks, controversial election delays, and the outbreak of the Tigray war.‎

The creation of the Prosperity Party in 2019, combined with the fallout from the assassination of Oromo artist Hachalu Hundessa, shifted the political landscape and “precipitated a sharp crackdown on civic space and CSOs,” according to the document.

The Federation said while reforms are advanced in certain areas, civic space continues to contract while subsequent armed confrontations in Amhara and Oromia “undermined the reform measures tentatively introduced in 2018 and 2019,” pushing human rights defenders into a climate of fear and danger.

It indicates that human rights defenders face abductions, arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances, and even extrajudicial killings. ‎According to the document, many have been forced into exile, while those who remain face harassment, surveillance, and legislative reprisals.

‎The report concludes that shrinking civic space is “part of a publicly acknowledged policy designed and applied by the government itself.”

‎”Human rights organisations have been subjected to systematic restrictions, while prominent HRDs have faced harassment, threats, attacks, and, in many cases, forced exile. The government does not tolerate any type of protest or peaceful demonstration unless they are pro-government. The use of excessive force to suppress protests and peaceful demonstrations has spread fear among the population and limited opportunities for exercising rights,” the document reads.

‎The Federation reports the arbitrary arrest and detention of HRDs have become “alarmingly common,” often executed by masked individuals using excessive force and refusing to disclose reasons for arrest. ‎It states that detainees are routinely held incommunicado, denied access to court within 48 hours, and remain behind bars even when granted bail.

The report cites that between 2019 and 2024, 244 arrests involving 201 journalists were recorded, citing data from the Ethiopian Press Freedom Defenders.

‎The Federation documents the case of a journalist from the Amhara region who was detained for interviewing critical political voices. He recounts being held in a dark room without water, food, or light for three days, then transferred to a military camp under the state of emergency.

‎“We faced psychological torture, death threats, denial of medication and fresh air… constant confinement under heavy guard, and no toilets,” he said. “Our families did not know where we were”.

‎He remained detained for 11 months without access to a lawyer or family.

‎The report warns that torture has re-emerged as “an entrenched tool of governance” and‎ cites new allegations that torture centres have been re-established in Awash Arba, a military camp 220 kilometers from Addis Ababa, where detainees are held incommunicado and denied due process.

‎International bodies, including the Human Rights Committee, CAT, and the UPR, have all confirmed ongoing torture and enforced disappearances in Ethiopia.

‎Several attacks on media institutions are documented, including burglary at EHRCO’s office targeting a laptop containing investigation documents, a break in at Ethiopian Insider’s office, a similar attack on Ethio-News and an April 2025 raid on Addis Standard by security forces.

‎‎The report notes that intimidation comes from both state and non-state actors. In the document, Befekadu Hailu explains that insurgent and ethnonationalist groups also wage “psychological warfare against HRDs,” asserting that “each group sees itself as the only victim” and attacks HRDs who criticise any side.

The document describes successive states of emergency (SOEs) since 2020 as a central tool for targeting HRDs. Although constitutional, SOE powers in practice “have gone far beyond what is strictly necessary,” enabling warrantless arrests, media censorship, and bans on assemblies.

‎The Federation revealed that during the 2021 wartime SOE, mass detentions targeted Tigrayan HRDs, journalists, activists, and even aid workers. The 2023/2024 Amhara SOE similarly targeted HRDs and journalists of Amhara origin, it said.

‎The report concludes that SOEs have “evolved into recurring governance tools” rather than temporary responses to crises.

‎Even when bans on rights organisations were lifted in March 2025, the ACSO imposed “suffocating conditions” requiring CSOs to report every activity, disclose all partners, and provide funding details constantly.

‎One interviewee cited in the report said, “It was not a lifting of the ban, but a replacement of outright prohibition with surveillance and control.”

‎Another interviewee noted that ACSO officials pressured organisations to change their leadership, saying the resignation of EHRDC Executive Director Yared Hailemariam was “directly connected to such pressure”.

‎One expert interviewed by the researchers of the Federation tied current repression to the political calendar stating

‎“The current attack on civic space and HRDs is largely related to the upcoming 2026 general elections and the transitional justice process,” he said, implying that the government is wary of CSOs’ roles in election observation and victim-centred justice.

‎The report concludes that repression persists because “the government is unwilling to address these violations,” reinforcing “a persistent climate of impunity” that undermines transitional justice and national dialogue.

The second National Digital Payments Strategy that regulators envision guiding the financial sector for the coming five years was presented at the Skylight Hotel this week during an event that saw the attendance of new NBE Governor Eyob Tekalign (PhD) and Wamkele Mene, secretary general of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The document indicates that although Ethiopia boasts a total of nearly 140 million mobile money accounts, only 15 percent of them are active. ‎It confirms that the rapid increase in digital account registrations has not translated into active usage, and argues that this points to “a need for the deployment of catalytic use cases at scale and more compelling value propositions to transition users from registration to sustained activity.”

The gap remains “one of the core ecosystem challenges” alongside a widespread lack of digital and financial literacy, according to the draft.

It details that two-thirds of women and 60 percent of men report not using mobile money because they do not know how—a significantly higher barrier than in peer ‎countries like Nigeria and Kenya.

‎”This skills gap not only limits uptake ‎but also increases vulnerability to scams and erodes confidence in the digital ecosystem,” reads the draft.

‎The document states that Ethiopia’s digital financial system absorbed fraud losses in 2024 that amounted to 1.3 billion Birr, making it one of the largest recorded losses since the expansion of mobile money and electronic payment platforms began in earnest a few years ago.

‎Alongside these losses, the strategy documents a significant rise in cyber threats. NBE reported 4,623 cyberattack attempts in the first half of 2024, a 115 percent increase compared to the same period in 2023.

This escalation demonstrates the increasing cyber-security challenges facing financial institutions and digital platforms but despite the scale of the losses and rising threats, the document confirmed that Ethiopia still lacks a formal system to protect victims of fraud.

“These security challenges are compounded by the absence of a specific regulatory framework that defines liability and establishes clear compensation mechanisms for fraud victims, leaving consumers with slow and often ineffective recourse,” it reads.

‎The strategy highlights the absence of a national liability system as a critical gap and identifies improving consumer protection as an immediate policy priority under the 2026–2030 plan. ‎It recommends developing a harmonized compensation and liability framework to ensure “clear, consistent, and enforceable protections for consumers” across all digital payment channels.

‎On the other hand, the NBE’s proposed strategy described government digital payments as fragmented and closed, identifying this disharmony as a major structural issue.

‎It states that for instance, many government payment flows, both collections such as taxes, fees and disbursements like social transfers, and salaries, remain fragmented on account of bilateral agreements with financial service providers (FSPs) and cash-based distribution.

“The existing digital government payment platforms are closed-loop systems which restrict interoperability and constrain competition and consumer choice in ‎government digital payments and collections,” reads the document.

Regulators urge for a unified e-government service platform to centralize payment flows, proposing the creation of a digital platform to facilitate the efficient and transparent delivery of government-to-person (G2P) payment.

The platform would allow recipients to choose their preferred payment service provider, eliminating the current practice of assigning beneficiaries to specific providers, according to the draft.

The document also sets an ambitious target to increase the value of annual digital payments from 82 percent of GDP in 2024 to 750 percent by the end of the decade.

While Ethiopia’s digital transaction volume has grown exponentially in recent years, the draft concedes that much of the growth is owed to compulsory use cases such as the mandatory digitization of fuel payments, which processed over 176 billion Birr between August 2024 and May 2025.

‎The document lists fuel digitization as a key catalyst but acknowledges that widespread voluntary adoption still remains limited.

It highlights “underdeveloped” merchant acceptance infrastructure as another obstacle, noting that as of June 2024, Ethiopia had just over 14,000 point-of-sale (POS) terminals or less than 18 per 100,000 adults. The figure pales in comparison to Kenya’s 136 or Nigeria’s 2,139.

Only a quarter of registered mobile money merchants are active, and merchant payments accounted for less than 0.2 percent of total digital transactions in 2023/24, according to the document.

Regulators also addressed the growing divide between digital payment adoption in rural and urban areas. They cited a study from 2024 which reported that 40 percent of urban adults had made a digital transaction within the past year, compared to just 16 percent of rural adults.

The document concludes that “digital payments are becoming mainstream in cities, but cash remains dominant in rural regions,” driven by limited connectivity, fewer agents, and weaker merchant acceptance outside major towns.‎

Another major structural challenge highlighted in the strategy is the lack of a national data-exchange layer, leaving financial data siloed within institutions and preventing providers from offering digital credit, insurance, savings, and other data-driven services at a scale needed in the economy.‎

Regulators say they want to establish a centralized data exchange infrastructure by 2030 in a bid to improve interoperability, data-driven innovation, and public-service delivery efficiency.‎

The draft strategy states that the NBE will require all licensed financial institutions to adopt the ISO20022 messaging standard, noting that it will be mandated within six months, with a one-year window for market implementation .

‎According to the document, this will enable “enriched data exchange” and align the national payment system with global standards. ‎It also proposes establishing a national shared-agent platform to improve viability in rural and low-density areas stating that a new independent entity will “deploy, maintain, and govern the network’s technical infrastructure, and day-to-day operations”.‎

It calls for revising the existing agent regulation by creating two separate regulations for banking agents and mobile-money agents, both of which will formally enable shared agent networks to reduce costs and expand reach.‎

The contrast was noted during  the two-day African Women in Media (AWiM25) Conference held at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa this week.

Giving a keynote speech, Yemisi Akinbobola (PhD), head of AWiM, said that although the Convention was celebrated as Africa’s first legally binding continental treaty dedicated solely to preventing and eliminating violence against women and girls, no African country has ratified it.

“Zero have ratified it. Not a single African country has ratified that important document,” she said. 

Adopted by the heads of state at the AU Summit, the Convention requires 15 member states to ratify before it can enter into force. Without ratification, it remains political symbolism rather than a binding legal commitment.

“Without ratification, the Convention exists politically, symbolically, but not as an enforceable legal obligation of member states,” said Akinbobola.

Ethiopia is not among the seven countries that have signed the Convention. Those that have signed in principle are Angola, Burundi, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, The Gambia, and Ghana. 

Conference participants who spoke to The Reporter stated that Ethiopia’s absence highlights a widening gap between the country’s public rhetoric on women’s rights and the continent’s efforts to create uniform, enforceable standards against gender-based violence.

According to the AWiM keynote, the Convention fills major gaps left unaddressed by older instruments such as the Maputo Protocol, a human rights instrument adopted by the AU in 2003 to guarantee a comprehensive set of rights for women in Africa.

However, the eighth Convention to End Violence Against Women and Girls introduces recognition of intersecting vulnerabilities including disability, displacement, age, health and mandates accountability for perpetrators.

Its provisions also include prohibitions on workplace violence and harmful labour practices involving girls, obligations to prevent, investigate and prosecute femicide and enforcement of fair, non-discriminatory judiciary processes, fast-track mechanisms and victim/witness protection. 

The Convention also addresses online and digital violence, a growing threat identified in recent research on the barriers facing Ethiopian women journalists.

The AWiM presentation also linked the Convention to the Kigali Declaration on the Elimination of Gender Violence, co-designed during AWiM 2023, which outlines minimum standards for addressing harassment, intimidation, unsafe work environments and online abuse faced by women in the media. 

The AU official urged the people of the countries which did not sign the convention to galvanize public pressure on the government to sign and ratify the Convention.

“If your country is not on that list, then I call on you to play your part in changing that,” she said, emphasizing the role of media and citizens in pushing leaders to act on an issue affecting half of the population.

Akinbobola warned that without immediate action, Africa risks reversing decades of progress on women’s rights, adding that activism should focus on converting political commitments into legal obligations.

In a lengthy statement released on Wednesday, December 3, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) said Egypt’s posture demonstrates an entrenched refusal to adapt to the political, demographic, and developmental realities that define the 21st-century Nile Basin.

The statement marks one of Addis Ababa’s most forceful public responses in recent months, or even years, and came following a string of increasingly direct warnings from senior Egyptian officials throughout 2025.

The strongly worded statement also signals a shift in tone from Ethiopia, which for months remained largely silent while Egypt intensified its diplomatic campaign at regional and global forums.

‎‎The Ministry’s latest message asserts that Ethiopia does not and will not seek “permission from any country” to use the waters of the Abbay basin (Blue Nile), insisting that Cairo’s repeated objections to the operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) are grounded in outdated assumptions of entitlement.

‎‎Analysts say Ethiopia has now disclosed its position, with the country seemingly reaching a breaking point in a long-simmering dispute. 

‎Although the two countries have verbally clashed for more than a decade over the construction of the GERD, Addis Ababa’s new statement suggests that the government views Cairo’s recent growing rhetoric as crossing a line.

For Ethiopia, the Ministry said, the pattern is no longer one of political disagreement but a clear “categorical rejection of dialogue,” deliberately designed to obstruct regional cooperation.

‎‎According to the statement, Egypt’s refusal to negotiate has now become “overt,” ending what Ethiopian officials say were “years of public performance” in which Cairo took part in talks but allegedly kept decision-makers from compromising or engaging in substantive talks.

The Foreign Ministry urged all concerned actors, a seemingly implicit reference to regional governments, the African Union, and major partners including the United States and EU, which have all put on an effort to get the two countries seat around the table previously, to denounce what it framed as Cairo’s dangerous shift toward militarized language.

‎‎MoFA’s unusually sharp tone comes after a year in which Egyptian officials repeatedly announced that Ethiopia’s operation of GERD constituted a threat to Egypt’s national security, regional stability, and even “the lives of millions.”

‎‎In recent months, Egypt’s position regarding Nile and GERD has been increasingly sharpening and a review of the nation’s official statements in 2025 reveals a steadily intensifying pattern.

In October, Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation issued its strongest public condemnation to date.

It accused Ethiopia of “reckless and irresponsible” management of GERD, alleging that sudden water releases had led to downstream flooding. The Ministry said Ethiopia’s actions represented a “direct threat to the lives and security of the peoples of the downstream states,” and warned that its patience was wearing thin.

The statement said Egypt “cannot ignore” such behavior, a phrase interpreted by regional analysts as an indication that Cairo was preparing the ground for stronger diplomatic or other means of posturing.

A month earlier, Egypt escalated the dispute to New York.

Its government submitted a formal letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), accusing Ethiopia of violating international law by continuing to fill and operate GERD without a trilateral agreement.

‎‎In the letter, Egypt asserted that it “will not allow Ethiopia to impose unilateral control over shared water resources,” vowing to “defend its existential interests” through “all measures permitted under the UN Charter” and the wording of the letter had raised an alarm among diplomatic circles given its potential implications.

Earlier, in July, Badr Abdelatty, Egypt’s foreign minister, issued another televised warning, declaring that Egypt “reserves the right to defend itself” against the effects of Ethiopia’s “unilateral” actions.

He accused Ethiopia of “endangering regional equilibrium” and warned of consequences should Addis Ababa continue operating GERD without what Cairo considers a binding agreement.

‎‎This too was preceded by a warning from the Egyptian Prime Minister pushing the “matter of existence” narrative.

‎‎A few weeks before the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s comments, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly reiterated the long-standing message that the Nile is a “matter of existence for Egypt and not open to compromise.”

While not explicitly threatening, analysts widely viewed this repetition as part of a coordinated campaign to increase and intensify international pressure over the dispute.

‎‎However, after months of official threats, Ethiopia this week broke its silence over the matter.  Prior to the Ministry statement, Ethiopia had largely refrained from responding directly to these warnings. Officials in Addis Ababa had instead stressed their preference for African Union-led dialogue, technical cooperation, and collaboration between riparian countries.

Wednesday’s statement ended that restraint.

‎‎“The repeated threats show the failure of the Egyptian government to come to terms with the realities of the 21st century,” the Ministry stated, arguing that Egypt’s approach is “not compatible with contemporary international law, basin-wide cooperation norms, or the developmental needs of upstream countries.”

‎‎Ethiopia said some Egyptian officials “think they have a monopoly over the waters of the Nile” and rely on “colonial-era treaties” and concepts of “historical rights” that Ethiopia has never recognized.

‎‎Addis Ababa also accused Cairo of regional destabilization. ‎‎In one of the most striking parts of the statement, Ethiopia accused Egypt of undermining regional stability not only over the water dispute, but also through broader political strategies.

‎‎According to the Ministry, Egypt has sought to “engineer pliant, weak and fragmented client states” across the Horn of Africa, using “a campaign of destabilization focused on but not limited to Ethiopia.”

‎‎While the statement did not detail specific incidents, analysts who spoke with The Reporter note that Ethiopia has long suspected Egypt of supporting political factions or diplomatic alliances that could pressure Addis Ababa on Nile issues. Cairo has consistently denied such accusations.

‎‎“This misguided approach and effort is a failure of imagination and leadership,” the statement reads, calling Egypt’s tactics an “obsolete playbook that has never cowed Ethiopia.”

‎‎The East African nation reasserted its rights over the Abbay basin and central to Ethiopia’s message is the assertion that it contributes the vast majority of water that sustains the Nile.

‎‎The Ministry emphasized that Ethiopia contributes roughly 86 percent of the Nile’s total volume through the Abbay River. As such, it said, Ethiopia has “full sovereign rights to utilize water resources within its borders.”

‎‎“Ethiopia, like all other riparian states, has a right to utilize this natural resource,” the Ministry declared. Addis Ababa stressed that the principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization,” a cornerstone of modern international water laws, supports its position.

‎‎The Ministry underscored that Ethiopia “has no obligation to seek permission from anyone” to develop the water resources inside its territory.

Beyond the legal and political arguments, Ethiopia’s statement framed GERD as a regional development project rather than just a national one.

Ministry officials described GERD as an “embodiment of Africa’s self-reliance and progress,” repeating Ethiopia’s long-held argument that the dam provides substantial benefits to Egypt and Sudan through regulated water flow, reduced flooding, and hydropower integration opportunities.

‎‎Ethiopia also reiterated its stance that the dam is designed for electricity generation not for water diversion, an assurance Addis Ababa has provided since construction began more than a decade ago starting from the inception of the dam.

‎‎‎‎Despite its confrontational tone, the Ministry said Ethiopia remains open to dialogue, cooperation, and technical coordination “based on fairness and equity.” It insisted that the solution lies in “win-win outcomes” rather than confrontation.

‎‎However, the statement made equally clear that Ethiopia will not yield to coercive pressure.

‎‎Ethiopia says it will continue exercising its rights under international law, reject threats of force, and resist what it called Egypt’s attempts to impose unilateral veto power over upstream development.‎

‎“What the world needs, what Africa needs is more cooperation and dialogue, not confrontation and conflict,” the statement concluded.

‎‎Analysts who spoke with The Reporter noted that the escalating rhetoric has raised fears of renewed tension in an already fragile region.

Speaking anonymously, a Nile politics expert noted several potential consequences including increased diplomatic pressure, shifting regional alliances, risk of miscalculation, internal pressures in both countries, as well as implications for the African Union.

‎‎‎He stressed that Egypt’s referral of the issue to the UN Security Council signals its intent to internationalize the dispute. Ethiopia, however, has consistently argued that African-led mechanisms, not global bodies are the appropriate forum.

‎‎On the other hand, the expert explained how the recent disclosure of Ethiopia’s strong position might strengthen some shifting alliances.

‎‎”Horn of Africa states continue to navigate relations with both countries,” he said. “Ethiopia’s accusation that Egypt is seeking to influence regional politics could heighten mistrust and reshape alliances in the Red Sea and Nile Basin regions.”

‎‎According to analysts, while neither country has indicated imminent military action, the repeated use of existential and defensive rhetoric widens the margin for misunderstanding. Regional analysts also warn that messaging designed for domestic audiences can inadvertently raise regional tensions.

‎‎The simmering dispute between the two countries and ‎‎Ethiopia’s strong stance comes at a time of domestic reform and post-conflict stabilization, while Egypt continues to grapple with economic pressures and public concerns over water scarcity.

‎‎On the other end of the spectrum, experts state that the AU’s ability to re-energize trilateral talks may be tested once again. Previous rounds have stalled over sequencing, data exchange, and legal frameworks for long-term operation.

‎For now, Ethiopia’s latest statement marks a decisive moment in the evolution of the GERD dispute. After months of silence, Addis Ababa is signaling that Cairo’s rhetoric has crossed into territory it can no longer ignore.‎

‎But despite the sharpness of its tone, Ethiopia still frames cooperation as the path forward. Whether Egypt will shift from confrontation to negotiation and whether both countries can break years of mistrust still remains uncertain.‎

‎What is clear is that the Abbay, the Nile, and the Grand Renaissance Dam remain at the center of one of Africa’s most consequential geopolitical challenges. And as both states harden their rhetoric, the stakes in diplomacy, development, and regional stability continue to rise.