Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly announced his country’s decision to recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state on Friday, marking a significant diplomatic development for the self-declared republic in the Horn of Africa.

The announcement was made during a telephone conversation between the Israeli Prime Minister and Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro), in which Netanyahu formally conveyed Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.

The Declaration by the State of Israel which is signed by PM Benjamin Netanyahu, reads “Israel respectfully acknowledges the formal appeal conveyed by Somaliland president, requesting recognition. In response this appeal and in light of the shared values, strategic interests and the spirit of mutual respect that binds the two nations, Israel officially recognizes the Republic of Somaliland as sovereign and independent state.”

Full diplomatic relations is declared between Israel and Somaliland, as per the statement, ‘to advance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and beyond.”

Somaliland president Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillah (Irro) also issued official declaration, “warmly welcoming and deeply appreciating Israel’s recognition.” Further, Irro stated “Somaliland expresses its firm intention to accede to the Abraham Accord, to contribute meaningfully to peace and stability across the Middle East and Africa.”

In the conversation, he said his country officially recognized Somaliland and its right of self-determination.

“Our friendship is historic,” said Netanyahu. “The recognition would be a good opportunity for expanding our partnership and we intend to work with you in economic, agriculture, and social developments.”

The Israeli PM also invited the President of the Republic of Somaliland to Israel.

In a subsequent social media post, Netanyahu stated that the declaration is in the spirit of the Abraham Accords, signed at the initiative of US President Donald Trump.  

The Office of the President of the Republic of Somaliland has issued a statement declaring the move a “historic milestone in Somaliland’s prolonged quest for international legitimacy.” It asserted that the recognition reaffirms Somaliland’s historical, legal, and moral right to sovereign statehood.

The office further announced Somaliland’s firm intention to accede to the Abraham Accords.

“Somaliland reaffirms its commitment to building constructive partnerships, fostering mutual prosperity, and meaningfully contributing to peace and stability across the Middle East and Africa,” reads the statement.

Somaliland intends to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel, according to the statement.

Costantinos Berhutesfa (PhD), a seasoned economic and political analyst, believes Israel’s recognition of Somaliland could trigger a chain reaction, prompting other influential countries to follow suit, including Somaliland’s former colonial power, the United Kingdom.

He cited recent remarks by the British foreign minister, who stated that the United Kingdom should recognize Somaliland as an independent state, noting that such statements signal growing momentum among Western powers.

Costantinos said Israel’s decision was not taken in isolation.

“They are not alone in this decision,” he told The Reporter. “The United States is part of it, because major decisions of this nature are made together.”

According to him, coordinated recognition by Israel and the United States would carry weight within international institutions, influencing deliberations at the United Nations Security Council and potentially within the African Union.

Costantinos predicts Ethiopia’s recognition could come later, as Addis Ababa seeks to preserve the relations it has built with the Somali federal government and avoid actions that could strain those ties.

Meanwhile, Egypt, Somalia, Turkey, and Djibouti are among the countries that have issued statements condemning Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state.

Ankara characterized the decision as “clear interference in Somalia’s internal affairs.”

In a statement issued following a phone call between the foreign ministers of the four countries, the Egyptian government expressed its “full opposition to any unilateral measures that could undermine Somali sovereignty or destabilize the country.”

However, Costantinos argues the recognition of Somaliland will not undermine stability in the Horn of Africa, noting that the territory has remained stable for more than three decades.

“We have to be intellectually honest about Somaliland,” he said. “For over three decades, it has maintained a level of internal stability that many recognized states envy. It has a functioning democracy and political stability. The delay in recognition has been about who takes the first step, not about bad intentions.”

A political expert spoke to The Reporter requesting anonymity, also shares Costantinos’s view that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries to take similar steps.

He said it remains too early to draw firm conclusions, as the situation is still evolving, but noted that such political decisions are inherently “contagious.”

“Once a door is opened in situations like this, it is only a matter of time before others follow,” he said, adding that Somaliland’s case had long been delayed over questions of which country would make the first move.

The expert said Israel’s decision has the backing of the United States, noting that officials from the US Embassy and its delegations made an official visit to Hargeisa on the same day to assess Somaliland’s diplomatic capacity.

“Who comes next will depend on time,” he said, adding that Israel’s move may also be aimed at countering the influence of Turkey and Egypt in the region.

He said recognition of Somaliland could act as a trigger for the revival of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) Ethiopia signed with Somaliland.

While stating that Israel would not pose a threat to Ethiopia’s sovereignty, the expert said Somaliland’s recognition would benefit Ethiopia in several respects.

Costantinos also said Ethiopia’s political tensions with Asmara could ease following recognition of Hargeisa, arguing that it would open additional opportunities for Addis Ababa.

“Israel’s move will directly affect Egypt’s interests and could also reduce the significance of the Assab issue with Eritrea by offering Ethiopia a better alternative,” he told The Reporter.

The case was brought forward by Human Rights First Ethiopia, a local civil society organization, which is seeking court orders compelling the defendants to ensure the safe return, security, and sustainable reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In its petition, submitted to the Federal High Court, the civil society organization asked the court to order the defendants to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons to their places of origin, establish conditions that guarantee security and protection for returnees, take concrete measures to ensure the practical implementation of return processes and ensure that returnees recover their homes and receive sustainable resettlement support.

The lawsuit argues that the rights violations stem from the defendants’ failure to fulfill their constitutional and international obligations.

According to the case file, following the outbreak of war in the Tigray region on December 3, 2020, citizens of Tigrayan origin were displaced from Western Tigray Zone and Shehet Woreda of the Afar Region.

The petition states that more than one million people remain unable to return to their homes and are currently living in temporary shelters and host communities in locations including Shiraro, Shire, Axum, Adwa, Tembien, Adigrat, Mekelle, and other areas across Tigray.

The plaintiff further reported that nearly 520,000 IDPs from Oromia are sheltering in Debre Birhan city and the North Wollo Zone of the Amhara region. It also states that more than 84,000 IDPs within Oromia remain displaced in temporary shelters or host communities within the region itself.

The organization said many displaced people are living in overcrowded shelters, schools, and open spaces, without adequate food, water, sanitation, shelter, or health services, exposing them to severe hunger, poverty, and psychological distress.

The case file also cites various constitutional and international obligations the defendants are obligated to fulfill, including the African Union Kampala Convention, ratified by Ethiopia in 2009, and formally approved by Parliament in February 2020.

According to the filing, all defendants are legally bound to implement the Convention’s provisions, which require them to ensure the voluntary return of IDPs, provide adequate security, and facilitate reintegration assistance.

The lawsuit alleges that the Amhara regional government, which currently administers areas from which Western Tigray IDPs were displaced, has prevented their return in violation of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of movement and residence. The petition claims this has subjected displaced citizens to years of suffering and hardship.

It further argues that the Tigray Interim Administration, under the Pretoria Peace Agreement, is obligated to work with federal authorities to prioritize the return of displaced persons. However, the organization alleges that political considerations were prioritized over humanitarian responsibilities.

Similarly, the Oromia Regional Government is accused of failing to facilitate the return and resettlement of displaced persons, both those displaced from the region and those internally displaced within Oromia, despite constitutional and legal obligations.

The case was presented to the Federal High Court this week, and the bench has scheduled a hearing for January 2, 2026, where judges will rule on whether the defendants are required to formally respond to the claims raised in the lawsuit, The Reporter learnt.

In an interview with The Reporter in May 2025, Tesfalem Berhe, director of Human Rights First Ethiopia, stated that the organization was finalizing preparations to file a court case against the government over the plight of internally displaced persons.

Dalliance in the approval of gene editing projects is delaying research and arresting desperately needed improvements in agricultural productivity, say experts at the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR).

Ethiopia adopted a guideline on the regulation of genome-edited products nearly six months ago, permitting research and active gene editing for the first time in the country’s history, adding to legislation that opened the door to genetically modified organisms a decade ago.

Research institutions and investors have been awaiting approval to embark on gene editing projects, but it has yet to transpire.

“Following the ratification of the guideline, specific approval letters have to be issued by the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority (EPA). We have been awaiting approval letters from the Authority to embark on a number of gene editing projects that are very crucial for Ethiopia’s agriculture. But the Authority is taking time for some unknown reason,” said one EIAR expert who spoke to The Reporter on condition of anonymity.

The EPA is the authority charged with regulating biosafety and genome editing. Its tasks include granting permits, conducting risk assessments, and overseeing compliance. On the other hand, the Bio and Emerging Technology Institute (BETin) supports policy, coordination, and public communication.

A National Biosafety Advisory Committee consisting of representatives from various ministries, the Customs Commission, universities, and research centers (all appointed by the Prime Minister) is also involved in regulation.

EIAR and universities play central roles in R&D and capacity building, while the Ethiopian Food and Drug Authority (EFDA) is relevant for safety assessments.

A director at EIAR confirmed the wait for approval, and noted that Ethiopia is signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Cartagena Protocol, which regulate GMO-related activity worldwide.

“So far, we have been working on genetic engineering, because Ethiopia’s laws allow that. A guideline that allows gene editing has been introduced, but the guideline is not enough. Approval and go-ahead is required to start activity. We are awaiting it from the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority. We will also have a new facility for gene editing once it is approved,” said another director at EIAR.

One gene editing project involving teff has already yielded results, but cannot be implemented on a larger scale for lack of approval from more senior authorities.

The director explained the thinking behind the gene editing project.

“When teff bears more seeds, the plant gets heavy and its stem can no longer support it. Teff is thin and long, meaning it can fall over even during light wind. Hence, a short but strong-statured variety of teff is important. Using gene editing, the gene that gives teff its height was removed, and a field test is being finalized in Bishoftu,” he told The Reporter.

A recent report from the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) highlighted Ethiopia’s nascent venture into gene editing.

“Genome editing in Ethiopia is moving from policy design to early implementation. Momentum increased in 2023-2024 with the acceleration of teff Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) collaborations, supported by external regulatory experiences that clarified non-transgenic pathways and informed Ethiopia’s domestic approach. Culminating in 2025, Ethiopia officially published its Guideline on the Regulation of Genome-Edited Products, which is now being applied in dossier scoping and preparing the ground for the country’s first confined field trials of gene-edited crops,” reads the report.

The guideline introduces a risk-proportionate, case-by-case pathway for evaluating gene-edited organisms distinct from transgenic GMOs, according to the AU agency.

The report details that a number of private companies have expressed interest in investing in genome editing. The list includes MIDROC Investment Group, Luna Group (owner of the Fresh Corner grocery chain), Corteva Agriscience (a US-based agri-tech giant), and BASF (Germany).

These companies want to partner with EIAR to invest and commercialize gene-edited biotech seed varieties and supply them to farmers. However, absence of gene edited products so far remains a challenge, states the report.

Funding for genome editing projects is also another challenge, according to the AU document.

It details that Ethiopia has three ongoing gene editing projects involving teff, Ethiopian mustard, and sorghum. These are being funded by SIDA, Corteva, Feed the Future, and the Donald Danforth Plant Science Center.

Enset, cotton, and coffee are also included in plans for future gene editing projects, according to the report. 

A ‘Bioeconomy Strategy’ approved by the Bio and Emerging Technology Research Institute (BETin) and the Ministry of Innovation and Technology aims to commercialize at least one genome-edited plant variety every year starting from 2028.

Sources close to the issue claim the government is undertaking gene-editing projects without official approval to avoid opposition related to GMOs and gene editing, particularly from conservative stakeholders.

Officials of the EPA did not respond to The Reporter’s requests for comment.

A lobby group representing soap and detergent manufacturers says forex-related issues burdening a foreign-owned supplier of essential chemical inputs have forced production cuts and closures, warning of higher prices for consumers.

The managers of the Ethiopian Chemical Products Manufacturers Association (ECPMA), which represents basic chemicals, soap and detergent, and paint and adhesive factories, say their pleas for government intervention have gone unanswered for months.

An assessment conducted by The Reporter found that countless small-scale soap and detergent manufacturers, as well as large factories like Repi Soap and Detergent PLC, have been forced to shrink their output as they struggle to access key raw materials.

Assessments conducted by a team of experts at the Chemical and Construction Inputs Industry Research and Development Center Ministry of Industry also confirm that a number of soap and detergent factories have been forced to shut down production lines and cut back employee work hours.

The chemicals in short supply are linear alkyl benzene sulphonic acid (LABSA) and sodium lauryl ether sulfate (SLES) —both crucial components in the production of bar soap, powder soap, liquid soap as well as shampoos, body washes, dishwashing liquids, and detergents. 

Allied Chemicals, a firm established in 2008 with backing from Indian investors, is the primary importer of SLES and LABSA in Ethiopia. The firm processes the imported chemicals at one of several plants it operates in the country before supplying them to soap and detergent manufacturers. 

Manufacturers say the chemicals have been unavailable for months.

“For several past months, Allied stopped supplying these inputs. Since July, we’ve been tabling the problem to the Ministry of Industry, but there’s still no solution. Meanwhile, factories are closing their production lines,” a manager at a detergent production plant told The Reporter.

A manager at Allied who spoke to The Reporter anonymously confirmed the firm faced supply issues between September and last month in light of forex shortages, but contends things are now back to normal.

“Our supply stopped for a brief time due to forex shortages. But we didn’t interrupt distribution as we had adequate stock. Our factories are back in operation now. Challenges like forex shortages happen sometimes. It’s normal,” said the manager.

However, he also claimed this interruption in supply was the first since Allied began processing SLES and LABSA a decade ago.

“We have 300 employees at our factories, we are paying them salaries. Why would we stop supply, seeing as it is our own business and benefit? The benefit of the business is not only for the factories but also for us. We also don’t want interruptions and we are sure it won’t occur again,” he told The Reporter.

The manager argues that fluctuations in supply emanate from the soap and detergent factories themselves.

“They never send us their projected annual demand for SLES and LABSA, so we can’t precisely allocate the forex needed to import the raw materials,” he said.

Allied supplies manufacturers with up to 30,000 tons of LABSA and around half as much SLES each year.

“There’s a shift in the domestic market from bar and powdered soap towards liquid soap. So it’s difficult for us to know which raw material is in greater demand unless factories tell us,” said the manager.

The Ministry of Industry’s report says otherwise.

Over a 16-month period, Allied provided 12,888 tons of LABSA. More than two-thirds of the total volume was supplied to four major detergent companies: Zac, Bekas, Unilever, and Repi. Large manufacturers accounted for the lion’s share of 6,300 tons of SLES supplied by Allied as well.

The report concludes that Allied does not possess the production capacity to meet growing demand from manufacturers.

The total installed capacity of Ethiopia’s soap and detergent factories stands at over 535,000 tons. The report indicates they need at least 80,000 tons of SLES, much higher than the 57,000 tons Allied has the capacity to supply, according to Ministry documents obtained by The Reporter.

In reality, Allied is covering just half of demand from manufacturers.

“Factories manufacturing liquid, powder and bar detergents, have huge manufacturing capacity. However, due to lack of raw material supply, inadequate forex supply to import the inputs, inadequate working capital, security issues, local market fluctuations and growing cost of living; they are unable to manufacture at full capacity. The raw material supply from Allied Chemical is covering only half of their demand,” reads the Ministry’s report.

It indicates that while detergent industries’ demand for SLES and LABSA has been surging substantially, Allied’s supply has remained stagnant for two years. The report also showcases fluctuations in the supply of SLES and LABSA in the months since July 2025.

Allied also managed to generate USD 1.2 million in recent months through the export of SLES and LABSA, according to official documents.

However, the lobby group contends the problem goes deeper than forex shortages and production capacity.

Allied is the beneficiary of an exemption from the 15 percent duty levied on the commercial import of SLES and LABSA. Other importers are not exempted, giving Allied what the lobby group describes as an unfair advantage that has allowed it to corner the market.

“The duty free policy is designed to serve only one supplier. It was designed to serve Allied, not the sector. As a result, the whole sector is on the verge of collapse because one company stopped supplying inputs,” said a senior member of ECPMA, which represents more than two dozen large-scale manufacturers.

He alleges Allied is using its superior bargaining power unfairly.

“Allied typically collects payments upfront before supplying the SLES and LABSA. It takes 50 million or 100 million Birr in upfront payments and holds on to the money before eventually supplying the inputs after five or six months. Several factories have their capital tied up before they even get the inputs,” said the senior Association member.

Because other importers do not enjoy the same duty-free privileges that Allied does, buying SLES or LABSA from them carries a 15-percent markup.

“Then soap and detergent companies have to add 15 percent to the price when they sell their products to the public,” said one plant manager.

The lobby group wants to see an immediate solution to the problems.

Melaku Alebel, minister of Industry, convened industry players to discuss their misgivings and review a study on the problems plaguing the sector.

Manufacturers called on the Minister to push Allied to resume imports, and requested that the company’s duty-free privileges be removed. Melaku promised to table the issue to the Ministry of Finance and get back to them with a solution swiftly, but that has yet to happen, according to people who took part in the meeting.

“If importers were also allowed to import the inputs duty-free like Allied, supply could have been secured and the problem would have been solved,” said one industry executive. “The solution is to grant the privilege to all importers so that the policy works for the sector rather than a single company.”

Industry players say the situation has left them in a state of indecision.

“Factories now have to decide whether they should await a solution or buy the inputs from commercial importers with the 15 percent markup,” said one plant manager. “If we buy from the commercial importers, then we have to add the cost to our products, which would affect end consumers. If we keep waiting for Allied to resume imports, we may be forced to close our factories.”

Ethiopia imported soap and polish valued at seven billion Birr in 2024/5, up from five billion in the previous year, according to data from the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). Import volumes have also surged in recent years, nearly doubling to 110,000 metric tons since 2022.

A substantial volume of soap and detergent was imported through the franco valuta scheme, according to the NBE.

While Ethiopia sources most of its SLES and LABSA from suppliers in the UAE, Egypt, Turkey, India, or China, suppliers in many of these countries rely heavily on manufacturers in Iran, whose operations have been affected by Tehran’s feud with Israel and the US, industry insiders say.

“The remaining options are India and China. Importing from China can take up to four months. We hope other countries might resume manufacturing the ingredients after January,” said an Association member.

Importing a ton of these chemicals can cost up to USD 3,000.

“SLES and LABSA are dollar-intensive. The NBE says there is no forex problem, but banks do not allocate when importers ask for more,” said one manager.

Experts at the Industry Ministry recommend that soap and detergent manufacturers be allowed to import their own SLES and LABSA at a reduced import duty of five percent as a short-term solution. They urged the manufacturers be granted priority in forex allocation and called for the establishment of a ‘LABSA-SLES Taskforce’ to oversee Allied Chemicals’ import and distribution process.

However, the experts cautioned that Ethiopia can not afford to depend on imported SLES and LABSA. They see attracting able investors to enable the domestic production of these materials as the only sustainable way forward.

“The shortage of SLES and LABSA emanates mainly from deep-rooted problems of forex shortage, distorted tariff systems, and dependency on imported raw materials. To solve these issues permanently, introducing strategic intervention and ensuring sustainable value chain supply for the sector, and attracting domestic investors in the domestication of the raw materials is critical,” reads the report.

The legitimacy of any election rests on the extent to which the environment it is held under is free, fair and democratic. An enabling environment presupposes the existence of conditions where political parties can organize freely, candidates can campaign without fear, voters can access information and polling stations safely, the media can operate independently, and civil society can observe and participate without obstruction. In Ethiopia today, these conditions cannot be assumed; they must be carefully examined and honestly reported. Ongoing armed conflicts, restrictions on political activity in some regions, and persistent allegations of arbitrary detention and intimidation raise serious questions about electoral readiness.

As the constitutionally mandated body responsible for administering elections, NEBE has both a legal obligation and a moral responsibility to assess these realities and communicate its findings to the public. Silence or ambiguity would not be neutral acts; they would risk eroding public confidence and inviting speculation, polarization, and mistrust. Ethiopians deserve to know whether the circumstances allow them to exercise their democratic rights meaningfully, or whether extraordinary measures—including postponement or phased elections—may be necessary to preserve the integrity of the process.

Crucially, such an assessment must be credible. This means it cannot be confined to internal deliberations or selective consultations. NEBE must engage widely with political parties across the spectrum, regional electoral offices, civil society organizations, media institutions, security bodies, traditional and religious leaders, women’s and youth groups, and communities in conflict-affected areas. An assessment that excludes dissenting voices or marginalized regions would be fundamentally flawed and would fail to capture the lived realities of millions of voters.

Transparency is equally essential. The methodology, criteria, and findings of the assessment should be made public. Ethiopians should understand what benchmarks NEBE uses to define an enabling environment, how data is collected, and what risks have been identified. Transparency does not weaken institutions; it strengthens them by inviting scrutiny and building trust. In a deeply polarized political climate, openness is one of the few tools available to counter misinformation and conspiracy narratives that thrive in the absence of credible information.

Informing the public is also a matter of institutional independence. NEBE’s credibility depends on its ability to act—and be seen to act—free from political pressure. Publicly communicating its assessment is essential to enable the Board convey the message that electoral integrity, not political expediency, guides its decisions. This is particularly important in Ethiopia’s context, where past elections have been marred by boycotts, uneven participation, and disputes over fairness. A forthright assessment would signal a break from past practices and demonstrate a commitment to democratic norms.

There are also important preventive benefits to public disclosure. A clear-eyed assessment can serve as an early warning system, identifying gaps that can still be addressed before election day. If certain regions lack security, targeted interventions can be planned. If legal or administrative barriers are restricting political competition, reforms can be prioritized. If trust deficits are identified, confidence-building measures can be undertaken. Concealing or downplaying problems, by contrast, ensures that they will surface later in more destabilizing forms.

Some may argue that publicly acknowledging an insufficient enabling environment could undermine confidence or embolden spoilers. This concern misunderstands the source of legitimacy. Confidence does not come from optimistic declarations detached from reality; it comes from honesty and accountability. Pretending conditions are adequate when they are not would only guarantee that the election’s outcome is contested and its legitimacy questioned. In fragile democracies, flawed elections are often more destabilizing than delayed ones.

International partners and observers are also watching closely. Ethiopia’s electoral process carries implications beyond its borders, influencing diplomatic relations, development cooperation, and regional stability. A transparent assessment by NEBE would not signal weakness; it would demonstrate maturity and responsibility. It would also provide a factual basis for international engagement that respects Ethiopia’s sovereignty while supporting democratic standards.

Ultimately, the question is not whether elections should be held at all costs, but whether they should be held with integrity. NEBE’s duty is not to the electoral calendar alone, but to the Ethiopian people and their constitutional right to genuine political participation. If the Board is to make a meaningful contribution towards ensuring that the 7th general elections, whenever and however they are held, contribute to peace, legitimacy, and democratic renewal rather than deepening division, it has no option but to undertake a credible, inclusive, and transparent assessment and by informing the public of its conclusions.

In a moment of national uncertainty, honesty is not a risk; it is a necessity.

The new expiration date for AUSSOM, which was supposed to be a one-year mission, is December 2026. Ethiopia has agreed to keep its peacekeeping troops in Somalia under the revised schedule.

As per the latest decision, troop contributing countries (TCCs) including Ethiopia and Egypt, “continue to deploy up to 11,826 uniformed personnel, inclusive of 680 police personnel, to AUSSOM until that date. The additional support to AUSSOM and the Somali Security Forces is necessary to enable Somalia to bolster its fight against Al-Shabaab and improve peace and security in the country and the region.”

The AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) also welcomed the readiness of Egypt to finalize the deployment of contingents in Somalia, while requesting troops from Burundi, Ghana, and Sierra Leone to remain in place until Egyptian troops are deployed to avoid a “security vacuum.”

Uganda and Ethiopia have deployed additional troops in Somalia on a bilateral arrangement basis, as a short-term measure, continuing their commitment and sacrifices in addressing the prevailing security situation in Somalia.

Last year, after Ethiopia disclosed potential plans to recognize Somaliland, Mogadishu threatened to expel Ethiopia from AUSSOM. It remains unclear whether Ethiopia will follow through in light of Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland this week.

Some analysts fear the circumstances could renew tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.

AUPSC also commended Somalia’s reaffirmed commitment and progress made towards one-person-one vote elections in December 2026; and encouraged continued inclusive political engagements in the country.

The AU also underscored the need to cultivate local security forces as a critical step in informing the exit strategy.

Meanwhile, AUPSC reiterated its deep concern over the persistent financial gaps to support the operations of AUSSOM, which it deems critical for the peace, security and stability in Somalia, the region and the continent at large.

A statement issued by the Council this week indicates the AU Commission has allocated USD 20 million from the AU Peace Fund towards peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, but notes the funding has not yet been released.

On the other hand, the UNSC decided that the United Nations Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) shall cease all operations on 31 October 2026 after completing the second phase of its transition.

During its meeting on December 23, 2025, members of the UNSC raised strong concerns regarding the funding shortfalls of AUSSOM.

Sierra Leone’s delegate, also speaking for Algeria, Guyana and Somalia, stated “Regrettably, some of our core concerns were not reflected in the text,” adding that the financing of AUSSOM had not been a central issue throughout the negotiations despite being the core concern.

Nevertheless, his group voted in favour of the text, recognizing the need for Council authorization “as the basis for continued support to AUSSOM by international donors.” The chronic underfunding of AUSSOM seriously impedes its objectives and risks reversing the progress achieved, he warned.

Several speakers echoed that, with the representative of France saying: “It is now more urgent than ever that new donors mobilize in support of security in Somalia.”

Denmark’s delegate highlighted AUSSOM’s role in providing logistical support to UNSOS in Somalia’s fight against Al Shabaab and in strengthening stabilization efforts. “Further progress must be made on the national level for Somalia to assume full responsibility for its security,” he emphasized.

The speaker for Pakistan said that while Al-Shabaab and its affiliates threaten peace in Somalia, sustainable and predictable financing for the Mission remains vital. AUSSOM, operating under the principles of national ownership and in full respect of national sovereignty, has a critical role to play.

The Russian Federation’s delegate stressed that the focus of the resolution should continue to be the security issue and support for AUSSOM. Domestic political issues in Somalia and the activities of the transition assistance mission and the relevant reports of the UN Secretary-General are “secondary in nature” and not a mandatory precondition for the Council to authorize the work of African peacekeepers in Somalia.

Stressing the need to listen to Somalia, he added: “We fail to understand the attempts by some delegations to defend the expansion of the UN Secretary General’s reporting on Somalia.”

 The United Kingdom’s representative, however, said the text creates a process to enable an informed review of the logistical support provided by the UN. This adoption follows the recent extension of the Al-Shabaab sanctions regime, he said, adding: “Taken together, these decisions demonstrate the Council’s continued determination to support Somalia in its fight against Al-Shabaab.”

China’s delegate said the funding gap facing AUSSOM is unsustainable and the liquidity shortfall confronting UNSOS merits concern. He called on donors to honour their funding commitments, paying their assessed peacekeeping contributions to UNSOS in full and on time. Further, the Secretary-General must present practical proposals on adjusting support for AUSSOM and bridging the funding gap, he said, calling on UNTMIS to ensure a smooth second phase of the transition.

As the largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget, “China shoulders nearly one quarter of the unsourced budget and has made significant contributions to the logistical support of AUSSOM over the years”, he said.

The United States, that country’s delegate said, has contributed billions of dollars to various missions in Somalia. Expressing concern that the “transfer of most security functions to Somalia has been elusive”, he said the responsibility for combating Al-Shabaab and other terrorism threats must shift “primarily to those who have the most at stake.”

The incidents have been reported along the route stretching from Edna Mall to the area commonly known as Haya Hulet, where telecom cables including used plastic tubes and metal parts embedded in concrete pipes have been removed from construction sites.

Observers say the looting has become a regular occurrence since road works began, intensifying over the past month.

Eyewitnesses described groups of organized youths, homeless children, and garbage collectors working together to remove and transport the materials, often without interruption. According to residents, the activity occurs from morning until late at night, sometimes while construction work is ongoing.

A resident familiar with the area told The Reporter that some security officers have allegedly facilitated the practice by negotiating with looters, particularly during nighttime hours.

“The bargaining mostly happens at night,” the resident said, speaking on condition of anonymity. “There are security officers who have received bribes ranging from 30,000 to 280,000 Birr.”

The same source said sections of the copper cables and plastic tubes are sold at prices ranging between 800 to 1,000 Birr, depending on size and condition. The Reporter also observed young people and destitute children breaking concrete pipes on-site to extract metal components while construction crews continued their work nearby.

Local business owners say the theft has become a daily sight along the corridor.

“It looks like no one cares enough to stop it or even question what is happening,” said a shop owner who operates near the construction area. “Construction workers dig the ground, looters collect the cables and damaged plastic tubes, and security forces look the other way as if nothing is happening.”

A source told The Reporter that Ethio telecom initially transported heavy copper cables in four rounds at the start of the road construction. According to the source, the company later halted the transportation.

When contacted to verify the incident, Ethio telecom Chief Communication Officer, Mesay Woubshet, said the institution was not aware of the reported theft. He stated that, given the scale of the corridor projects underway across the city, the incident could be an “isolated case”.

Mesay added that Ethio telecom works through a joint committee with the project owner and the City Administration during ongoing projects to prevent related problems.

“We have a committee working with the City Administration and the project executor to avoid related issues, as similar incidents have always been a threat, even before the start of the corridor project,” he told The Reporter.

He added that incidents involving the theft of the company’s materials are not new.

“Looting of our materials is not new. In some cases, we have found ourselves in the middle of shootings while trying to protect our assets,” he said.

Mesay noted that his office does not have clear information about the specific incident reported in the area, adding that the company usually deploys security personnel in locations where such risks are anticipated.

While the organization maintains that it lacks sufficient details about the incident, observers say similar cases have been reported in different parts of the city during the implementation of the corridor project.

The Ethiopian corridor project has been underway for three years, with the Addis Ababa City Corridor Project launched in December 2022. The project aims to upgrade key routes and improve connectivity in the capital.

The first phase was completed in September 2024, while the second phase began in October 2024, covering 132 kilometers and 2,817 hectares of urban development to enhance infrastructure and public spaces.

The Ethiopian Securities Exchange (ESX) has ambitions to list nine companies before the end of the Ethiopian calendar year in September, according to CEO Tilahun Kassahun.

“Our plan for this year is to list nine companies in the ESX and I think we can exceed that target,” said Tilahun, who was appointed to head the Exchange in November 2023.

Although the country’s maiden stock exchange went live almost a year ago, its floor has yet to begin trading. So far, only four companies have taken the first steps towards listing on ESX.

They include the state-owned Ethio telecom, whose disappointing initial public offering (IPO) from earlier this year is slated to go live on the Exchange in the near future. The others are private commercial banks Wegagen, Gadaa, and Dashen.

Dashen Bank published a prospectus this week after officials at the Ethiopian Capital Market Authority (ECMA) approved its registration documents for its planned IPO and registered more than 14.3 million active shares.

The bank plans to offer 2.2 million additional shares to its shareholders first, while any leftover shares will then be offered to “qualified investors and/or the public,” according to a statement issued by the Authority this week.

Last year, Tilahun told The Reporter that other state-owned companies under Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH) were set to follow Ethio telecom in listing on the Exchange. On the list were the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise and the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation.

“We’ve received applications from four companies,” Tilahun told The Reporter this week.

Firms that are not yet listed will continue trading through the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market until they fulfill listing requirements with ECMA.

“Whenever the registration at ECMA is done and companies have an objective of listing, we’ll register,” said Tilahun, noting that draft prospectuses are jointly reviewed by ESX and ECMA before approvals in principle are granted.

Tilahun explains that listing timelines differ depending on whether a company intends to raise new capital. Companies opting for listing by introduction, also known as direct listing, can complete the process faster, while those planning public capital offerings require additional regulatory review and preparation.

Dashen Bank’s prospectus provides a practical example of this process.

The bank has chosen a phased approach in which its listing on ESX is separated from its planned capital-raising exercise. While Dashen has already completed registration with ECMA and secured its place on the exchange list, its public capital raise is scheduled to follow in February 2026, allowing regulators and investors to observe how listing and capital mobilization function as distinct processes within Ethiopia’s capital market framework.

Meanwhile, regulators are enforcing mandatory dematerialization of securities, replacing paper-based share certificates with electronic records held by the Central Securities Depository (CSD). The reform, anchored in the Capital Market Proclamation, is a prerequisite for trading on the Exchange.

Under the dematerialization process, shareholder data are transferred from company share departments to the CSD, after which shareholders must open accounts with licensed brokers to enable electronic trading.

“In this regard, Gadaa and Wegagen banks [Wegagen Capital Investment Bank] have finalized the dematerialization process,” Tilahun said. “Going forward, when other banks come, their shares will be moved, accounts will be created, and trading can start.”

Tilahun explained that trading is generally expected to begin automatically after listing, although delays may occur if account opening or operational requirements are incomplete. In some cases, listing may occur before capital raising, while in others trading can commence immediately once shares are transferred to the CSD.

He emphasized that securities registration deadlines are strictly enforced. Securities required to be registered by November 2025 will not be permitted to trade if registration and dematerialization are not completed.

“ECMA has clearly stated that if companies fail to dematerialize their documents and move securities to the CSD, trading is impossible,” he said.

He further noted that dematerialization alone is insufficient without ECMA registration.

“If the security is not registered, dematerialization alone cannot enable listing and trading,” he said, adding that companies that fail to complete both steps will be barred from the Exchange.

As a regulatory measure, companies that do not dematerialize their securities will be prohibited from trading, limiting shareholders’ ability to transfer ownership, receive dividends, or exercise shareholder rights.

The 2025 edition of the Digital Progress and Trends Report places Ethiopia at the bottom tier globally, highlighting deep structural gaps in connectivity, computing power, data availability, and digital skills that threaten to widen economic and social inequality.

The report classifies Ethiopia as a low-income country underperforming on both dimensions of AI readiness, meaning it lacks not only the market size and infrastructure to develop AI technologies, but also the per-capita capacity needed to adopt and use AI across public services, businesses, and daily life.

“Low income countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya underperform on both scale and intensity, highlighting the need to invest in foundational enablers such as affordable and high-quality broadband, digital literacy, and workforce skills,” the report states.

The World Bank warns that countries with limited AI foundations risk becoming permanent consumers of foreign AI platforms, rather than creators or shapers of technology suited to local needs. Ethiopia’s small and fragmented digital market, combined with limited computing infrastructure and skills shortages, places it firmly in this vulnerable category.

According to the report, countries that lack sufficient AI “intensity” often see adoption confined to elite institutions or a few urban centers, leaving most of the economy untouched by productivity gains. For Ethiopia, this means AI deployment risks deepening urban-rural and income divides rather than closing them.

A central barrier identified is Ethiopia’s limited access to compute, including both domestic data centers and affordable cloud services. The report notes that data centers are capital- and energy-intensive, requiring stable electricity and high-quality internet connectivity—conditions that remain unreliable in many low-income countries.

More than 60 percent of developing countries face serious energy security challenges, undermining the viability of infrastructure investment, the report adds, citing International Energy Agency data. Without stable power and predictable regulation, Ethiopia risks being locked out of large-scale AI deployment.

Even where infrastructure exists, Ethiopia faces a scarcity of advanced digital and AI skills, according to the report’s analysis of workforce competency. Limited access to advanced training, under-resourced educational institutions, and ongoing brain drain to higher-income countries further weaken the country’s capacity to manage and adapt AI systems.

The World Bank cautions that AI systems require specialized, often tacit expertise to operate effectively, and without domestic capacity, countries risk dependency on external providers.

The report also flags language and data gaps as major constraints for countries like Ethiopia, where many local languages are underrepresented in global AI training data. Without localized datasets and models adapted to national contexts, AI tools risk excluding large segments of the population, particularly in education, agriculture, and public services.

“Without dedicated investments in local language models and culturally relevant interfaces, AI risks replicating and even reinforcing existing inequities,” the report warns.

The World Bank concludes that Ethiopia’s pathway to benefiting from AI lies not in frontier innovation, but in urgent investment in foundational enablers—reliable connectivity, affordable compute, robust data governance, and large-scale digital skills development.

Ethiopia hosted the presidents of Somalia and Kenya within days of each other as tensions resurfaced along Somaliland’s northern coast near Zeila, while Sudan’s war deepened further into what humanitarian agencies now describe as the world’s gravest humanitarian catastrophe. At the same time, drought warnings returned across the eastern Horn, reviving fears of another cycle of displacement and food insecurity.

Taken separately, each development may be construed as another episode in a region long accustomed to instability. But, taken together? Analysts say they point to something more consequential, that Ethiopia’s unresolved quest for reliable access to the Red Sea is no longer a dormant geopolitical concern, rather it is actively reshaping diplomatic alignments, security calculations, and humanitarian risks across the Horn of Africa.

“What has changed is not Ethiopia’s geography, but the pressure surrounding it,” said a Horn of Africa analyst speaking with The Reporter anonymously, as this week also saw Egypt stepping into the Red Sea equation with what seems to be full commitment.

The clearest signal indicating the Horn is undergoing a reordering and of the intensifications of the simmering pressures came not from Addis Ababa but from Cairo.

On December 25, The National, the UAE’s state-run daily newspaper based in Abu Dhabi, reported that Egypt had quietly concluded agreements to develop and upgrade two strategically located ports on the Red Sea: Assab in Eritrea and Doraleh in Djibouti.

Both ports lie near the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the southern gateway to the Red Sea and one of the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoints. According to sources cited by the paper, the agreements go beyond commercial upgrades and include the creation of berths capable of hosting warships, provisions for re-fuelling and resupplying Egypt’s southern fleet, as well as the option to deploy small but elite military contingents.

Egyptian officials reportedly view the deals as legitimizing an expanded military presence in both countries. Egyptian warships, sources say, are already frequent visitors.

For Ethiopia, the implications are immediate and uncomfortable. More than 90 percent of its maritime trade passes through Djibouti, particularly via Doraleh port.

A policy brief paper published last month by Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and authored by Mohammed Seid (PhD), an expert on the Middle East, reiterates that Ethiopia’s transition from a littoral to a landlocked state witnessed a fundamental shift from strategic autonomy to survival and this according to the paper has left the country to economic vulnerability, structural dependency and national security risk.

Analysts also contend that Egypt’s move this week inserts a rival strategic actor into Ethiopia’s most critical commercial artery at a time when relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa remain frozen over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Egypt has repeatedly framed Ethiopia’s dam as an existential threat to its water security and Cairo has consistently opposed any scenario in which landlocked states gain a territorial foothold on the Red Sea. Experts note that with negotiations over the GERD stalled for more than two years now, Cairo’s expanding Red Sea footprint signals a shift away from bilateral dam diplomacy and toward regional leverage. This broader contest over access, influence, and chokepoints now frames nearly every diplomatic interaction in the Horn.

Further south, reports emerged on December 16 of renewed tensions around Zeila, a historic port town on Somaliland’s northern coast near the Djibouti border. Somaliland-based media and regional security analysts spoke of heightened alert levels and diplomatic unease. Even as no formal Ethiopian military or commercial presence was announced, the response from Mogadishu was swift and unequivocal.

Somali officials reiterated their rejection of any unilateral arrangements involving Somaliland’s coastline, warning against actions that could undermine Somalia’s territorial sovereignty. The statements were familiar, but the timing was not accidental.

As of now there are no official documents or statements indicating that Zeila is Ethiopia’s primary commercial objective. That distinction still belongs to Berbera, Somaliland’s most developed port and the centerpiece of Ethiopia’s earlier memorandum of understanding with Somaliland authorities.

Yet Zeila’s symbolism appears potent. It sits at the intersection of unresolved regional fault lines: Somalia’s fragmented sovereignty, Somaliland’s long-standing bid for recognition, Djibouti’s strategic sensitivities, and Ethiopia’s determination to reduce its reliance on a single maritime corridor.

For Addis Ababa, the issue is existential rather than opportunistic. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been landlocked, depending overwhelmingly on Djibouti for maritime access. Every disruption of any kind including political, logistical, or financial has reinforced a consensus within Ethiopia’s security and economic establishment that redundancy is no longer optional.

As Costantinos Berhe (PhD), a seasoned economic and political analyst, put it, “There is nothing definitive or conclusively established at this point. We have not heard that the Somaliland project has been cancelled.”

He notes that although Somaliland is not a formally recognized state, it has existed independently for over 30 years and has demonstrated a relatively strong democratic system.

“Moreover, it has remained separate from Somalia itself,” he told The Reporter. “Therefore, the understanding [MoU]  Ethiopia reached with Somaliland does not appear to have been annulled. Certainly, Somalia has repeatedly lodged objections, but we have seen Ethiopia and Somalia engage in negotiations, even mediated as far as Turkey, and return to more peaceful engagement. So, dialogue appears to be what is needed, and it seems the government is pursuing that path”.

Within days of the Zeila reports, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud arrived in Addis Ababa on December 22, marking his fourth visit to Ethiopia in less than two years. Official statements highlighted cooperation on counterterrorism, security coordination, and regional stability. Absent from the communiqués but believed to be central to the visit was the Red Sea question.

Since Ethiopia signed its memorandum of understanding with Somaliland authorities two years ago, Somalia has increasingly framed Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as a political and sovereignty challenge rather than a neutral economic pursuit. While Addis Ababa insists it seeks access through lawful and negotiated means, Mogadishu fears that any normalization of Ethiopian port access via Somaliland could weaken Somalia’s already fragile federal authority.

An HoA analyst speaking with The Reporter was blunt in his assessment of the balance of control. “As for Hassan Sheikh [Mohamud], he has repeatedly come forward on this issue. First of all, Somalia does not control Somaliland, nor has it been able to control even its own capital city. So, at that level, this is how the situation stands.”

Diplomats familiar with the Addis talks describe the visit less as a breakthrough than as containment diplomacy, an effort by both sides to prevent escalation while their core disagreements remain unresolved. Experts note that Somalia needs Ethiopian military cooperation against Al-Shabaab and Ethiopia needs Somalia calm while it continues to explore strategic alternatives to Djibouti and in the wider Horn.

Analysts contend that the relationship of the two countries is increasingly defined by necessity rather than trust.

Just two days ahead of Hassan Sheikh’s visit, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) hosted Kenyan President William Ruto in Addis Ababa. Unlike Somalia, Kenya does not see Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions as a direct sovereignty challenge. Instead, Nairobi has positioned itself as a stabilizing buffer, offering cooperation through regional corridors and multilateral forums while quietly expanding its diplomatic footprint in the Horn.

Kenya’s interests appear to be pragmatic. Descalating Ethiopia–Somalia tensions risk spillover into its own security environment, particularly along its Somali border. At the same time, Kenya sees an opportunity to assert itself as a regional broker at a moment when Sudan has collapsed and Eritrea remains largely isolated.

Projects such as the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, long delayed but never abandoned, regain relevance whenever Red Sea tensions intensify. While such corridors cannot replace direct maritime access, they provide Ethiopia with leverage—and Kenya with influence—in a region undergoing recalibration.

On the other hand If Somaliland represents Ethiopia’s most flexible maritime option, Eritrea remains its most sensitive one. Addis Ababa has openly stated its interest in access to the Assab port, a move that immediately raises historical and security alarms.

“A port is not merely about cargo transport,” Costantinos explained. “Ports involve industrial parks, special economic zones, and serve as hubs where we can produce and export significant volumes of goods.”

He added that the Red Sea’s volatility makes access a strategic insurance policy.

“Because the Red Sea region is perpetually volatile, such access would be something Ethiopia could use to safeguard its national interests,” said the expert.

Yet he stressed that there is no indication Ethiopia seeks this access through force.

“There is no indication at the governmental level that this would involve launching a war against the Eritrean government. Even now, it appears to be something Ethiopia seeks to pursue through peaceful means,” said Costantinos.

He stated that reports that Eritrea is mobilizing its population for war seem and remain unverified.

“But how true is that? That remains a questionable matter,” he asked.

Egypt’s decision to upgrade Assab, however, complicates the equation further, effectively inserting Cairo into a space Ethiopia once viewed as a potential bilateral negotiation.

Conversely, if Ethiopia’s eastern and southern diplomacy is driven by caution, its western frontier is shaped by absence. Sudan’s civil war has removed Khartoum as a regional actor altogether.

“Sudan is almost becoming among those referred to as a collapsed state,” said an analyst. “Because foreign powers have intervened there, I personally do not believe Sudan will return to peace anytime soon.”

He described a conflict sustained by external backing, looted gold, and an endless supply of weapons.

“As long as these two Sudanese warring parties continue to receive foreign support, they will not run out of weapons.”

For Ethiopia, the consequences extend beyond humanitarian concern. Sudan once represented a strategic counterweight, a neighbour with Red Sea access, agricultural potential, and diplomatic weight. According to the expert, that anchor is now gone, narrowing Ethiopia’s options just as its urgency grows.

Overlaying these geopolitical pressures is a worsening humanitarian reality. As diplomacy intensified in December, aid agencies warned of renewed drought conditions across eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern Kenya.

“Climate shocks do not create geopolitical conflict, but they accelerate it. States under humanitarian strain have less tolerance for diplomatic ambiguity,” said the expert. “Aid competition hardens political positions. Fragile societies become less forgiving of perceived external threats.”

Somalia, Costantinos noted, has endured more than three decades of crisis. Sudan now ranks first globally in displacement and food insecurity. South Sudan, too, is sliding back toward conflict following the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar and other senior government officials this year.

“In the East African region, something could erupt at any time,” he warned. “However, it appears that governments are aware of this risk and are giving it serious consideration.”

Experts and analysts alike agree that what emerges from the final weeks of December in the Horn region is not a single turning point, but a pattern. Ethiopia’s geography, unchanged for more than three decades, has become newly intolerable under modern pressures including global supply disruptions, Red Sea militarization, regional state collapse, and climate stress.

Neighbors are adjusting accordingly. Somalia engages defensively. Kenya mediates strategically. Sudan disappears. Somaliland advances cautiously. Egypt tightens its maritime grip. And Ethiopia presses forward, aware that delay carries its own risks.

“The African Union and the United Nations Security Council should also be involved,” Costantinos argued, pointing to the limits of sub-regional mechanisms. “IGAD should now play a major role in bringing these governments together. The African Union and the United Nations Security Council should also be involved, especially since Eritrea has withdrawn from IGAD membership. It is possible Eritrea believes IGAD is biased toward Ethiopia because its leadership is Ethiopian.”

Experts speaking with The Reporter contend that the Horn of Africa is not being reshaped by grand treaties or summits, rather it is being reordered by pressures of the economic, environmental, and strategic kind. The Red Sea sits at the center of that pressure, not as a destination, but as a question Ethiopia can no longer afford to leave unanswered.