Researchers at the NABRC laboratory complex sprawled on a vast tract of land in Holeta, 40 kilometers west of Addis Ababa, have since been busy with work on agricultural innovations like heat- and disease-resistant crop varieties, efficient cattle feed, and microbial research.

A decade down the road, Leta Tulu (PhD), NABRC director, says the Center’s contributions to Ethiopian agriculture have been immense. He sat down with The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale to describe the work being done at NABRC and discuss researchers’ ambitions for the future. EXCERPTS:

What does Ethiopia envision achieving in terms of agricultural biotechnology? Can Ethiopian agriculture, which remains largely traditional, keep pace with global progress in biotech, or even leapfrog advances?

Contextualizing the Ethiopian scenario versus the global high-end biotechnology trend is critical. With nearly 130 million people, Ethiopia is the second largest population in Africa, next to Nigeria. The projection is we will have between 170 million and 200 million people by 2050.

The FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] projected that in order to feed this fast-growing population, we must increase food production by 70 percent. Because of climate change, which is inducing additional biotic and abiotic challenges, additional solutions are required. Plus, because traditional agriculture methods in Ethiopia are hindering productivity increment efforts, it has become difficult to achieve the projected production increment with the business-as-usual approach.

The conventional agricultural research we have been doing has contributed to agricultural growth in Ethiopia. But it is not sufficient compared to the skyrocketing population and demand. We cannot continue depending on conventional research to develop. To cope with the problems stemming from population growth and climate change, additional technologies are necessary..

Globally, biotechnology is a proven tool to address challenges of climate change and population pressure. It is the decision of the Ethiopian government that we have to complement conventional research with modern biotechnology tools.

Ethiopia envisions the exploitation of the potential of modern biotechnology in agriculture research to generate information, data, and technology that enables the achievement of food security, export promotion, industrialization, employment generation, and natural resources conservation.

Other than agriculture, biotech’s contribution to drugs and vaccines is also substantial, and its commercialization is helping resolve many diseases. Industrial biotech—like enzymes, essential amino acids, and catalysts—has also become a big industry today.

Biotechnology efforts in Ethiopia are already paying off.  Our labs are working on several enzymes and catalysts that are essential in manufacturing and agro-processing, among others. We are at the stage of commercializing the enzymes and catalysts we have identified and developed through years of research.

Ethiopia can definitely leapfrog in biotechnology. Even in the 10 years since NABRC was established, we have seen immense contributions and identified immense potentials.

How does NABRC prioritize its mandates in achieving those national targets?

Mandates are not conditional. They are foundational commands that must be accomplished. The first mandate is becoming a center of excellence for agricultural biotechnology. Second is research and generating innovative and competent technologies in botanical, animal, and microbial [fields]. We are accomplishing our mandates.

NABRC is mandated to research and generate data and improve agricultural biotechnological solutions to enable Ethiopia to achieve food security. Our work includes generating knowledge that enhances conventional breeding, research on biotechnology, genetic engineering, livestock breeding, and microbial biotechnology, among others.

NABRC has three major national research programs: plant biotechnology, livestock biotechnology and microbial biotechnology. Each of these thematic areas have their own directions.

So, the critical role of NABRC is formulating and introducing protocols for such procedures. We have developed protocols for countless plants. All other research centers in the country take these protocols from us and distribute them to farmers. We work intensively on tissue culture and molecular research works.

In general, we embarked on biotechnology works to introduce new and important varieties like hybrids, and to provide solutions for problems that cannot be resolved through conventional research and breeding systems. We produce new varieties after studying DNA at the molecular level, and then we give the new variety or breed to the multipliers or breeders.

We introduce heat-tolerant, disease/pest-resistant, and highly productive varieties. Genetic engineering has revolutionized agriculture globally, unlike any other factor in agricultural history. Currently, over 200 million hectare farmed land globally is covered with GMOs.

Our mandate is to evaluate the leading agricultural technologies in the world, domesticate and introduce them to farms. We have introduced GMO maize and cotton. We also developed a new, disease-tolerant variety of Enset [false banana].

How do you asses the capacity of NABRC?

We are running a lot of research programs on microbial, animal feed, agro-industry, and environmental protection. We have already introduced a lactic acid bacteria that helps dairy processing industries. Ethiopia spends over USD 40 million annually to import chemicals for dairy processing industries. Our finding substitutes the import. We identified that bacteria, developed the technology, and are currently commercializing it in collaboration with dairy industries.

NABRC has substantially developed its capacity. This is the first well equipped, advanced, well-organized facility and center of excellence in Africa. Researchers across Africa, including AUDA-NEPAD, send their researchers here. We have over 50 researchers, all with graduate degrees or above.

When COVID-19 broke out, Ethiopia used to send samples for testing in South Africa. Then the WHO and Ministry of Health approved the EPHI [Ethiopian Public Health Institute] and our Center to test for COVID-19. Our lab contributed a lot to the pandemic response. 

NABRC also contributes highly to the Ethiopian export sector. Agricultural commodity exporters test their samples at our labs. Buyers across the world, especially in Europe, have stringent requirements regarding agricultural imports. They do not import if a single trace of unwanted chemicals, microbial, pests, diseases, weeds, or anything is identified in the export commodity. So we check for all that at our lab before the commodity is shipped. Shipping only takes place after we confirm to the Ministry of Agriculture that the commodity is free from these contaminants.

NABRC is a center of excellence. Regarding anything related to biotechnology, genes, and productivity of plants, livestock and microbial; the center generates and disseminates knowledge, data, and solutions. We provide critical support and capacity building support to regional agriculture bureaus, other research centers across the country, and universities.

Ethiopian and foreign researchers do their graduate and postgraduate work at our labs, because this is the only facility [that can accommodate them]. Regulators and experts at the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority and other institutions receive training at our Center.

Creating a national biotechnology capacity across the board is our mandate, and we have succeeded. Currently, 13 universities are graduating biotech experts at the graduate and postgraduate levels. We have several technology breakthroughs in the pipeline for commercialization. Biotech is key to transforming Ethiopia’s economy.

Do biotech interventions prioritize commodities meant for household consumption, or industrial inputs and export crops?

All are priorities. For instance, we introduced Bt cotton because the existing local cotton variety is poor in productivity and could not satisfy demand. We addressed both the industrial input demand and also exports by introducing cotton biotechnology.

For food security, we are working on several commodities including wheat, maize, teff, rice, and barley, among others. We work intensively on coffee hybrids, which is for export. At Wondogenet, the Aromatic and Medicinal Plants Center is also working on medicinal plants. We work on vaccines, tissue culture protocols, etc. So our research programs are aligned with all sectors, and national needs.

We also formulated the national research strategy. We build national biotech capacity. We support regional states to build their own biotech labs. 

NABRC is not mandated to introduce a biotechnology policy. Crafting a policy is not a mandate of our center. In a report, the Office of the Federal Auditor General [OFAG] stated that NABRC introduced a strategy before introducing a policy first. That is a mistake. OFAG does not know the biotechnology sector and most of what it reported as findings is wrong. The mandate to introduce a biotechnology policy is given to the Ethiopian Bio and Emerging Technologies Institute, not to NABRC. We have introduced the biotechnology strategy based on Ethiopia’s existing agricultural policies, roadmaps, and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals [SDGs]. Whatever we do, should align with the 17 goals of SDG. EIAR has a stringent internal control mechanism that aligns research with SDGs.

Each and every research program and project under our center and EIAR passes through a stringent process before approval. There are layers where each research proposal is scrutinized by other researchers, internal and external, and at EIAR director levels. Each project is launched after the technical as well as economic contribution is evaluated exhaustively at each step. Once it is approved at EIAR level, then the institute applies for a budget from the Ministry of Finance. Hence, OFAG’s claims that research works are not prioritized is baseless. We don’t just waste taxpayers money and our system does not allow that.

Could you give us examples of successful work at the Center?

We have state-of-the-art labs each for plant, livestock, and microbial research. Our tissue culture lab is especially advanced. We extract DNA from plants, identify their genotypes, then DNA analysis is done from different perspectives. Gene documentation is also done.

Before our DNA lab was built, Ethiopia was forced to send samples abroad for testing. That used to cost the country a lot in foreign currency, and the test results were almost never on time. But now, we can provide DNA testing for exports, for example, within two days. This is a huge capacity for Ethiopia. The facility also has a huge library. Some of these facilities were built with the World Bank’s support.

In Ethiopia, the germplasm of many indigenous varieties are stored at gene banks. But unless the genotypes are mapped and analyzed; we cannot utilize them. To know which gene of which variety is required for what purpose, all the genetic analysis and mapping of existing domestic varieties in Ethiopia must be done. We are doing that.

At our tissue culture lab facility, genes of plants selected at the DNA labs are turned into plant shoots in a highly controlled environment. Air components, temperature, light, power, nutrition, and everything in the tissue culture facility is controlled and monitored. Several sophisticated machines are deployed to regulate each of these factors, until the tissue shoot is multiplied and distributed to farmers as first generation seeds.

Since it takes years to produce a single improved variety of a crop, then we use the leaves of the first generation of that improved variety to duplicate it. Once we produce the F1, then we introduce the protocol. Tissue culture helps to expel certain disease causing genes, and breed disease-free, highly productive varieties. Our job is introducing the new selected variety, delivering them to seed multiplying stakeholders, and providing the initial materials. If the new varieties we release are multiplied in millions, and delivered to farmers, Ethiopia’s agriculture could reach a new height in the history of agricultural revolutions.

We have introduced hybrid improved varieties for many specialty coffee varieties in Ethiopia, be it Harar, Sidama, Wolega, Jimma, or Illubabor. We’ve also introduced disease-free and productive banana varieties.

Coffee is typically cultivated only in the southern and western parts of Ethiopia. Now, it is being adopted in the highlands in central and other parts of Ethiopia following the introduction of improved new varieties by our Center. In the near future, coffee will be grown in all parts of the country.

Unlike maize, coffee varieties cannot be generated easily. A number of limiting factors exist, hampering multiplication of a selective produced variety. In several parts of Shewa, including Ejere, Woliso, Metarobi, Girar Jarso, and in the surroundings Addis Ababa; we are supplying improved coffee varieties. Coffee is trending in the highland areas of Ethiopia now. We have promoted the improved varieties and demand is huge now.

Multiplying the new improved varieties and technologies introduced by NABRC requires private investment. NABRC’s role is researching and releasing new varieties, but not multiplying the improved varieties and supplying to farmers. This role is for private investors, state enterprises, and seed sector actors.

Regarding microbial research programs, we have also done a tremendous job. Under this program, we are running five thematic areas; food, agro-industry, livestock feed, bio-organic fertilizer, and environmental microbial technology.

In food microbial, we identified and introduced probiotic lactic acid bacteria technology. In highland parts of Ethiopia, fermenting milk into yogurt takes up to four days. Our technology reduced the time to six hours. It is in the commercialization process currently, in cooperation with large dairy industries in the country. We have also identified and introduced a microbe that turns fruit and food wastes into biofuel, bio-fertilizer and other products.

We developed technology that enables us to produce animal feed rich with protein, from single-celled microbes. The feed includes essential amino acids that are critical for poultry and fishery farms. We are supplying it.

We also produced new feed for cattle. Usually, when cattle consume legumes and grasses, it takes longer for the animals to digest it. This means it can take a long time to produce milk, and it can also have an effect on the health of the cattle.

We are field-testing organic fertilizers that work with nitrogen fixing, and can increase soil fertility. We are introducing new technology to the textile and leather industries. So far, they have been using chemicals and heavy metals for bleaching of textile and tanning. But these chemicals have been destroying the environment in Ethiopia. They use chemicals like chromium and lead. These are very toxic. We’ve extracted an enzyme from a microbe to replace these chemicals. It is environmentally safe and affordable.

Currently, the global enzyme industry is growing fast, with huge demand and transaction. In the future, our Center will also capitalize on this, so that Ethiopia can rely on this sector economically.

Multiplying single celled microbes in the lab and producing them en masse for high-protein animal feed is also a great breakthrough. It will completely change the current lack of feed in poultry, fishery and other livestock, which soared prices currently. We also developed a microbe that can shorten the time needed to bake injera from three days to 24 hours, as well as one that can shorten the time it takes to prepare food from enset from three months to one month.

We also developed technology that eliminates cyanide concentration from cassava. Cassava has cyanide concentration naturally, but a lactic acid bacteria we identified can reduce the content so that cassava can be consumed safely.

We are also working on mushrooms, including finalizations of optimization of substrates. We are training youth and supplying them with new products.

Regarding animal biotechnology, we are working on four thematic areas: animal reproduction, health, and breeding. Livestock health biotechnology uses molecular agents to diagnose disease in hours, once the DNA is extracted. Without the PCR at this lab, which enables diagnosis within hours, the livestock might die.

We produce productive livestock breeds, but the feed supply in the country is not good. We recently introduced technology that enables the determination of embryo sex. Dairy farms need female cows, while meat ranches need bulls. So determining the embryo sex on time helps them.

Why does substituting the import of sexed semen remain difficult?

Sexed semen and embryos are currently being imported to Ethiopia from abroad through the facilitation of the Ministry of Agriculture [MoA]. We could simply substitute for it here if additional facilities were fulfilled. To prepare sexed semen, first identifying the X and Y chromosomes of the livestock is critical. But in Ethiopia, there is no machine that helps to identify the X and Y chromosomes. For instance, in Kaliti, they collect conventional semen, but they cannot determine the sex of the chromosome. Therefore, it is difficult to use for a predetermined sex type of animal. This means it is a probability that one gets a female or male calf. This does not help dairy or meat investors who want only certain sex types for better productivity.

So, the machine that sorts out the X and Y chromosomes is essential. As a country, Ethiopia does not have a single sorting machine.

What we have developed now enables us at least to determine the sex of the animal at the embryo stage. So, though we don’t have the sorting machine to determine the sex at the DNA level, at least we managed to determine it at the embryo level. We developed this technology recently, and it also substitutes for imports.

Importing sexed semen from abroad is expensive. But the technology is highly successful. The dairy village established in Bishoftu is highly successful. Over 98 percent of the calves born are heifers, which is good for dairy production. Now the MoA is expanding it to 21,000 dairy villages.

Tell us about the impacts of the interventions taken by your Center in terms of achieving agricultural modernization, productivity, and structural transformation in the economy towards the industrialization aspirations in Ethiopia’s development endeavors.

The major impact of biotech is modernizing Ethiopia’s agriculture. The Bt cotton eliminated the bollworm and reduced herbicide impacts. Many technologies we introduced have saved farmers from traditional back-breaking work like weeding and pesticide spraying. Productivity has significantly improved. Women are relieved of back-breaking agricultural work. Children have time to go to school. Agricultural modernization is simplifying agricultural work so that people have time for other priorities and a quality life.

The Federal Auditor General recently disclosed a report in which it criticized the Center for failures in carrying out its duties. What is your response?

OFAG failed to understand and define NABRC’s success. Having such a state-of-the-art biotech lab and releasing several breakthrough technologies within ten years is a major accomplishment. Succeeding in a single biotechnology program takes several years, but NABRC achieved so many within the first decade of its establishment.

With the nascent biotechnology trend in Africa and in Ethiopia, NABRC has done extraordinary work. Over 50 researchers and biotech scientists have spent day and night in our labs for the past several years. But OFAG says NABRC failed to do anything.

When the officials and experts of OFAG first came, we had meetings with the management of NABRC. They told us their objective and said the audit would take around ten months. They told us at the end there would be an exit conference to reach a consensus on the audit findings. Both OFAG and NARC should have approved the findings before finalizing the report. An exit conference is a legal procedure for OFAG. For several months, we provided all the documents and reports and everything for OFAG. But finally, they left without doing the exit conference. OFAG also did not do the exit conference with EIAR.

OFAG gave us a draft report initially. We found a lot of mistakes. We provided tons of documents and evidence for them to correct their draft report. But they refused to consider any of our evidence. They also refused to do an exit conference. Hence, they proceeded to publish the draft report as a final report without our agreement and approval.

OFAG is a public institution created to check if public institutions are doing the right job. But their report regarding NARC is completely baseless and far from the truth on the ground.

Policy cannot be developed at the Center level but at the government level. We told OFAG that it was not our fault, but they failed to listen. Our reference is the existing rural agricultural development strategy to develop our research strategy. In terms of biotech performance, we are ahead on all our targets.

The Bio and Emerging Technologies Institute has drafted a biotechnology policy for Ethiopia. The draft policy is being scrutinized and reviewed at different stages. Our researchers also participated in the forums to contribute from the aspect of Agri-biotech. That draft is tabled to the Council of Ministers and is awaiting approval.

So, OFAG’s allegation that we did not produce a biotechnology policy is not related to our mandate.

The NABRC strategy is designed for 15 years, up to 2030. There are 100 strategic targets set in Agri-biotech in the strategy. Now we are in 2025, and we have achieved 71 strategic interventions. We are left with 29 strategic interventions and 5 years to accomplish them. But OFAG stated the strategic interventions failed totally and inefficiency has been ongoing for years. That is completely incorrect.

So it was all a misunderstanding?

OFAG did not understand the documents we provided to them. In one specific year, we were handling 62 research projects, but OFAG reported only two. OFAG lacks the willingness to understand what we do. They went on to publish a very substandard audit report on NABRC.

OFAG also stated NABRC mismanaged resources. That is unfounded. Each of the resources we utilize for all these research projects is mobilized based on our strong work and well-understood partnerships. EIAR and all the research wings under it, including NABRC, are among the most efficient public institutions in Ethiopia, and nobody can accuse us of anything. The nature of research disciplines and our sector does not allow us a single mistake. Our Center is the last public institution to be accused of inefficiency and failure, let alone the allegations made by OFAG.

As per the procedure, OFAG should have discussed it with us, with EIAR management, and then presented its findings to Parliament. But OFAG did not do any of this. Yet, it published its unfounded report.

We are not saying there are no challenges in our work. For instance, we need sensitive reagents for lab work. But we don’t access such chemicals in the local markets. We import directly from manufacturers abroad, so we need forex. Such chemicals should be kept at minus 20 degrees Celsius. When the chemicals arrive at Bole Airport,  the temperature rises as we await for Customs clearance. So we are requesting that refrigerating facilities be installed at Bole Airport. But OFAG reported we have a procurement crisis instead of recommending the requests we made to the Customs Commission. We never do a single procurement outside of the government’s procurement guidelines.

OFAG also reported that research students going abroad on scholarships are not coming back. This is also wrong. Every scholarship student is sent after committing collateral to come back and serve the country. Whenever a student remains abroad, the monetary guarantee is submitted to the government. If they fail to come back, they pay a fine to the government, including all expenses for their study. All that is collected if a student fails to come back. We cannot go and bring that student from abroad using force. They pay back all the money to the government treasury, every penny spent for their training. There are even students who have been brought before court to return the money. Some are in the court process currently.

OFAG also accused us of moving funds from project to project and wasting money on research not benefiting society. This is also a very amazing allegation. We would be happy if they could present one piece of evidence. Each project we are running is crucial for our society, the economy, and the national economy. No money is moved from project to project. As per government regulation, public institutions can reallocate funds from one budget code to another based on the priority at hand. In general, the OFAG report is not final until we endorse it.

Given that agricultural biotech is a new frontier for developing economies like Ethiopia, what can you tell us about the challenges your Center is facing, and how you are trying to resolve them?

Biotech is new for Africa and Ethiopia. There are also wrong perceptions regarding biotechnology, including a fear of the unknown. Not only do some segments of society doubt GMO technology, but so do some scientists. In developed countries, over 90 percent of farmland is covered with GMOs. But there are doubtful scientists even in those countries. Awareness creation is important. But in the past several years, the mindset towards biotech has substantially improved.

Research takes time. Nothing can be done overnight. Researching and developing these technologies took us years. Now we are on the verge of commercializing and translating them into economic benefits. They will revolutionize agricultural productivity, industrialization, and the modernization of Ethiopian agricultural practices as well as industries. Now is the time to see the fruits of our years of research.

We are also expanding the lab capacities of our programs under NABRC. We are building additional facilities for microbial, tissue culture, and animal biotechnology and for infection-resistant traits.

Finding a lead researcher is difficult. A lead researcher is a professor who is well-published, seasoned in breakthrough research work, and has contributed to the community and the country. Finding such manpower on the market is difficult. Therefore, we produce them ourselves.

Success in introducing a single improved variety takes several years. OFAG thinks it is something that can be done every year. This is very wrong.

The Center needs electric power 24/7. Especially the tissue culture facility, which needs regulated light for 16 hours and dark for 8 hours every day. If the power goes out for a second, all the genes and samples in machines and specific refrigerators, stored for years, will be lost. Hence, the Center has deployed three generators in case of a power outage. But OFAG reported the Center has no generator.

While commercializing the technologies it introduces, does NABRC enter into benefit-sharing agreements with the private industries?

NABRC releases the technological finding, produces a prototype, and gives it to private developers for large-scale production. For tissue culture, we also give the protocol to private multipliers or labs or developers. For instance, we released a wilt-disease-free ginger variety. Then the Mekelle biotech center multiplied the new variety in large amounts. We also developed a protocol for sugarcane, which the Mekelle biotech center multiplied and gave to all sugar industries across Ethiopia.

Private companies and industries are benefiting a lot from our technologies. In return, NABRC gets no benefit for the research it conducts. NABRC is a non-profit research institute; hence our mandate is just releasing problem-solving technologies.

But currently, a guideline is being developed to guide how such research centers can share benefits with private developers of their prototypes.

What can you tell us about reports of GMO wheat in the lowlands?

There is no GMO wheat in Ethiopia. It is a variety developed by EIAR using conventional breeding.

Bt cotton technology was introduced to farmers in 2019, but productivity has yet to improve. Farmers also report being unable to access Bt cotton seeds. Can you tell us more about this?

There is an independent task force working on cotton under MoA and the Ministry of Industry. We researched, tested and introduced Bt cotton technology. The follow-up work in implementation is mandated to the task force and the seed sector.

How do you evaluate the capacity of firms in the seed sector?

There are private, multinational, and also government enterprises involved in multiplying and supplying certified seeds for farmers.

For instance, Corteva has huge capacity in hybrid seed production in Ethiopia. It is the leading company in taking improved maize seed from research centers, multiplying and supplying it to the farming community. The Ethiopian, Oromia, Amhara and Debub seed enterprises are also major players. These are companies feeding Ethiopian agriculture.

Pioneer, which is currently called Corteva, has reportedly monopolized the supply of hybrid maize for almost all farmers in Ethiopia. A recent management crisis at the multinational prompted reports of supply disruptions in Ethiopia. Farmers also have complaints about the productivity of its improved seeds. Can you tell us more?

I do not think there is a monopoly. The demand for improved maize seed skyrocketed in Ethiopia. Currently, we are satisfying half of the demand. Regarding Corteva, you can ask the company.

Do farmers pay more for improved seeds?

Our improved seed technologies are provided for farmers royalty free. Farmers should not pay for the technology. Companies have the right to receive improved seed technologies from research centers, multiply the seed, and sell it to farmers with their own brand. The company does not incur additional cost regarding the technology. It should not charge farmers for the seed technology.

The Reporter’s Sisay Sahlu sat down with Dr. Ferdinand von Weyhe, Chargé d’Affairs a.i. of the German Embassy in Addis Ababa, to discuss Germany’s current role, its support for Ethiopia’s ongoing reforms, and the future of bilateral ties.

Dr. von Weyhe brings a wealth of experience to his post. Since 2023, he has served as Deputy Head of Mission in Addis Ababa, following senior leadership roles at the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin, where he headed both the Humanitarian Response Division (2021–2023) and the Rule of Law Promotion and Security Sector Reform Unit (2016–2021). His diplomatic career spans postings in Dhaka, St. Petersburg, Sofia, and Berlin, with expertise ranging from humanitarian response to governance and security reform.

His career reflects a blend of legal scholarship, humanitarian leadership, and diplomatic service across diverse regions. Against this backdrop, he shares insights on Germany’s priorities in Ethiopia, the challenges and opportunities in investment and security, and how the two countries can build on their 120-year legacy of cooperation. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: The diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Germany have a long history. What has been achieved over the past 120 years?

Dr. Ferdinand von Weyhe: Well, 120 years is indeed a very long time. When we speak of achievements, it is important to remember that the primary task of diplomacy is to enable and facilitate interactions between our two countries.

We have established a set of very strong pillars in the relationship between Germany and Ethiopia. If we highlight some core diplomatic achievements, one of the most significant was Emperor Haile Selassie’s visit to Germany in 1954. It was the first official visit to West Germany after the Second World War. Beyond such milestones, the role of the embassy and diplomacy is to build bridges—whether in business, culture, academia, or people-to-people exchange.

These exchanges are where we truly see achievements. The relationship is not abstract; it involves 80 million Germans and 130 million Ethiopians coming together, learning from one another, and making the best use of shared opportunities.

For example, the German Embassy School in Addis Ababa has been here for 70 years. Many Ethiopian children have studied there, and it continues to enrich our educational and cultural ties.

If we look even further back, beyond the 120 years of formal diplomatic relations, we find evidence of cooperation dating back 400 years. A notable example is the collaboration between the Ethiopian scholar Abba Gorgorios and the German scientist Hiob Ludolf.  Together, they produced works on the Ge’ez language, Amharic, and the history of Abyssinia. This illustrates the deep and long-standing intellectual connections between our two nations.

Another important pillar is our cooperation in archaeology, which is almost as old as our diplomatic relations. Next year will mark 120 years since the Axum expedition. What is remarkable is that this cooperation is not only historical—it continues today. I had the privilege of visiting German archaeologists working in Yeha, near Adwa, where there is an impressive cultural site: the Temple of Yeha. We are proud to join hands in this ongoing work, which strengthens our shared heritage and partnership.

What are the current developments and are there any priorities regarding diplomatic relations?

Well, if you look over the years, I think in those days, and this goes for diplomats around the world, at the beginning of the 20th century, the first task was to have very high-level interaction with the authorities of the receiving country. I give you one example, my predecessor in the 1920s.

He had a very close relationship with the Ras Teferi [Mekonnen] and members of the imperial family were coming to his house, having lunch together, and maintaining a friendly relationship. You might be aware that some days ago, we had a wonderful celebration at the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, where several artefacts were donated to the Institute, which is part of Addis Ababa University. These artefacts were gifts from Ras Teferi 100 years ago to my predecessor.

So, we chose this very close interaction at the highest level. And then there was the task of supporting your own nationals. Both tasks are still relevant today.

But also, one stream of diplomatic support has always been business, which was relevant then and is still relevant today. I also mentioned the field of scientific cooperation. I think this has been, from the very beginning, an important pillar of interest, where diplomats supported expeditions to Aksum, just as we support archaeologists today working in Yeha or other places.

I think what has emerged as a new point of bilateral ties is development and economic cooperation, which only started after World War II and which today is also an important pillar of our bilateral relations.

The EU, specifically Germany, has been a very good supporter of Ethiopia’s development efforts and humanitarian issues. The Tigray war prompted a diplomatic backlash from the international community and EU members. What has changed since then, and how is the German government balancing this diplomatic relationship?

We make a clear distinction between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. Humanitarian assistance is focused on people in need. So, we support people in need irrespective of government, regime, or conflict situation, across the globe.

It is a principled approach to humanitarian assistance: we assess how many people are in need, and we provide support. This applies to Germany, but also to many other countries that want to support people in need.

A second axis of interaction is development cooperation. For us, this is very important to make government-to-government, because we don’t want to carry out development actions in any country without working jointly with the government. It is more efficient, and most importantly, we don’t want to interfere in another country’s affairs without the agreement of its elected government.

Now, coming to the northern Ethiopia conflict, there was indeed a suspension of EU budget support. I want to stress that Germany also suspended its budget support, but we have now unblocked this support so it can flow again.

It will flow together with the DPO, the World Bank program. This is very important to emphasize, because we are doing this in respect and support of the macroeconomic reforms that have been undertaken. As a community with the IMF and World Bank, we have clearly signalled that we want to support Ethiopia’s macroeconomic reforms. This is why the IMF is spending a lot of money, this is why the World Bank is spending a lot of money, and as contributors, we are also in line with this by unfreezing our bilateral budget support to Ethiopia.

How is your government measuring the effectiveness of the support provided? For example, recently we have seen a large amount of money pledged by the German government: 205 million euros for support to the Ethiopian government and five million for UNDP’s peace efforts in Ethiopia.

Indeed, we have just pledged a lot of money. One part, I was just talking about it, the 100 million for the budget support, which had been subscribed already a couple of years back and has now been unfrozen because of the progress we saw with the macroeconomic reforms.

Then there is another 106 million, which is based on the recent development negotiations we had only last month in Berlin, where a delegation from Ethiopia went to Germany. This money is not budget support, but it is very specifically for jointly agreed programs and projects.

Now to your question, how do we measure, evaluate, monitor—we do all this. Well, every program, every project must not only be monitored, but also evaluated.

We have an institution for this in Germany. It is called Deval. This institute has the responsibility to evaluate our programs and projects undertaken in the field of development cooperation.

So, it is a very technical approach. If you have a project, then you have a log frame, then you define what your impact shall be, what your outcome shall be, what your output shall be, and what the indicators are.

And then, after or even during the program, we assess to what extent these goals have been attained.

Germany is known for initiating new projects in Ethiopia, which have been very successful, including in public housing, agriculture, and TVET schools. How do you evaluate the government of Germany’s endeavour to support Ethiopia in different sectors?

First, it is, of course, German taxpayers’ money. So, we must be very attentive to how it is spent and used. By and large, we are convinced that the programs—again, jointly designed by the German and Ethiopian governments—are very good.

And they have a good purpose. We all know that even as a company, you might have a good purpose and a good goal you want to attain, but it will not always succeed. This is also fair to acknowledge.

In the end, there are others to judge this, not the German acting ambassador. I see, for example, the Universities of Applied Sciences. I think this is something many people will associate with Germany and with German contributions.

The vocational schools are a very good example. The TVET system, which we attach great importance to, comes from our own experience in Germany. The important issue about the TVET system is the interaction between industry and the schooling system.

Because we all know that industry—I call it industry at large, it includes services, hotels, or whatever it is—the demand is changing rapidly. And if there is a school system saying, “Oh yes, we have this curriculum, and last year we had the same, and ten years ago we also had the same,” then the industry will say, “Yes, that is very nice, but we don’t work for history. We want somebody trained for our needs today.” And there is a lot of change.

So, it is very important to have this interaction between industry, the demand for the workforce, and the training institutes—the TVET system—so that TVET is training young people according to the needs of the labour market, and not according to some curriculum invented 20 years ago.

The vast majority of students have failed the university entrance exam in Ethiopia, and the government is pushing them to join TVET schools. Are there any plans to expand support for the TVET system?

I wouldn’t say expand, but we want to continue this path, because we consider it important, and based on our own experience, I think we can contribute here.

But again, I think most importantly—and this is why we always stress the interaction of the schools with industry, services, architecture, or whatever—is this cooperation between local demanders, local job providers, local employees, and the schools, to make it really top-notch and up-to-date.

How much are German companies investing in Ethiopia?

I can’t say, because the German embassy does not keep track of investors here in town or in the country.

So, it is only by chance, through those who come to the embassy for some issues, some problems, or just to say, “Hello, I’m here,” but we do not have any system where every German coming here must pass by the embassy and declare, “I want to invest so much money.”

So, I cannot give you exact figures. There is some investment in the field of agriculture, and some investment in Bole Lemi Park to produce specific materials. But, by and large, the investment is not big.

When I came here two years ago, I was wondering why this was the case. Talking to many businesses over time, having visited Dire Dawa this week and Hawassa Industrial Park, I tried to understand the problem: why is there not more FDI coming to Ethiopia? And I think, if you talk to businesses, and again, I’m just a diplomat, I don’t have to make money here, I don’t have to protect my investment, I don’t have to make a business case—we do see that they face a lot of problems and challenges.

The important issue is that a potential investor may come to the German Embassy to ask, “How is the situation? What can you tell me about the country you are serving? But the most important information he will get is from businesses already in the field, already active in Ethiopia. If they say, “Everything is very smooth, administration is good, we have a good legal framework, everything is fine,” then the investor will say, “Okay, this is a place where I will put my money, my intellectual capacity, and my technical equipment.”

But if the companies are saying, “We are facing administrative hurdles, we face insecurity, we have challenges with the tax system, or whatever,” then this investor will say, “Okay, better to spend my money in another country.”

The EU Chamber in Ethiopia recently spoke out about the challenges that EU businesses are facing. Are there any specific challenges for German companies?

This goes beyond investing. I think one challenge, in addition to what I just said above, is not what an investor might face, but what a buyer faces. It is also very important to bring in buyers to purchase Ethiopian products—not only coffee, which we all know about, but also other agricultural products—to increase the labour-intensive component of production here in Ethiopia. For example, buyers of garments from the industry.

Let me put two points here. One is that there is a huge opportunity for Ethiopian companies producing in Ethiopia—when I say Ethiopian, I am not referring to the passport, but to companies based here—because there is a European customs regime called ‘Everything But Arms.” This means that from Ethiopia to Europe, you can export everything except arms with no customs duties and no tariffs.

I think this is attractive and provides a great competitive advantage for products produced in Ethiopia. But those who want to source from Ethiopia, for example, garments, say they face two issues. The first is logistics. It is difficult, expensive, and time-consuming. They told me that it takes more time to ship garments from Ethiopia to the European market than from Southeast Asia to Europe, even though the distances are much greater from Asia. So, logistics is really an issue.

I think there has been a good step forward in opening the freight forwarding sector. It is very important to have more competition here, to bring in more freight forwarders, and to make this a success. Logistics is a critical link in the chain of making Ethiopian products successful. The second issue is customs. Buyers say it is sometimes very difficult and takes too much time to get items through customs.

When Volkswagen executives visited Ethiopia two years ago, they personally told me they had a plan to open a plant in Ethiopia and were looking for favourable policies from the Ethiopian side. What happened to their plan?

Have the policies been changed? Yes, some policies have changed, particularly regarding e-vehicles. Over the past two years, I have seen a huge change in the car market here.

We had discussions with Volkswagen because we also asked ourselves about the ideas we heard two or three years ago about them coming to Ethiopia. The big issue, I think—and this applies to many European car companies—is that imports of combustible cars are now restricted. Another issue is that the e-vehicle market, from their perspective, is not yet fully developed.

If you have a European high-end quality brand, then you must protect it. If the after-sales service, workshops, and infrastructure for e-vehicles are not yet secured, then they say, “We’d better wait.” They don’t want their customers to buy a Mercedes, Volkswagen, or any other car here in Ethiopia and then ask, “Where is the workshop? Where is the mechanic? Where is the after-sales service? Where is the charging infrastructure for this car?”

If those things are missing, then these high-reputation brands face challenges in terms of marketing and branding worldwide. So, they say, “Once this is secured, in terms of all these things that are important—not only selling, which is easy, but ensuring reliability—we will move forward.” A high-end quality product must guarantee that the customer is happy not only on the day of purchase, but also five or ten years later.

And for this, after-sales service is essential. This is what they explained to me, and it makes sense.

Is there any possibility of things changing?

Oh, yes, of course. Because we all know Ethiopia is a fast-growing market. So many people live here. We have the African Continental Free Trade Area, which is on the way.

So, from here, you might also be able to export. And if conditions are set for these brands to come in, I mean, they want to make money. They want to make customers here happy as well. So, they would say, “Okay, let’s go.”

Ethiopia mostly exports agricultural and textile products to the EU market. Is there any plan to diversify exports from Ethiopia? How is the EUDR being negotiated?

For the first one, we must ask the business. Because we are not a state-run economy. We are not, as an embassy, saying, “Oh, we now want to import this or that.” It is the business.

And if they see a good opportunity to source from Ethiopia, they will surely do so. Coffee, agricultural products, flowers—yes, all of this. I think for the value chain in Ethiopia, it would be crucial not to export raw materials or raw products, but to climb further up the production chain.

Now, for the EUD, the purpose of this regulation is very good and very important.

It feeds into Ethiopia’s green legacy, for example, to prevent forests from being cut. And this is something we all should fight for—following the Paris Agreement, following our climate goals, seeing the devastating effects of climate change. So, it is important to have such a regulation in place.

Being one of the biggest markets in the world, the EU has a responsibility as a consumer. I am talking not about governments, but about consumers, to contribute. Because in the end, it is the consumer who pays for everything added in terms of clarification, regulation, and so on.

Because businesses will pass all the costs on. So, the European consumer is ready to pay extra costs to contribute to preventing forests from being cut down. Now, for the EUDR regulation, the timeline has been extended. And the administrative challenges or requirements have been eased. So, this is something that Ethiopian coffee farmers—and we know there are millions of them—can now work with more easily. It is also quite important to have this tracking of coffee, because other things can build on it.

For example, if you want to make extra money with coffee in terms of organic or fair trade or whatever you call this extra branding, then again, consumers are ready to pay extra money for this. And for this, of course, you need localisation of the product.

What about the EU’s human rights considerations in production?

Well, at least I can say for Germany, there is a law on this. And it is not only about child labour, but about a responsible supply chain. The consumer and the company in Germany that sells the product to the German consumer must ensure that, along the supply chain, certain standards in terms of human rights are respected. Child labour is one of these issues. So, no child labour is allowed, and other social conditions must also be met. Again, the German consumer is ready to pay for this because it all creates extra costs, and he or she will pay a higher price for the product, but is willing to do so.

Ethiopian officials have been undertaking reforms on human rights, media laws, and initiating transitional justice and national dialogue. How is your government following the practicality of those undertakings? How are these issues being evaluated in a country that has also been supporting those reforms?

In the end, it is, of course, an Ethiopian decision how to move forward, what kind of freedom of expression, what kind of healing process after a war. We can share our experience; we can give support here and there.

We are very happy that we are working together with Ethiopia on the Human Rights Council in Geneva, where Ethiopia is now elected vice president of the UNHRC, which gives, of course, a certain responsibility also towards the world.

The national dialogue, I understand, is a very strong, inclusive, ongoing process—inclusive wherever possible in this country. I understand that it is not possible in all provinces, and not in all areas, due to security issues, so this, of course, is hampering. But by and large, I think it is important.

It is a way of expressing grievances, interacting with society, and giving room for different groups. And I think, when I read it correctly, we are now at the stage of how to really feed this into a final national convening—integrating all the ideas, problems, grievances, solutions, whatever is coming from the public.

Of course, this is my German experience: normally, in our system, we don’t have a national dialogue. People have the right and the possibility to express their aims, goals, and wishes through elections. And since elections are coming up next summer here in Ethiopia, I think this will feed into the process.

The second one is transitional justice. From our own experience, after the reunification of Germany, which we celebrated this year with 35 years of reunification, we also had different approaches to healing, because in the end, it is about healing. One example was that people had the chance to look into the archives of the secret police to see whether there was any file on them. This was one attempt at healing—it is all about healing. And I know here there is also something like truth-telling, meeting, and forgiving.

But again, in our system, what was clear for me at least is that there were also actions that had been taken—let me put it in neutral terms—that had to be followed through an accountability system in the sense of a criminal court system. This was at least our experience after reunification. So, we do think that such a process might also be troublesome for some people, and it can be challenging for many, but we believe that in the end, it is a healing process after difficult times, whether it be war or the system we had in East Germany.

The next point was on the media. We attach great importance to media freedom. Why? Because it is spelt out in so many legal documents—not only in our constitution, but in many constitutions and international agreements. Freedom of the media is very important. With the media, people have the chance to express themselves, and this can also, from a government perspective—and I am a civil servant—prevent things from boiling over, because people already have the chance to express themselves, share grievances, and say they are not happy or whatever it may be.

So, in the end, it is good to get this kind of feedback, because only then can we work towards the people, and we are, in the end, responsible to the people. It is sometimes not pleasant to hear what the media is saying, yes, that is true, and I am not sure how all politicians in Germany take the media, but I think all politicians should be aware that the role of the media is helpful as a kind of mirror to the actions of the administration.

We are here with Deutsche Welle Amharic, which is not a government institution but a free media. We follow the situation of Deutsche Welle Amharic very closely, and I know from many Ethiopian interlocutors who tell me, “Oh, already my father and my mother have been listening to Deutsche Welle Amharic.” So, I think for many Ethiopians it is an important tool of information. We are still hopeful that the suspension of the two remaining journalists will be lifted, so that all journalists here—all correspondents of Deutsche Welle Amharic—can continue to work as they did for many, many years.

To tell the truth, to inform the population—I think this is very important. Regarding human rights, I touched upon this by mentioning Geneva and Ethiopia’s vice presidency at the UNHRC, which is a very important responsibility in terms of human rights. We also see the situation here with the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. It must be an Ethiopian institution—it is not foreigners, but Ethiopians—and it is very good that they have a close view on the situation in this country.

To speak out when needed on human rights, not in a way that blames, shames, or confronts, but really to put a finger on issues. It should be a helping hand for the government to improve the situation, because, as I said, all our governments have subscribed to human rights.

When your government and the EU in general provide development support to Ethiopia, how do they evaluate the state of human rights, media freedom, and democracy in the country, given that these values are often considered Western principles closely tied to diplomatic and bilateral relations? 

I wouldn’t say these values are Western. They might have been developed in the Western world because the Enlightenment, historically with Descartes and Kant and other philosophers, was strong in the West. But in the end, we can derive all these human rights from a core value deeply embedded in Ethiopia, even based on religious values—the dignity of the human being, which is central in Christianity.

We are about to celebrate Genna (Christmas). In Christianity, we believe that man was created by God according to His image. So, these values are not simply Western ideas; they are based on the dignity of human beings, something universal.

It is no coincidence that these values unite the world through so many international treaties, including in Africa.

Now to your question about cooperation with countries regarding media freedom, rule of law, or similar issues. One approach is: if there is a lack of rule of law, why not work jointly on it? That would imply increasing cooperation. But another view is: if we have worked for years on improving the rule of law and see no progress, why continue? So, it is not an easy answer.

We take it from a partnership perspective. If there is a clear interest, even with shortcomings in human rights or governance, we treat it as a joint challenge to work on. If we are invited to support, we do so. If the government says, “No, we want to keep it as it is,” we will not interfere.

Here in Ethiopia, one strong pillar of our development cooperation is improving governance. If the government invites us to support us with our experience, knowledge, and institutions like KfW and GIZ, we are happy to do so.

During the northern Ethiopia war, there was huge pressure from the EU, the US, and other countries to stop the fighting. Although the scale is different, there are also conflicts in Amhara and Oromia, with reports of killings, looting, and rape. How are these developments being observed now? Is there similar pressure?

I am just an observer. We see conflicts ongoing, and this is very sad. It hampers travelling through the country, and it hampers investment. Investors need stability and security. If they hear of looted farms or insecurity, they will choose another country.

When I talk to Ethiopian interlocutors, I see how difficult it is to reach political agreements and solutions. We can only encourage peace. What we can contribute is support after the war in the North, where so much is ruined and people are in despair.

For example, we support the UNDP Peace Support Facility, and we contribute to programs for medium-sized enterprises and the PSNP, especially in rural areas. These instruments feed into stability and discourage people from picking up arms again.

We also support repairing schools, water pipelines, and institutions like police and courts, so people feel everyday life is improving—not just that fighting has stopped.

Any pressure or efforts from the EU or Germany to push officials for more peace efforts?

I wouldn’t say pressure. But of course, we have conversations with the Ethiopian government to understand how they are working toward peace. No external pressure is needed to convince a government to seek peace with its own population, to increase security, stability, and investment.

Children going back to school is a huge issue. Many are prevented from attending because of conflict. So, peace is in the government’s very own interest. If they ask how we can support them, we stand ready. Stability in Ethiopia matters not only for Ethiopia but for Africa as a whole.

How do you see Ethiopia regarding its role in Horn of Africa politics?

Ethiopia is a major stabiliser, contributing to the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and fighting terrorism. Ethiopia’s role in combating al-Shabaab is commendable, both within AUSSOM and bilaterally. This is why the EU strongly supports this African-led mission. It is a good signal that it is AU-led.

The same applies to the AU mission in Ethiopia’s North. African ownership and African-led solutions are crucial.

On sea access, I can only reflect on reactions from Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Ethiopia’s request for port access has caused concerns from its end. The memorandum with Somaliland two years ago caused an outcry, but it has been settled, which is good.

We fully support Ethiopia’s diversification of ports, as spelt out in a letter by the foreign minister. Today, about 90 percent of trade goes through Djibouti, but there are many options—Assab, Lamu, Berbera, and Mombasa. Opening the freight forwarding sector and enabling competition will reduce costs and improve Ethiopia’s competitiveness.

The EU visa restrictions imposed in April 2024 included longer processing times, suspension of multiple-entry visas, and stricter documentation. This was due to insufficient cooperation on the readmission of irregular migrants. Is there development?

There was a lack of cooperation, and we are very happy to see that this cooperation in terms of taking back or identifying and then taking back own nationals from Europe has improved, that there’s a good, solid cooperation now. This is why there’s a lot of discussion going on in Brussels about how to come back to the situation as it was one and a half years ago, to abolish the visa requirement.

Will it be soon?

That depends on Brussels. I don’t know if it will be soon, but the process is underway, and I am hopeful. Cooperation has improved, and this gives a good chance for the restrictions to be lifted.

The EU and Germany are strong supporters of Ethiopia’s elections. But opposition parties say the release of imprisoned politicians is necessary for free and fair elections. Has this been discussed?

We have constant conversations with the relevant authorities, such as NEBE. We strongly support the election process—not only technically, but also by supporting civil society organisations to build trust in free and fair elections.

We hear the opposition’s concerns about security. It is important that all parties can communicate their messages through the media. Ultimately, all parties must do their homework, and the people must have the choice to vote freely.

A recent study conducted by OCP Ethiopia, a subsidiary of the OCP phosphate mining and fertilizer production conglomerate owned by the Moroccan state, and the Sidama Region Agricultural Research Institute (SiRARI) portrays soil acidity as a growing concern in Ethiopia, where agriculture remains central to the economy, employing about 80 percent of the workforce and contributing more than 35 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The study found that more than 43 percent of Ethiopia’s actively cultivated land is acidic, with pH levels classified as critically low. It highlighted that roughly 72 percent of land in areas such as Sidama, Southwest Ethiopia, and South Ethiopia is affected by low soil pH, while up to 60 percent of farmland in the Oromia Regional State and 35 percent of farmland in the Amhara Regional State experience similar acidity-related conditions.

Experts involved in the study, including lead researcher Selamyihun Kidanu (PhD), note that acidic soils significantly reduce agricultural productivity. They explain that low pH conditions bind essential nutrients such as phosphorus, limit the availability of key elements needed by crops, and reduce microbial activity that supports soil health. As a result, crop yields in affected areas can fall to around half of the national average.

The researchers further highlight that acidic conditions increase the solubility of toxic elements such as aluminum and manganese. These elements, according to the experts, can accumulate in the soil at harmful levels, placing additional stress on crops and reinforcing a cycle of low productivity for farming communities already facing declining returns from their land.

Selamyihun has been a principal agronomist at OCP Ethiopia since 2017, where he currently serves as director of agronomy and business development. A soil scientist with training from Haramaya University, Selamyihun has built a career centered on large-scale agricultural production within cross-social contexts. He is widely recognized for his work on soil acidity and nutrient management in Ethiopia, including the development of solutions such as OC-MASSA, a specialized type of fertilizer, to address phosphorus deficiency and acidic soils and improve conditions for crop production.

In an in-depth conversation with The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle, Selamyihun examined the critical soil acidity crisis in Ethiopia and the transformative agricultural and economic potential of OC-MASSA. He also provided updates on the current status of OCP’s 2021 agreement to develop a fertilizer production plant in eastern Ethiopia. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: You recently conducted a field trip to the OC-MASSA Wheat Cluster Demonstration, organized by OCP Ethiopia in partnership with the Sidama Region Agricultural Research Institute (SiRARI). Walk us through its purpose and key findings of the project and share with us the relationship between your visit and the study conducted in the region.

Selamyihun Kidanu (PhD): I think the journey took several years, driven by the search for products that work effectively in challenging soil environments. Soil acidity is a major constraint in the country for several reasons. It affects a large share of cultivated land, estimated at 43 percent. These areas also coincide with zones of high agricultural importance where rainfall is substantial. Addressing soil acidity can significantly improve the productivity of rain-fed agriculture, as many of these regions receive more than 800 millimeters of rainfall within three to four months. This makes them reliable in terms of moisture and temperature regimes. However, soil acidity remains the main bottleneck to fully utilizing this potential.

Soil acidity presents four major constraints that must be addressed together. The first is low soil pH, which affects nutrient stability. Even when soils contain nutrient reserves, these are not biologically available under acidic conditions. When soil pH falls below 5.5, acidity becomes a limiting factor. For optimal crop growth, soil pH should range between 6.5 and 7.5.

Since 2019, a blended fertilizer has been developed to support crops affected by soil acidity. The product was evaluated in the field with local partners, the national agricultural research system, and regional counterparts. Over two years, rigorous field studies were conducted across 54 benchmark sites. Based on the results, 11 blended fertilizer formulas tailored for wheat production were advanced.

With the support of the Ministry of Agriculture, these products went through the registration process and were approved as commercial fertilizers. Before market introduction, efforts focused on building awareness at the grassroots level. Multi-location preliminary trials were conducted during the current season across several regions. One of these initiatives took place in Sidama, where work was carried out on crops such as common beans and wheat. Field visits were organized with partners to observe farmer responses and hear feedback based on their experiences using the blended fertilizers called OC-MASSA.

Based on your findings, what government policy changes are being considered to scale up the adoption of OC-MASSA nationwide—especially in addressing low farmer awareness and to bring more results in the agricultural system?

The primary objective of our pre-commercial demonstrations was to systematically gather evidence, beginning with small-scale experimental plots and scaling up to 10-hectare farm clusters. By implementing these trials within local communities, incorporating groups of 30 to 40 farmers, we have successfully bridged the gap between research and reality. We now possess a full spectrum of data, ranging from controlled experimental results to real-world farm performance. This comprehensive evidence base provides policymakers with the necessary confidence to take decisive action rooted in locally developed, scientific findings.

Beyond the data, securing “buy-in” from the farming community is essential for the long-term adoption of these products. We are actively capturing farmer perceptions and testimonials to understand how they envision integrating these solutions into their future practices. By connecting technical research data with the lived experiences of farmers in our semi-commercial demonstrations, we have created a cohesive narrative of success. This integrated body of evidence, combining objective science with community feedback, now empowers policymakers to make informed, strategic decisions for the agricultural sector.

What has been done to create awareness in this regard to low-informed farmers to cut the cost of these technological materials to the farm lands?

OC-MASSA is designed as an alternative option for addressing acidic land. From a logistics perspective, it has a significant advantage. To illustrate this quantitatively, correcting soil acidity using lime requires the application of about 20 quintals over 2.4 hectares. OC-MASSA can achieve a similar effect with only three quintals of fertilizer. This represents a shift from conventional soil amendment approaches to a customized fertilizer solution that combines pH correction with the supply of missing nutrients, particularly phosphorus, which are the two main constraints being addressed.

Because of this efficiency, OC-MASSA is easier for farmers to use and more cost-effective. An investment in OC-MASSA can be recovered within a single season, without a long waiting period. In contrast, lime requires the application of large quantities, involves higher logistical costs, and demands more infrastructure for transport, storage, and handling. OC-MASSA can be distributed through existing fertilizer value chains without additional infrastructure, allowing it to reach remote areas through the national distribution system. It provides productivity comparable to lime while offering faster recovery, quicker returns, and better accessibility.

What does the long-term research show about the efficacy and cost-benefit of OC-MASSA compared to traditional bulk agricultural lime in managing soil acidity?

Extensive research was conducted as part of this work, including the collection of about 1,200 data points across multiple activities. On average, comparisons between conventional fertilizers and OC-MASSA show a yield advantage of around 20 to 30 percent. In some cases, particularly in highly sensitive agro-ecological zones, the advantage ranges from 20 to 50 percent. Variations are observed across locations due to differences in crop tolerance and sensitivity to soil pH levels.

When compared with the conventional fertilizers currently in use, the average advantage of OC-MASSA generally ranges between 10 and 25 percent. When these gains are translated to the scale of cultivated land, the overall impact is substantial. The improvement significantly reduces crop susceptibility to soil acidity and can result in an estimated additional 1.4 million metric tons of grain production.

How is the ongoing site-specific fertilizer research being integrated into the national agricultural extension system?

This represents OCP’s core vision of building a sustainable agricultural system in Africa. When soil acidity limits crop production, the objective is to shift toward more nutrient-dense crops such as wheat, maize, and barley, rather than relying mainly on more acid-tolerant root crops. While root crops contribute primarily carbohydrates, cereals offer broader nutritional value. Increasing the production and productivity of these crops is a central priority, closely aligned with government policy aimed at achieving national self-sufficiency. Once self-sufficiency is reached, the focus can shift to export or import substitution, reflecting the strategic outcomes of sustained productivity growth.

Secondly, addressing soil acidity has become a top priority for the government, as it directly influences the livelihoods of millions. Geographically, this issue affects regions home to approximately 18 million people; when considering the average household size of five, the impact extends to nearly 40 million individuals. Enhancing agricultural productivity in these areas does more than just bolster the national economy—it fundamentally secures the future of these households. By improving yields on acidic lands, the country is not only lifting its overall economic status but also ensuring steady progress and increased capacity for the millions of citizens.

OCP has announced the completion of its comprehensive soil mapping study. Could you provide an update on the current status of the map? When can we expect the results to be fully operationalized or made accessible to the public?

Soil maps provide information on the spatial distribution of soil types and their key properties. To link specific products with appropriate recommendations, a dedicated tool is required. A cartographic tool that shows the spatial distribution of soil acidity across different regions serves this purpose and can be effectively used by the agricultural extension system. At the same time, digital agricultural tools have been developed and are supported through national distribution and decision-support platforms.

These tools are being developed through collaboration between the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research, and related centers. Initial cartographic and soil fertility mapping has already been completed, including soil fertility maps produced under the ETH project. This work resulted in the country’s first soil fertility atlas, which identifies nutrient deficiencies, their geographic locations, and the constraints that must be addressed to reach appropriate solutions. The atlas provides precise location-based information to guide interventions.

Regarding the publication, the core work is complete, though we continue to refine the data iteratively. The final phase, which incorporates the full national dataset, is scheduled for release this year. Currently, updated segments are already available in databases for some parts of the country. While we intend to publish all generated findings, the system is already fully operational and being utilized.

In September 2021, Ethiopia and OCP signed the agreement for a fertilizer complex valued at more than USD 2–3 billion. Where does this project stand today, and what is the updated timeline for construction and commissioning—especially in light of the later USD 2.5 billion urea plant deal signed with the Dangote Group in August 2025?

Progress on the Dire Dawa project has been limited, primarily due to the lack of ready raw material sources required for manufacturing. The initial strategy was to capitalize on natural gas reserves from the Ogaden region to power fossil fuel plants; however, because the government-controlled gas supply did not meet initial expectations, the project required a lengthy revision of its planned capacity. As the industrial landscape shifts—notably with the Dangote Group’s Urea plant now utilizing available gas—our organization is adapting its approach. We are currently proposing an alternative path: the establishment of a unilateral fertilizer plant in Ethiopia to better align with these evolving market dynamics.

Considering the four-to-five-year timeframe since the project’s inception, what factors would you identify as the primary drivers of this delay? Is this stagnation attributable to shifts in the political landscape, or has it been caused by specific policy-related challenges?

This issue is not related to political or policy changes, nor is it a matter of right or wrong decisions. The development of value chains and the development of products follow separate paths. While OCP is not the direct source of supply, it has been a key technical contributor from the very beginning. When the government requested the establishment of four complexes, the responsibility for end-supply inputs rested with the government, as these were not within OCP’s capacity to provide.

During this process, a series of rigorous studies were conducted. The findings showed that the initial approach could not be implemented as assumed. As a result, the work shifted to a parallel pathway focused on developing local TSP granulation. However, once the process moved from assumptions to detailed feasibility studies and granular analysis, the results indicated that this option was not economically viable. This led to a clear separation into two distinct approaches, based on a shared understanding of the constraints involved.

Beyond the Dire Dawa initiative, has OCP partnered with the Ethiopian government on any other projects of a similar scale or nature?

Yes, but while many of these initiatives are starting from the ground up, we currently have five planning units under lease. Our focus is on supporting local initiatives that face operational challenges by prioritizing the development of OC-MASSA. Through this, we aim to revitalize and support customized suppliers, helping them recover and achieve stability. Although the journey over the past four to five years has involved building from scratch, our progress has significantly exceeded expectations. However, to transition into full-scale commercial production as per our existing agreements, the government must now provide the necessary off-take guarantees.

Recent developments indicate a notable shift in Ethiopia’s fertilizer procurement, with a portion of sourcing moving from Morocco to China. Does this transition reflect OCP’s operational performance or supply capacity? To what extent is OCP currently positioned to fulfill Ethiopia’s total national demand for fertilizer?

OCP participates in international tenders and primarily supplies products that complement national fertilizer resources, such as NPS and NPS Plus. When the government changes the source product from NPS to DAP, the cost increases significantly. In addition, it is not possible to shift production from one product to another on short notice, particularly when demand is high, because production lines are committed well in advance. By the time the government decides to shift to DAP our production lines are often already fully allocated, making it impossible to meet the additional demand through the same international tender process.

Why the sudden change?

First, the timing of the government’s tender purchases is often not known in advance. While the government has the full right to change its expectations and procurement decisions as it sees fit, such changes are typically communicated only at the final stage of the procurement process. As a result, this information remains unavailable until the last moment, limiting the ability of suppliers to plan or adjust accordingly.

Askari is one half of a joint venture with Hong Kong Xingxu Mining International Investment Co. Ltd undertaking exploration work for a copper and gold project in western Ethiopia. Hong Kong Xingxu, through its parent company Shining Star, was also involved in a USD 300 million copper mining project in Angola.

With their combined technical expertise, capital, and skill leverages, the two companies envisage the rapid realization of the Nejo Gold and Copper Project in the Oromia region, which D’Anna says can serve as an example for Ethiopia’s commercial-scale mining ambitions.

Askari is also interested in lithium, tin, tantalum, rubidium, rare earth metal pegmatites, and D’Anna argues Ethiopia should responsibly exploit its mineral wealth as a pillar of development. He notes that global mining giants are eyeing Ethiopia as the government moves ahead with its liberalization efforts, particularly in banking.

In an interview with The Reporter, D’Anna observes immense potential and argues that Ethiopia’s mining sector is at the beginning of a transition that he says hinges on reconciling gaps between federal and regional governments, nurturing investors, and installing certified refining and  smelting plants to grow local employment, skills transition and curb illicit outflow. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Could you give us an overview of your projects in Ethiopia and Namibia?

Gino D’Anna: We have been operational in Namibia for three years now. Our project is 400 square kilometers of continuous tenure, adjacent to an operating tin mine. It has prospects for lithium, tin, tantalum, rubidium, and rare metal pegmatites. We have done extensive drilling, trenching, geophysics and soil surveys. We are looking to finalize our next phase of drilling as we seek to declare our maiden JORC (2012) mineral resource in the next 12 months.

In Ethiopia, our focus here is the Nejo project. It is on the same greenstone belt as Kurmuk mine, which is 3.4 million ounces. It surrounds the Tulu Kapi mine, which is 1.7 million ounces. For us, it is a flagship project as it contains high-grade gold and copper. There has been a lot of drilling, trenching and geophysics work done there. But these works are close to three decades old in some cases; there is no modern exploration done for the area. So we’ve deployed modern techniques and expertise for the Nejo project. It is 1,200 square kilometers. We are approaching it with multiple exploration disciplines technically in parallel with each other. We are currently focused on drilling on southern mineralised corridor zones, extensional trenching, as well as magnetic geophysical surveys, particularly on our copper targets. We are utilizing drone technology to map variations in mineralization, and also using spectral satellite imagery to advance target generation. We are also bringing in the expertise of what we have been doing in Namibia to Ethiopia in terms of modern exploration.

When do you expect to finalize exploration and proceed to the mining development stage?

This is the first modern exploration work at Nejo, since the last exploration was done for Nejo over two decades ago. We expect to reach preliminary results within 12 months by declaring our maiden JORC (2012) mineral resource. There will then be technical and economic feasibility works, as well as environmental feasibility assessments. In terms of finalizing the exploration works and beginning mining development works, we estimate anywhere between 12 to 24 months. After finalizing exploration, identifying operational environment constraints and studying the different landscapes, going operational will take three to four years from there.

We will also work on copper reserves in the northern zone of the license area; antimony, platinum, palladium and rare earth mineral potentials in the area also exist which haven’t been followed up. There is also the historical Yubdo platinum, palladium reserve. Askari is investing to uncover and refine all the data and information for these minerals.

Several foreign mining companies, including others from Australia and Canada, have acquired licenses and concessions in Ethiopia. However, none have managed to go operational despite trying for several years and extending their license terms. This can be attributed to a number of factors, but how do you plan to maneuver these challenges?

Fundamentally and historically, Ethiopia has struggled to attract FDI, manage the expectations of western companies, and maintain FDI operations. There has been an extensive period of unrest and political instability in Ethiopia, which has actually now been dealt with under the current government operating with a regime that values the crucial role of mining in Ethiopia’s economic development.

The government is also opening up the economy, including opening up the banking sector. So there is a much easier flow of forex in the economy now. While Ethiopia’s mining industry is in its infancy, the government understands the crucial need for commercial-scale mining in Ethiopia. The government is also balancing the needs of local communities and artisanal operators. As mining areas in Ethiopia have historically undergone extensive artisanal mining, the government is now ensuring employment and financial benefits for them. Artisanal mining is good for locals as a short-term source of finance. But it is also full of danger. It is large-scale commercial mining which will highly benefit the economy.

Over the past weeks, Askari management has been discussing with high-ranking officials from federal and regional governments. Large-scale commercial mining has multi-generational benefits, and has potential to transform the economy, create more jobs, and generate revenue streams for government and community. Even after the mining is over, the company will redevelop the land and make it productive for the society.

Exploration takes capital and needs patience. It needs government protection. For Ethiopia, mining is not about gold and precious metals. Take GERD, which is a huge source of renewable energy power, but you need significant copper inventories to ensure the transmissions of the power. Ethiopia needs to explore more of its minerals that is necessitated by its developing economic sectors. That is why we are also working on copper production, to feed into the great economic initiatives of Ethiopia’s green initiatives.

Of course, there is a lot of work to be done to realize the fruits of the economic reforms underway at macro, structural, and sectoral levels. Especially once investment bankers start coming to Ethiopia following the banking sector open-up, that will be a powerful turning point in terms of unlocking huge finance for development. Once that powerful pillar trenches to Ethiopia’s economic standard, we will see a lot more western companies coming in. Government protection of FDI and mining investments is also crucial.

What are the terms of Askari’s joint venture with Hong Kong Xingxu, and what is the size of the investment?
We benefit from the partnership with Hong Kong. Askari brings modern technical skill, financial feasibility and expertise to the table. The parent company of Hong Kong, which is Shining Star, commissioned Angola’s only commercial-scale copper mine. They have been producing copper for about two months now. That is a USD 300 million dollar investment on their part. That is substantial.

On top of the strong relationship between Hong Kong and Shining Star, Askari has strong skills and expertise in gold exploration. Once Askari finalizes the technical exploration works, that is when Shining Star brings in the capital required for the gold and copper production stage, to construct, commission and start mining. That is where the importance of the partnership is. For the exploration work, we will spend around five million dollars on Nejo over the next twelve months. This initial exploration is crucial for the next stages of investment. Then tens of millions of dollars will be invested.

How do you view regulatory frameworks in Ethiopia and what kind of support does your company enjoy?

Our Nejo project is located in the Oromia Regional State. So you need a strong relationship with the Oromia Mineral Development Authority as well as the Oromia Mining Group. We have been developing this relationship for sometime now. We have also got support from the federal government in terms of the licensing process.

Part of a successful mining development in any country is cooperation among relevant stakeholders and discharging social responsibilities so as to manage the expectations of the community.

In Ethiopia, we are seeing there is a lot of crossover between the federal and regional, although there is a need for the establishment of a clear line between. Directors at the federal level, including the prime minister’s office, promote commercial-scale mining. This also needs to be reconciled with regions’ tendency to promote small-scale and artisanal mining. The boundaries can be strengthened through cooperation. But at the end of the day, as a foreign company operating in another jurisdiction, my view is that you have to seamlessly align and operate with federal and regional officials, and local communities. So you have to earn a high level of respect and collaboration across all stakeholders at federal, regional, and local. The project must benefit the government and also local communities.

Askari recently acquired all of Hong Kong Xingxu’s issued capital for the Nejo project. How do you compare Ethiopian legal frameworks with other countries, in terms of the legal procedures surrounding share swapping agreements?

The structure of the agreement is called a share-swapping joint venture. Askari enjoys the benefits of the operational, technical, and financial leverages it brings to the Nejo project. At the same time, we get the exposure to what Hong Kong did successfully in Angola through Shining Star. In turn, Hong Kong and Shining Star get the skills and expertise of what we have done in Namibia and Tanzania. So it is pretty much a symbiotic relationship where each party relies on each other for different skills and leverages.

As far as corporate legal issues are concerned, there was a misunderstanding of the relationship. This joint venture means a lot for the realization of the Nejo project. I have been here for weeks, meeting with high-level officials at federal and regional levels, and different department heads from different areas.

It enabled all stakeholders to be on the same page on how the Askari-Hong Kong joint venture has elevated the leverage to realize the exploration and mining potential of the Nejo project. As a CEO and founder of the company, I have also connected well with the officials and stakeholders across the board. I have briefed everyone on the leverages Askari brings, our aspirations and the kind of collaborations we are looking for—not only for this project but in a broader sense for future strategies.

Historically, the Nejo project has been overshadowed because of the absence of personal efforts, and also due to the disconnection between federal and regional governments and the original Hong Kong. Now, under the share swap joint venture agreement, Askari has been able to step into the shoes. So, the government at all levels now knows who is responsible for the work at each step to realize the Nejo project. So now everybody is comfortable to finalize the works to realize the project.

Initially, it was challenging because some stakeholders did not well understand the type of joint venture between Hong Kong and Askari. Now everyone is on the same page. The level of knowledge sharing, understanding and commitment between the companies and government is encouraging.

Australia is a global leader in mining in terms of output, skill, and technology. What can developing economies like Ethiopia learn from the likes of Australia and Canada?

I don’t think there is anything differently done in those countries. In countries like Australia and Canada, the role of mining in economic development is high on the agenda, and these countries have been practicing professional mining for decades. Mining in these countries offers huge opportunities, generates huge revenues, and contributes hugely to the general industry. That is where African countries can also look and extract lessons. African countries also need to look at each other, to learn what does not work. Ethiopia is pretty much at the beginning of transitioning to harvesting or strengthening its utilization of its mineral endowments. It has to look at the experiences of Australia. Look at Tanzania, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, and understand what worked in their jurisdictions and what did not, and what needs to be avoided.

My recommendation for developing countries is: learn from the experiences of neighboring countries. Learn what works and what does not, and balance between immediate benefits and multi-generational benefits. Also learn how the government protects investments at all levels.

The Ethiopian government also needs to make sure investors are getting the support required to succeed. There is huge untapped mineral wealth in Ethiopia. It is not just gold; it is copper, platinum, silver, lithium, tantalum, antimony, palladium, and rare earth. Ethiopia has got everything. It just needs a safe way, and what works for everybody to come and invest. And ensure their investments are secure. For any investor to invest in foreign jurisdiction, securing the administrative support at all levels is crucial, not only operational support but also protection from losing your opportunities. Any failure is going to be very pronounced.

As Ethiopia continues to develop with an economy under reform, there are more opportunities and investment opportunities attracting western companies, and Ethiopia is open to these investments and opportunities.

Much of the minerals extracted from Ethiopia and its neighboring countries are smuggled out informally. The region also remains embroiled in conflict. How does illicit mining affect formally licensed investors, and how do you view the intertwined relationship between mining and protracted conflict?

Infrastructure is key here. The reason gold is smuggled often is because it is a high price environment. Smuggling is also visible in copper. This is because these minerals are also easily identifiable. The market is instant. Gold or copper smugglers get instant payment. The smugglers don’t pay tax. So illicit mining remains lucrative for many.

But if there are infrastructures like smelting plants, and proper incentives for all, all miners will be encouraged to do mining through the proper legal channels. If there are gold refining infrastructures, provision of technology and working capital; then everyone would be willing to sell their minerals though the proper channels. So, having certified and legal gold processing plants is crucial for countries like Ethiopia, Sudan and others, to curb gold smuggling. Then the certified gold from documented legal miners can be sold in the global market. Only having certified, documented gold can enable countries in conflict to export gold legally. Otherwise, it is labeled as conflict gold, which cannot enter the global market legally. Due to the absence of certified and internationally recognized gold smelting and other minerals processing plants in countries like Ethiopia, illicit mining has risen as an alternative venue. If Ethiopia manages to have its own gold and other mineral processing facilities, that will change the whole thing. That will take some time now, but that is where the real challenge lies.

There will always be a black market. That is because there is always opportunity and somebody is taking advantage of it. But if the government manages to reduce the flow of the black market, by putting in place infrastructures, more investors, and more initiatives, then the curve of the black market will decline.

Do you think more mining investors will come to Ethiopia as the banking sector opens?

Definitely. More capable foreign investment banks will come to Ethiopia, followed by big mining companies. If Askari succeeds in Ethiopia, then other companies will be encouraged—this is how investment works. Success stories matter to attract more FDI, which will hugely benefit the economy. That is sort of the thing the Ethiopian government is actively looking at the moment. Success stories matter for the global market, to showcase Ethiopia is open for business.

The conference reviewed the first strategy, which participants praised for its success and exemplary implementation.

Among those in attendance was OswellKahonde, who heads the Africa division for the Better Cash Alliance—a UN body tasked with supporting developing countries in transitioning from a cash-based economy to a digital financial system.

The Reporter caught up with Kahonde to get his thoughts on Ethiopia’s growing affinity for digital transactions, the Better Cash Alliance’s work in the country, and the dangers of digitalization without infrastructure. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Tell us about the Better Cash Alliance.

OswellKahonde: The Better Than Cash Alliance is a partnership of governments, corporates, and international organizations that have come together to accelerate the transition from cash to digital payments. We call it responsible digital payment.

Ethiopia is one of the members of the alliance. We are the secretariat of the alliance, which provides support to our members. We provide advisory, advocacy, and research support. The goal is digitizing the financial sector. Ethiopia joined the Better Than Cash Alliance in 2016. We partnered with NBE, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Innovation and Technology.

We helped Ethiopia to develop the first National Payment Strategy, which was launched in 2021 and finalized this year. We also supported its implementation. We are behind digital payment transitions across many countries. When we heard the NBE report on Ethiopia’s progress in digital payment, we were proud. For instance, during the implementation of the first strategy, we provided our experts who are seconded and working at NBE. We also continued to provide technical support.

We supported the design and implementation of regulatory and licensing frameworks for digital financial services and provided strategic advisory support to relevant stakeholders.

Reforming the financial sector is a national vision for the country. And the country is a member of the alliance. So we are employees of the UN, and governments have formed the UN. So we are employed by the governments.

Ethiopia just launched its second National Digital Payment Strategy. How do you evaluate Ethiopia’s progress and the challenges outstanding?

The Homegrown Economic Reform stipulates harnessing digital to accelerate economic reforms and realize development. For instance, the digital Ethiopia strategy talks about ecommerce. Then the digital payment strategy comes up with how we do it. So these strategies support the overall HGER agenda.

Digital is not just about technology. It is about everything. What Ethiopia demonstrated in the past years, is the importance of policy leadership. If you make the right policies, bring in the right regulations, innovative systems, and forge partnerships, that definitely leads to realizing your targets.

There were 32 actions stipulated in the first digital payment strategy. For the independent evaluation done, over 80 percent of the action targets are achieved. Some of them are at different stages but by and large, they are completed. So our task is to identify the gaps, and support the government to fill those gaps and bridge human capital needs. We also identify sectors that would drive change.

How do you assess the progress and contributions of digital payments on the economy as well as the downsides of digital transactions?

We have developed the UN principles to support digital payments. Member countries have to follow those principles to digitize their financial sectors. Once these principles are embedded in the digital journey, which is what Ethiopia is doing now, then solutions are developed, whether it is merchants, traders, or consumers. We design them in a way it benefits different brackets, but overall it aims to drive the overall economy.

Without digital payments, even if you roll out fancy policies, you cannot see progress. It has huge economic benefits. For example Africa’s youth population is estimated to be around 60 percent. The youth wants tech, so you need to deploy digital systems. So the youth can easily use the tech and digital systems to do business. For instance if you go to Rwanda, a lot of youth think out of the box and leverage digital systems. Efficiency, cost minimization, time-saving and productivity are just a few benefits of digital.

In 2018, people in Addis were lining up in queues to pay water bills. They try at the Lehulu centers. Today, the queues are gone. These are some of the conveniences digital payment is bringing in. People are now using the queue time for other business.

What are the potential downsides of digitization?

If it is not done with responsibility, digitization might have downsides. If it is not inclusive, it also divides. If you don’t have a phone, you cannot transact. If digital is made 100 percent mandatory, that would be irresponsible.

The digitization process in urban areas is on an uptick. But in rural areas, it is still at a nascent stage. So we need to invest more on the rural infrastructure so that we don’t leave the rural population behind. It also widens the gender gap, if digitization is implemented irresponsibly.

During the presentation today, the NBE governor mentioned women own phones less than men. The numbers are quite worrying. The financial inclusion says the gender gap in Ethiopia is widening; it is over 25pct and that is huge. If you compare it to countries like Ghana, it is around three or four percent.

We need to focus on those areas. We need to work on how to include the traditional banking system. How can informal economy operators be included in digitization? They are now out of the formal channels but they can be formalized through digital platforms, if we could put the right tools in place. Digitization is the perfect tool to formalize Ethiopia’s informal actors.

Africa has a large educated work force. Internet infrastructure has also been expanding. India built its economy capitalizing on its youth and digital entrepreneurship. They have a lot of fintechs and digital economy operators, with digital-oriented education and economic systems. Can African countries replicate this?

It is happening. Even here in Ethiopia, it is happening. Ethiopia has already started the journey. The journey started in 2020/1. Only a few years down the road, the progress in Ethiopia is really amazing. You do not see such fast progress in any other economy.

The digital payment transition that is happening in Ethiopia is so fast that is surprising every time for everyone. That is the evolution of the digital financial system. It is not instant, but it evolves.

Now there are over 50 million accounts for mobile money. That is huge. Ethiopia’s digital innovation also needs to target where there is large cash circulation on a daily basis. Digital payment infrastructures are crucial. If digital payment is not better than the cash-based system, nobody should be forced to use digital payment. For instance, if somebody has a mobile account but there is no connection, then cash is better for that context.

Dr. Alaaeldin Awad Nogoud is a Sudanese medical surgeon whose foray into politics in 2018, ahead of the revolution that ousted longtime ruler Omar Al-Bashir, has led on an eventful journey that has seen him flee Sudan twice and eventually assume a position as official spokesperson for the Tasis government led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have been locked in a deadly conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for close to three years now.

Nogoud was a member of the Sudan Professionals Association (SPA), which spearheaded Sudan’s 2019 revolution, and has had a unique perspective on the events that have unfolded in the country over the past six eventful and difficult years.

Nogoud shared his side of the story during an interview in Addis Ababa this week with The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: What role did SPA play in the 2018 revolution?  

Alaaeldin Nogoud (Dr.): SPA has been the major opposition since the Muslim Brotherhood came to power in 1989. The Association remained an ardent force of change throughout Al-Bashir’s regime. The community of doctors [in Sudan] organized a major strike in 2013, to mention. The SPA was the body that ignited the revolution in 2018.

Then SPA on-boarded political parties to join the revolution. It became an agent of change. The united doctors office was supervising the strikes, every week throughout the protests. Finally, we succeeded in ousting Al-Bashir.

At the time, RSF and SAF were together. The transition started, and the coup happened in October 2021. The RSF rejected the coup, stating the Muslim Brotherhood was behind it. RSF and the transition were cheated by the Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood infiltrated the Sudanese army, intelligence, and other offices and security forces. Even the CSOs are dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood of the Al-Bashir regime. Many international media outlets report against the RSF, citing atrocities, rape, and other issues. This is because the CSOs are backing the Muslim Brotherhood and producing reports that support SAF. There is atrocity, but not like what the media and CSOs are reporting.

Eventually we reached a framework agreement aimed at bringing back the transition. I was one of the signatories. But just when we were about to reach an agreement, SAF ignited the war. Immediately, members of the SPA, including myself, were detained by the SAF. They released me following media pressures. Then I fled to Ethiopia.

The Sudanese Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Tagadum) failed and then we formed Tasis [The Sudan Founding Alliance]. I went to Nairobi to sign the agreement, and then back to Sudan as minister of health of the Tasis government. Then, again, I fled to Ethiopia.

In a nutshell, the SPA was the core igniting force of Sudan’s revolution. Then we joined the political coalition, the FFC. We were against the coup. We wanted change for our country, and a good future for our people. We wanted to get rid of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The problem now is that the people of Sudan do not understand the real cause behind the crisis. Even the international community and international and regional organizations do not understand what the real reasons behind the war are. That is why they fail to define the problem and forward a solution.

Why did the revolution fail?

Sudan was colonized by Egypt between 1820 and 1885. The people fighting the Egyptian, Turkish and British colonizers at the time were from Darfur. That is why people say history is repeating itself, because Egypt still controls Sudan today.

Egypt is behind all the coups in Sudanese history. Egypt has a deep hand in the Sudanese military and political parties, among others. The leaders of the military and some of the political parties are controlled by Egypt. That is why it remains difficult to resolve Sudan’s crisis, because Egypt is backing SAF in this war. Egypt is always working behind the scenes to have a loyal regime in Sudan. Sudan’s aspirations for an independent government are totally against Egyptian interests.

The main reason Egypt is involved in Sudanese politics is because of the River Nile. SAF backs Egypt’s interests on the Nile. That’s why Egypt is backing SAF.

But, the war in Sudan now is not only a war between RSF and SAF.

Sudan gained independence in 1956, from the Anglo-Egyptians. Since then, Sudan has been controlled by certain elite groups, or elite tribes, or elite families. They are mostly from north and central Sudan, with some from Darfur and Kordofan. These elites control Sudan’s political-economy, and social decisions. There has never been a PM or president of Sudan who is not from this elite group. The group is not of a certain ethnicity, as such, but is rather a trans-ethnic entity. This group has been enjoying high-class benefits since independence, and does not want power to be shared by anybody outside it.

So, the 2018 revolution was against this static elite power group. The fight was between the old Sudan, and the new Sudan. The revolution was against the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood took over Sudan’s political economy when Al-Bashir came to power through a coup in 1998. The Brotherhood embedded itself within Sudan’s existing elite ruling class.

So, the real war is between people who want an equal Sudan, and an elite ruling group who wants to maintain the status quo. The children and siblings of people in the elite group can rule Sudan, while its citizens cannot even if they have the capacity.

The real war is not just between SAF and RSF. If you simplify the war into these two groups, then you reach the wrong conclusion, which many are doing. Dr. John Garang was among the first to initiate military opposition against the ruling class. There are countless peace agreements  between the groups, but no actual deal. None has addressed Sudan’s real cause.

Both Al-Bashir and Al-Burhan are regimes of the Muslim Brotherhood. They are dictators, totalitarian and take any action to quash public outcry.

Sudan is not an Islamic Arab government but all the governments since 1956 have insisted on defining Sudan as Islamic Arab country. Sudan is diverse and multi religious. But these regimes have been imposing an Islamic state over the African ethnicities of Sudan. This has jeopardized the rights of many.

All the military coups in Sudan have been backed by Egypt. Egypt has been the main source of Sudan’s problems since 1956. Officers in the Sudanese army, including Al-Burhan, are loyal to Egypt. Egypt is supporting SAF militarily, politically, diplomatically and in all aspects. There is surmounting evidence for this, including from Egyptian scholars.

Why is Egypt involved in Sudanese politics?

Egypt does not want an independent Sudanese government that works for the sovereignty of Sudan and the interests of the Sudanese people. Egypt controls Sudan’s army, hence they are always behind every coup in Sudan. Egypt does not accept a civilian government in Sudan, or any government that is not loyal to Egypt.

The Nile waters agreement of 1959 should be scrapped, and we should look forward to a new agreement. We don’t want Egypt to exploit Sudan’s resources anymore. Egypt should stop dominating Sudan in the Arab summits. Egypt should no longer control our political decisions. These are our positions and the Sudanese people’s demands, but Egypt does not accept this. This is why it supports SAF.

In this context, how do you put into perspective the shifting alliances and rivalries in the Horn of Africa?

This is why Isaias [Afwerki] went to Egypt, Somalia and, a few days ago, to Sudan to meet SAF officers. There are forces who have forged an alliance with SAF. This alliance also has an interest of force to encircle Ethiopia from the south. Egypt has SAF in place to protect its interests in Ethiopia, but if SAF should fail, Egypt has prepared Somalia as a second option to influence Ethiopia. So, Egypt has forces both north and south of Ethiopia. Egypt uses leverage to secure its interests in Ethiopia. That’s why Egypt spoils not only the peace of Sudan, but of the Horn.

That is why the region’s countries must have a strong position against Egypt. The AU and other organizations also need to change their frame and mindset on issues concerning the Horn and Egypt. Otherwise, the Horn cannot realize peace, development and prosperity.

Reports presented to the UN indicate that Egypt transferred Iranian chemical weapons to SAF. The reports show that Egypt has been amassing benefits from the Sudan war. Sudanese gold worth eight billion dollars has been smuggled into Egypt since the war, according to a report presented to the UN. In fact, Egypt’s gold reserves have grown five-fold since the war began. Their gold exports grew eight-fold.

Egypt has also been utilizing six billion cubic meters of water from the River Nile, which is Sudan’s share. There is evidence that SAF uses weapons and ammunition manufactured in Egypt.

Why are people saying the UAE is backing RSF, while not a single bullet from the UAE has been tied to RSF? And why do people never say that Egypt is backing SAF, despite the evidence?

Besides Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and its network—people in Qatar, Cairo, and Istanbul—are backing SAF.

SAF is fighting on behalf of the global Muslim Brotherhood network. They are aligned with ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah, and backed by Iran, among others. Even some TPLF [Tigray People’s Liberation Front] units are currently fighting alongside SAF.

Who are other supporters of SAF?

Any Muslim brotherhood organization, including Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Al-jihad, ISIS, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran are backing SAF.

Sudan is the only country where Muslim Brotherhood extremists have managed to assert power, aside from Afghanistan. Al-Bashir was a Muslim Brotherhood regime. During his rule, Sudanese passports were sold to all kinds of Muslim extremist groups and jihadists around the world. Osama Bin Laden and others were in Sudan at some point. It was host to terrorists, jihadists, and extremists.

The International University of Africa in Khartoum is their instrument for expanding their extremist ideology across Africa. This university is the work of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. It brings scholars and students from all over Africa, brainwashes them with its ideology, and sends them back to African countries to implement the extremist ideology. The Muslim Brotherhood will boldly claim that they will own Africa not through war but through the words of these students and scholars from the university.

We closed the university during the transitional government of Sudan.

What benefits does Egypt get by supporting SAF?

Currently, the Egyptian army is 80 kilometers inside Sudanese territory, mining for gold. Al-Burhan has said nothing about this. The triangle where Sudan, Egypt, and Libya meet is key. When RSF advanced to control this triangle, it became very dangerous for Egypt. That is why the war in Sudan has escalated now.

After the first coup in Sudan in 1958, which was backed by Egypt, the 1959 water Nile agreement was signed. Egypt took 33 billion cubic meters of water from the Nile, and Sudan took 18 billion. Plus, Egypt receives water loans from Sudan. Since 1959, Sudan has been giving 1.6 billion cubic meters of water to Egypt as a loan. We do not know when or how Egypt will repay.

So, the reason Egypt is keeping a loyal government in Sudan is to maintain this agreement and all the benefits. Egypt calls itself ‘the Rose of Nile’ and aims to maintain its share of the river by any means.

Sudan’s first revolution was in 1964, but Gafaar Nimeiry conducted a coup backed by Egypt. The second coup was also undertaken by Egypt. Nimeiry, who was initially communist, managed to sustain his power after he shifted his alliance to the Islamists in 1971. In 1989, Egypt took full control of Sudan by bringing Al-Bashir to power through another coup. Bashir was an Islamist. Then, Bin Laden, Alzawhari, Hamas, and others came to Sudan. They have investments in Sudan.

How are Janjaweed, RSF and Hemedti related to the atrocities being committed in Sudan?

There is a misnomer that wrongly equates Janjaweed with RSF. This is totally wrong. The real Janjaweed that committed atrocities, was created in 2003. At the time, Al-Burhan was head of the western infantry. Al-Burhan gave orders to military leaders under him to commit the atrocities. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman [Ali Kushayb], who took orders from Al-Burhan, carried them out. Al-Bashir, Al-Burhan, and other officers were responsible for the atrocities.

Right now there are three people wanted by the ICC [in connection with the atrocities]: Al-Bashir, Ahmad Arun, and Abdelrahim Mohamed. These three are currently enjoying life in a luxury resort in Shendi, in SAF-controlled northern Sudan. The ICC has issued requests, but Al-Burhan refuses to hand over Al-Bashir.

In 2013, there was a military coup attempt organized by [Hassan] Al-Turabi, a member of the Islamist Popular Congress Party. As a result, Al-Bashir put Al-Turabi in jail and that was the time when he created the RSF. Hemedti was there. Al-Bashir formed the RSF to protect himself from extremists in the army, who were loyal to Al-Turabi.

Janjaweed was created in 2003, and RSF in 2013. Janjaweed is not RSF, and vice versa.

To know who is fighting who in Sudan, and why there can be no solution, one must know the history and genesis. The international media space concludes that RSF is Janjaweed. They want to blame RSF for all the atrocities committed by others in the past in Sudan. This propaganda is created to designate RSF as a terrorist organization. So all the massacres, ethnic cleansing and others committed by Janjaweed are now on the shoulders of RSF. RSF has nothing to do with Janjaweed. SAF is twisting this fact, and unfortunately it is believed by international media. This twist continues fueling the conflict in Sudan.

Where is Al-Bashir?

He is enjoying life in a resort controlled by SAF.

Are Sudanese forces aligning themselves along Arab and African ethnicities in Sudan?

The Muslim Brotherhood also created conflicts between the Arab and African tribes in Sudan, between the pastoralists and farmers of Sudan. They arm one against the other. Tasis managed to bring these people together for the first time. SAF divided them to rule, but RSF united them. All tribes and diversities of Sudan are represented in the Tasis alliance government.

That is why the Tasis government based in Nyala is threatening Port Sudan-based SAF and Muslim Brotherhood. Just like they divided Sudan into South Sudan and Sudan, the Muslim Brotherhood are again going to divide Sudan. RSF is fighting to prevent Sudan’s division.

Is RSF responsible for the atrocities committed recently in Al-Fasher?

Al-Fasher was intentionally dragged into the war by SAF, despite the city reaching an agreement with RSF to keep it from entering the city. But many Arab media were intentionally distorting the facts regarding Al-Fasher, including through fake AI videos. RSF suspended its collaborations with Arab media. Even the Yale Humanitarian Lab participated in distorting facts, which were later debunked by French media.

After Al-Fasher, many AI-generated videos emerged on international media as part of a campaign against RSF. In reality, SAF destroyed Al-Fasher and other many residential areas with explosives. RSF helped tens of thousands residents to safe areas, and provided humanitarian aid. But no media reports this. SAF forces charge hundreds of dollars per head to allow IDPs to pass to safe areas. SAF has committed a lot of war crimes. Whenever we send authentic videos to Aljazeera and other Arab media, they never cover it.

What portion of Sudan’s geography does RSF control at the moment?

Right now, RSF controls 60 percent, including  Darfur and Kordofan. SAF controls 40 percent, including Khartoum. RSF can advance to the capital.

Why have attempts at dialogue failed?

There were many peace talks and agreements including Jeddah, IGAD, Geneva and Washington. All were spoiled by SAF. The humanitarian truce was also refused by Al-Burhan.

We do not know what the international community is going to do with Al-Burhan, unless they force him to sign a peace agreement. But Al-Burhan and the Muslim Brotherhood will never accept a peace agreement. That is what we are telling the international community now. These people are not peaceful people. The international community must realize that SAF will destroy everything to take power. Dealing softly with Al-Burhan is very dangerous. If Al-Burhan takes power, he will bring all the extremists and jihadists to the Horn of Africa, including Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis, ISIS, Boko Haram, and others. This will be very bad for the Horn, the Sahel region, and the whole Africa.

The international community must push to cut off all financial support to SAF and the Muslim Brotherhood. These forces have various businesses. Their accounts, trades, and financial activities must be closed. Their officials must be banned from traveling. Whether it is in Turkiye, Qatar, or Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood must be stripped of all access. Countries that are backing SAF and the Muslim Brotherhood should be sanctioned. AFRICOM, the East African Standby Force and others must target their positions.

SAF and the Muslim Brotherhood will never respond to ordinary peace talks. They never go for peace through negotiation.

Who is backing who in this complicated war?

The question should be why are they backing any of the two? Evidence is also important to cite.

If the world is really against terrorism, and does not want jihadists to be harbored in the Horn of Africa, it must stop anybody from supporting SAF. If the world does not support RSF, it must at least see the danger SAF poses.

How did the parties fail to protect civilians and avoid war in Khartoum?

War inside Khartoum was avoidable. RSF refrained from fighting in Khartoum, until SAF surrounded and fired on our forces there. Then things escalated. Every war has atrocities. To stop the atrocities, you must stop the war. Worst is, SAF gains benefits from the war.

Disturbing videos have recently surfaced that appear to implicate members of the RSF in violence and atrocities committed against civilians. Is RSF responsible for these acts?

Most atrocities committed in areas under RSF control are carried out by undercover SAF intelligence officers who have infiltrated RSF. After committing atrocities under the banner of RSF, they defect to SAF and are welcomed as heroes.

What is the role of Tasis?

Take Ethiopia as an example. Mengistu used revolution to oust Haile Selassie. But after coming to power, Mengistu led the military, and lacked covilian givernance. Hence, he did not succeed in transforming and stabilizing Ethiopia. RSF learned from this. RSF is a military wing, so it needs to surround itself with a civilian government. Tasis is that civilian government. In any country, the military and civilian government must work side by side. You cannot build a country with an army. That is the essence of Tasis.

How do you see the AU’s approach to the war and crisis in Sudan?

The AU failed to do its job. During the last Arab summit in Baghdad, AUC head Mahmoud Ali Youssouf made a statement praising the military gains of the SAF.  While Egypt was chair of the AU Peace and Security Council, senior Egyptian and AU officials visited SAF leaders in Port Sudan and pledged to open a liaison office there. They branded the RSF simply as rebels.

The African Union’s position on Sudan is very bad. IGAD is much better. Some countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda, and others understand the real situation. IGAD leaders know why South Sudan seceded. The AU is not capable of solving the Sudan case, unless they change where they are standing.

Ethiopia is pursuing access to the sea. What will regional power alliances mean for its ambitions?

The alliance of Isaias, Al-Burhan, and Egypt will spoil the Horn’s peace and stability. They might escalate the participation of TPLF with Al-Burhan. They can escalate the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and also escalate things between Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt. That is why we urge that practical, powerful and strong action is required to stop this alliance. Condemnations and asking these people to sit for negotiations will not bear any fruit. There should be something strong, practical.

For instance, a military alliance against this axis, or a peacekeeping mission against this axis, is necessary. The Muslim Brotherhood must be denied a stronghold in the region. The international community should plan for peacekeeping or military intervention against Al-Burhan. Even if SAF reaches a peace agreement with RSF, the Muslim Brotherhood will sabotage that and continue the crisis.

How does the RSF view the Al-Fashga border dispute with Ethiopia?

Al-Burhan, just like Al-Bashir, has a trend of externalizing domestic problems. Whenever there is a domestic issue, they create an agenda with neighboring countries. Al-Fashga is an unnecessary agenda created by Al-Burhan, just to mobilize the Sudanese people behind himself.

Al-Fashga can be easily solved. Even Ethiopia’s sea access interests can be solved easily. Railway networks can come to Port Sudan, Eritrea, and other coastal countries to ensure and diversify Ethiopia’s port access.

What is your response to claims that RSF is heavily involved in smuggling gold out of Sudan?

Many claim RSF is involved in the gold trade with the UAE. In fact, it is the SAF who is smuggling gold to the UAE and other countries.

 Ethiopia and Israel established consular ties in 1956, leading to full diplomatic relations in 1961. These relations were severed in the 1970s, following the pressure that stemmed from the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. During this period, many Arab and Arab-aligned states pressured African nations to cut diplomatic links with Israel.

This pressure was exerted within regional diplomatic forums, notably the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Sources indicate that some Arab states threatened to relocate the OAU headquarters from Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, unless the Ethiopian government ended its diplomatic relationship with Israel.

Consequently, Ethiopia formally severed its bilateral relations with Israel on October 23, 1973. However, following a nearly two-decade hiatus, Ethiopia formally restored diplomatic relations with Israel in 1989.

Since re-establishing ties, the two countries have fostered robust bilateral collaboration focused on technical and development assistance—particularly in agricultural technology, water management, and irrigation—alongside capacity-building programs, education, and health.

Tesfaye Yetayeh has served as Ethiopia’s envoy to Israel since March 2023.

His diplomatic career spans two decades in multiple regions across the globe. His first assignment took him to the United Kingdom, after which he joined IGAD as director in line with the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs regulations, serving there for four years. He later held senior diplomatic roles in Brussels, Stockholm, and later in Djibouti.

Upon returning to Addis Ababa, he served in a senior position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before becoming ambassador to Israel in 2023. 

With an academic background in international diplomacy and organizational leadership, Tesfaye frames Ethiopia–Israel relations as having reached a point where both nations benefit equally. He notes that the current level of cooperation reflects years of accumulated diplomatic engagement and shared priorities, reinforcing the trajectory of balanced and mutually advantageous relations.

In an extensive interview with The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle, Tesfaye addressed a range of important topics, including the current state of bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Israel, economic, trade, and investment cooperation, health sector collaboration and other related support, as well as Ethiopia’s ongoing efforts to secure sea access. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: How does the embassy describe the current state of bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Israel in areas such as economic cooperation, development support, agriculture, and infrastructure? What specific role does the Ethiopian embassy in Israel play in advancing collaboration in these sectors?

Tesfaye Yetayeh (Amb.): Ethiopia and Israel have a long-standing history. It begins in ancient times, when the Queen of Sheba visited Jerusalem and linked the Ethiopian lineage to the Solomonic dynasty. In modern times, bilateral relations began in 1956. In 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, diplomatic relations were strained. In 1989, rapprochement started, and both countries reopened embassies in their respective capitals. Since then, relations have been strong.

Economically, the relationship is solid. Israel purchases large amounts of Ethiopian coffee, sesame, tea, and other products. Several Israeli companies are involved in investment activities in Ethiopia—agriculture, agro-processing, textiles, mining, and other sectors. In addition, the Ethiopian embassy in Israel works to promote investment in Ethiopia. It organizes investment and trade partnership forums to showcase Ethiopia’s investment opportunities. The embassy facilitates exploratory visits, connects companies with Ethiopian counterparts, and engages government officials.

The embassy plays an active role in promoting investment, trade, and tourism. It has been working on these areas for years and aims to accelerate the work. Therefore, Israel remains a priority in Ethiopia’s foreign policy. 

Agriculture is among the key areas of cooperation, and has been for decades. How would you describe Israel’s role in Ethiopian agricultural development?

For decades, the two countries have worked together to develop Ethiopia’s agricultural system. Israel has contributed significantly, especially in irrigation technology and efficient water use. This has been practiced for many years, and Israel has been successful in applying these techniques. They are now ready to share these technologies with Ethiopia and other countries.

The other thing Israel is known for is its horticultural production. They produce a large amount per unit area because they efficiently use water, fertilizer, and other inputs. So, Israel provides training to Ethiopian agronomists to help boost Ethiopia’s agricultural productivity. The training includes irrigation management and specialized training in avocado, mango, and other crop production. Many Ethiopian experts have received training both in Ethiopia and in Israel.

Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has an international development department called MASHAV, which is responsible for international cooperation. MASHAV conducts extensive training programs that support the development of Ethiopia’s agriculture and aim to make it more productive. Training of experts is the most important part of this cooperation, and these training programs are ongoing.

What are other notable areas of cooperation?

Health support is another sector that shows strong cooperation between our two countries. Volunteers regularly travel to Ethiopia to treat patients. There is a non-profit organization operating in Ethiopia that sends a professor, along with his assistants, to provide medical care. They treat people who are very poor, often living in remote areas, and who cannot afford medical services. They focus on cataract cases, trachoma, and other eye-related problems. In addition to performing treatments, they also provide eyeglasses so patients can see properly after the procedures. Since July, the team has gone to Ethiopia four times—once to Dessie, once to Hawassa, once to Bahir Dar, and once to Addis Ababa. They have treated many patients in different parts of the country.

Another source of support is the additional groups of doctors who travel to Ethiopia to provide medical assistance. They use advanced medical equipment that allows treatment without opening the body. This new method enables patients to receive care through minimally invasive techniques. These doctors not only treat patients but also train Ethiopian medical professionals. Many Ethiopian doctors have already received training in Israel. The training covers specialized medical fields, including surgery, ophthalmology, and cardiovascular care.

In addition, children under ten with heart problems are also brought to Israel for treatment. Cardiovascular surgeons and other specialists also receive training in Israel. Therefore, I can say that there is significant support and assistance from the Israeli side in both treatment and medical capacity-building.

What is your general overview of the status of the relationship between the two countries?

In my observation, bilateral relations between the two countries are multi-faceted relationships in both the economic and diplomatic sectors. We have strong bilateral cooperation, and we also work together in multilateral forums. We support each other at regional and international levels. The relationship is multi-dimensional. However, there is room to expand and improve it.

In my assessment, our relationship is strong, and we need to broaden its scope.

What diplomatic priorities is Ethiopia currently pursuing in its relations with Israel, particularly in areas such as labor migration and employment? What is the Ethiopian embassy’s role in this regard?

We are currently working on expanding overseas employment opportunities. In Israel, there is a labor market that employs migrant workers from the Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and India. As Ethiopia, we have submitted a draft labor agreement to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they are reviewing it. The goal is to create employment opportunities for Ethiopian skilled and semi-skilled workers. So, once the agreement is signed, there will be contractual arrangements with companies, allowing Ethiopians to come regularly and work as housemaids, caregivers, or in other roles. We are waiting for the final signing, and discussions are ongoing to ensure Ethiopian workers can access these job opportunities.

There are also various engagements between Ethiopian universities and Israeli institutions, including cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These efforts focus on strengthening people-to-people relations, linking universities for research collaboration, and securing scholarships for Ethiopian students, especially at the master’s and PhD levels. We are working to establish a training partnership between Addis Ababa University and Ben-Gurion University. Last year, we created a training arrangement between the Department of Technology and the Science and Technology Universities. These partnerships support joint research, scholarships, academic exchanges, and other forms of collaboration.

We are also facilitating city-to-city training and cooperation. Several Ethiopian cities have sisterly arrangements with Israeli cities—for example, Gondar has a sisterly partnership with a smaller city near Tel Aviv, and the city of Ashkelon has also a sisterly arrangement with Bahir Dar, aiming to expand these arrangements to other towns in Ethiopia. In general, the purpose of these partnerships is to strengthen cultural, sports, music, and other exchanges, and to increase overall engagement between the two countries for the benefit of both nations. 

In the context of Ethiopia’s investment sector, what specific initiatives or facilitative measures has your office implemented to attract and enable Israeli investment in Ethiopia’s strategic sectors, particularly to leverage the country’s substantial resource potential?

There is a lot of potential, but there are incentives in our investment and trade, you know. It’s not for Israel only, for the entire foreign direct investment, the investment regulation has got a lot of incentives. We have duty-free importation of capital goods and other services. So it’s not in particular for Israelis or Bete-Israelis, but foreign direct investment is treated in such a way.

What attracts investors is Ethiopia’s opportunities across various sectors such as agriculture, agro-processing, manufacturing, and digital development. Ethiopia’s geographic location also plays a major role, as it is considered a gateway to Africa. Additionally, Ethiopia has a population of 130 million, making it the second-most-populous country in Africa after Nigeria. With the African Continental Free Trade Area now operational, Ethiopia is part of a large regional market. These factors attract foreign direct investors from many countries, including Israel and the Bete-Israel community. So, there is no special or tailor-made incentive for Israelis, but they benefit from the same investment environment as others.

Israeli companies are involved in several sectors in Ethiopia. In mining, they are active and have strong expertise. In agriculture, especially in precision agriculture, Israeli companies are demonstrating modern methods—such as greenhouse systems fully controlled by computers, where agronomists can monitor exactly what each plant needs. Israeli companies also participate in agro-processing, manufacturing, and pharmaceuticals. In trade, Israel imports Ethiopian coffee and sesame. Sesame is widely consumed here in Israel. Therefore, these factors together create strong incentives for Israelis and the Bete-Israel community to engage in business in Ethiopia.

How would you characterize the current level of interest from Israeli investors in participating in Ethiopia’s investment sector?

Like I said earlier, they are already taking part in Ethiopian investment, trade, and tourism. We are encouraging Israeli investors and others to come. Israel calls itself a start-up nation, known for high-tech industries. These high-tech companies were not previously focused on Ethiopia, but now they see opportunities. Ethiopia’s payment system is transforming. The digital payment system is in place. They work with systems such as data storage and data mining. I am not a technical expert, so I cannot give the technical details, but they are interested in these areas.

They are also active in the mining sector. Ethiopia does not have diamonds, but Israel has strong experience in diamonds, gold, and other minerals. Ethiopia has many minerals except diamonds. These factors attract them to Ethiopia and encourage their participation.

How is the Ethiopian embassy in Israel addressing the concerns of Ethiopian citizens affected by the ongoing regional tensions and security situation in the country?

Well, it is part of our regular work. Normally, we engage with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry, through its relevant office and division, is responsible for covering our activities. We inform them about what is happening in our country, the situation, and other related developments. These are our normal engagements. We also communicate the position of the Government of Ethiopia regarding recent developments and ongoing issues.

Regarding the Ethiopian Jews community, we also engage with people of Ethiopian origin living here. Some of them hold Ethiopian Origin ID cards. Those who meet the requirements and prove their nationality are entitled to receive this ID card. Since most Ethiopians living here are Ethiopian Jews, they hold Israeli citizenship, and the Government of Israel is responsible for them. We simply sympathize with them, but they are Israeli citizens and fall under Israel’s jurisdiction.

Ethiopia has recently expressed strong interest in securing peaceful access to a sea outlet and is seeking the support of friendly countries in this effort. Given Israel’s political stake and active presence in the Red Sea region, how is the Israeli government responding to Ethiopia’s interest in obtaining sea access? In addition, Ethiopia continues to assert its rightful use of the Abbay River despite ongoing political tensions with Egypt, even after the completion of the GERD. What is the position of the Israeli government regarding Ethiopia’s rights over the Abay River and the broader dispute with Egypt?

Our core responsibility is to uphold Ethiopia’s national interests, which is why we serve in this position. Presenting and defending the country’s interests and rights is an essential part of our mandate. Historically, Israel supported Ethiopia’s right to access the sea. This support was not only to protect Ethiopia’s interests but also aligned with Israel’s own national concerns.

Israel believed that if Ethiopia lost access to the Red Sea, the area would fall entirely under Arab control. To prevent this, Israel provided military assistance to Ethiopia and helped establish elite forces such as the ‘Nebelbal’ unit during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie. This reflects the depth of Israel’s engagement and the support extended at that time. Despite these earlier efforts, Ethiopia ultimately lost access to the Red Sea following Eritrea’s independence, leaving the country without access to ports such as Massawa and Assab and rendering it landlocked. This outcome also undermined Israel’s earlier attempts to help Ethiopia maintain access to the Red Sea.

Therefore, Ethiopia’s current request to regain access to the Red Sea through peaceful, mutually beneficial arrangements has not faced negative reactions from the Israeli government. Israel has not rejected Ethiopia’s position, partly due to the longstanding relationship between the two countries and Israel’s view of Ethiopia as a gateway to the rest of Africa. Israel frequently asks Ethiopia to facilitate stronger ties with African nations and to support its bid to regain observer status at the African Union.

Moreover, Israel also sees opportunities in Ethiopia’s extensive natural resources through investment, which further aligns its interests with Ethiopia’s maritime aspirations. Although Israel has not made an official statement supporting Ethiopia’s position on sea access, it is expected to stand with Ethiopia when the issue reaches its maturity stage.

Regarding the GERD, Egypt has tried to halt the project before, but the dam is now complete, marking a significant achievement for Ethiopia. Despite continued objections aimed at limiting Ethiopia’s use of the dam, Ethiopia has maintained a firm and transparent diplomatic position, earning recognition from the international community.

What role does your office need to play in supporting Ethiopia’s effort to secure sea access, and what future position can be expected from the Israeli government on this issue?

Like I said earlier, I am the sole representative of the government of Ethiopia in Israel, so it is my responsibility to present my government’s positions to Israeli officials. I hold meetings and make appointments to clearly communicate Ethiopia’s positions on various issues. This is entirely my duty. I have discussed Ethiopia’s request for access to the sea. I have also explained, on several occasions, matters related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, including its purpose, its contribution to development, and the concerns and pressure raised by Egypt and others.

In addition, I have also outlined Ethiopia’s intentions regarding regional cooperation, regional economic integration, and engagement with neighboring countries such as Eritrea. I regularly raise these issues as part of my work. So far, I have received very positive responses from Israeli officials, which is encouraging.

Dozens of Kenyan EV users drove over 1,500 kilometers from Kenya directly to Addis Ababa to take part, making their journey the first recorded cross-border EV convoy.

Participants from all over Africa, also visited Ethiopia’s EV assembly factories, infrastructure and charging stations, one day before the summit commenced.

EV adoption in Ethiopia has flourished in light of various policies geared towards a transition from fossil fuels to renewable energies. EVs accounted for 60 percent of all vehicle imports in 2024, according to data from the Ministry of Transport and Logistics.

The number of EVs in Ethiopia also jumped from 7,000 in 2022 to over 115,000 currently. Even under a constrained scenario, Ethiopia could see over one million EVs on its roads by 2040. But strong policy execution can raise this figure to 1.7 million, according to a Ministry document.

The document also states that Ethiopia has become an EV frontrunner on the continent, alongside South Africa, Morocco, Rwanda, Kenya and Nigeria. More recently, the government rolled out plans for vehicles running on compressed natural gas (CNG) following the launch of a large natural gas production project in the Somali Regional State earlier this year.

Officials at the Ministry want to double down on the progress, harboring ambitions to erect more than 2,200 charging stations across the country and introduce subsidies, tax credits, and credit lines to make EVs more affordable.

Bareo Hassen is a state minister at the Ministry of Transport and Logistics, which is spearheading Ethiopia’s shift from fuel cars to EVs, under overarching political commitment and decision-making from PM Abiy Ahmed. In this interview with The Reporter, Bare offers his reflections on the country’s new transportation path. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Ethiopia has been crafting a new EV policy and strategy. What are the contents?

Bareo Hassen: Ethiopia’s EV strategy was recently approved by the Council of Ministers and launched. We are currently awaiting a printout of the document. Once we receive this, we will embark on implementation by on-boarding different organs, and mobilizing resources.

The strategy identified five flagship projects. One is quality control, the others are professional human development, awareness creation, financial and non-financial incentives. Very soon we will unpack all of these and communicate to all stakeholders. 

Regarding local value addition in EV production and localizing EV batteries, are there projects in the pipeline currently?

We have plans, and we have local capabilities. We have lithium, cobalt and other mineral resources. What we need is investment and technology. We are working on that scope too, to start EV battery technology using our own lithium resources.

In the next five years, hopefully we will have our own EV batteries.

The government recently ordered existing vehicle assembly plants to shift towards EV production following its ban on the import and local manufacture of combustion engine vehicles. However, through their lobby group, assemblers have complained that they have invested in their factories for years and are unable to shift to EV production lines at once. What is your take on this?

Two years ago, we banned fuel cars in Ethiopia and we sustain the scope of that decision without any problems or disruptions. The same is true for local assemblers. We have mechanisms in place. We have introduced attractive incentive packages for EV transitions, including for the smooth transition of existing fuel car assembly factories to EV production lines.

Domestic assemblers argue that assembling EVs locally is not as profitable as importing fully assembled EVs. They say this comes down to government incentives, like tax breaks, for the import of EVs. How do you respond to their concerns?

I advise you to go to the markets, and ask the end users. The impact is by far very different. EV is without any current maintenance cost, and also fuel expenses, EV is much cheaper and suitable for end users. The economic benefit of EVs is much greater than fuel cars. EVs are sustainable, environmentally friendly, and noise free. You can make a comparative analysis and prove this.

Does Ethiopia intend to use the recently inaugurated natural gas project in the Somali region to produce compressed natural gas (CNG) to be used as fuel for vehicles?

Exactly. We have identified the potential of the natural gas project, that it can be used by the transport and logistics sector. We are conducting research on it. Evidence-based decisions will be made. We are considering CNG vehicles and trucks now.

CNG is typically used as a replacement for benzene. Experts say vehicles, especially heavy trucks, which use diesel can not make use of CNG. The government recently prohibited the import of combustion-engine trucks, seeking to replace them with electric or CNG alternatives. How would this work?

CNG can be used for heavy duty trucks, city buses, automobiles and others. The world is using it. It is not a unique scenario for Ethiopia. So we’ll use our best option, based on our best potential capabilities.

How much do you estimate the monetary returns of the energy transition in the transport sector will amount to? By shifting from fuel-based cars to clean energy cars, how much will Ethiopia benefit?

Currently, we are spending over six billion dollars annually to import fuel. Replacing this means we can re-funnel that money into different mega projects. The energy shift is crucial for economic growth of the country.

What are the outcomes expected from the Africa e-mobility week, which is being held in Addis Ababa?

The objective is to create common ground and collaboration across African economies to elevate our visions of e-mobility. The transport and logistics sector is one of the pillars of green development. Ethiopia is working on energy independence and also environmentally-friendly transport and logistics.

Our strategies and policies are well communicated to our African brothers and sisters, in a bid to foster collaborations and share Ethiopia’s experience.

Our capital city, Addis Ababa is also working on its own EV transport infrastructure and a holistic urban smart transport system. Our corridor development is also designed to promote e-mobility. Addis Ababa has a well-tested calibre of smart mobility. This is also the reason it was chosen as the venue for the 2025 African e-mobility week.

How does e-mobility fit into Africa’s climate resilient development agenda?

It is obvious. Transport is crucial in Africa’s development. Hence, e-mobility, and having energy quality are essential to having a sustainable transport system, which in turn enables sustainable climate and environment. To this end, the standardization of e-mobilty must align with the standards of sustainable climate.

We are developing nations, hence, we must adopt a sustainable development path. Urban mobility is one of the pillars.

How are the government, private sector, financiers, and academics working in collaboration when it comes to e-mobility?

We are working with stakeholders from all walks. We are revisiting the scopes of our transport and logistics policies and strategies.

Currently, we have more than seventeen EV assembly factories in Ethiopia. Most of them are local. Our investors are investing in active urban motilities too. They are building charging facilities. They are working on after-sale service, and also technical parts and technology-based solutions. So our strategy and policy capitalizes on engaging our private sector, and all stakeholders.

What are the main challenges to the e-mobility initiatives in Ethiopia as well as across the continent?

One of our major challenges is public charging stations. In Ethiopia, we have identified the need for more than 2,300 charging stations. Currently we have 100-and-something. We are collaborating with the private sector, municipalities, regional governments, organizations and SOEs like Ethio telecom, to maximize the number of EV charging stations.

We are also working on domesticating EV value chains. We are incentivizing the private sector to get involved in semi- and fully-knocked-down EV assembly and supply, as well as spare parts and EV batteries.

Local value control is also considered an important aspect of our EV strategy. Capital is also another challenge. So we are trying to attract as much investment into the sector as we can.

In September, the PM was among the attendees at World Atomic Week in Moscow, where Ethiopia and Russia signed a preliminary agreement to partner in building a nuclear power plant.

The two sides have reportedly agreed to create a roadmap for the technical and economic foundation of the project, which would also include the training of professionals to run the planned plant and develop Ethiopia’s nuclear sector, which does not exist at present.

Government officials conceded during a subsequent International Atomic Energy Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, that the ambitious project would take at least a decade to realize but doubled down on their intention to see it through.

However, experts in the nuclear science field caution the project is inefficient, ill-timed, and unnecessary.

Gedion Getahun (PhD) is among the very few Ethiopian nuclear scientists around the world. He earned his postgraduate degree in nuclear chemistry and nuclear instrumentation from Loughborough University, UK, and his practical work history includes research on uranium chemistry, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste disposal strategies, and atomic power safety, among other topics.

Gedion is currently a member of the Department of Organic-Nuclear Complex Studies at the University & Technical Academy of Science, based in Mainz, Germany.

In Ethiopia, Gedion was part of a team of nuclear scientists, medical doctors, and radio-pharmacists who established the first-ever Department of Nuclear Medicine at Tikur Anbessa, the country’s largest public hospital. He was also a founding member of the Ethiopian Nuclear Science Society, which was established around five years ago.

In an interview with The Reporter’s Ashenafi Endale, Gedion expressed his concerns about the feasibility of Ethiopia’s newfound ambitions for nuclear energy. The expert argues that building the infrastructural and institutional capacity for a project this massive in scope alone can take decades, highlights the gargantuan financial costs involved, and urges the government to focus on Ethiopia’s abundant renewable energy sources instead. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: What is your take on the latest nuclear energy agreement between Ethiopia and Russia? How do you evaluate Ethiopia’s preparedness for a nuclear power project?

Gedion Getahun (PhD): Ethiopia recently signed an agreement with Russia’s Rosatom to develop a nuclear power program, but faces significant challenges like the lack of funding and technical expertise, and a weak regulatory framework. There are potential risks associated with the lack of a clear funding plan and extensive prior investment, and the lack of necessary infrastructure and personnel.

These are Ethiopia’s problems. Technical and financial details have not been disclosed but the country is preparing to launch six large-scale infrastructure projects worth an estimated 30 billion dollars.

The initiative includes a nuclear power plan, an oil refinery, a national gas facility, an airport expansion program, and the construction of housing over the coming six years. The huge amount of funding needed for these projects represents a quarter or more of Ethiopia’s GDP. The country faces acute foreign exchange shortages and high debt servicing costs. As a result, securing and financing these huge capital-intensive projects simultaneously could prove difficult.

My evaluation of the nuclear power project is that the necessity of nuclear power could be compensated by developing and improving technical standards and raising the generation capacity of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam [GERD].

Currently, Ethiopia is not ready to build a nuclear power plant owing to several challenges and concerns. 

What challenges and concerns do you observe?

Labor, security, maintenance, and fuel, which involves the purchase and manufacture of fuel rods. Waste management, including the long-term storage of spent fuel and plant decommissioning. Security and stability: ongoing regional conflicts raise concerns about the security of a nuclear power facility in Ethiopia.

The country needs to build significant infrastructure and institutional capacity to manage such a complex project—a process that can take decades. Building a nuclear plant requires sophisticated regulatory systems, safety protocols, and a highly skilled workforce, which Ethiopia should start to develop.

The project would also be extremely expensive and considering Ethiopia’s current debt levels and foreign exchange shortages, securing the necessary financing will be difficult. It would also require intensive human capital in the form of educated, high-caliber nuclear engineers and scientists.

In terms of the environment, surrounding areas must be protected from radioactive contamination by minimizing radioactivity and nuclear pollution. Security and risk control of the nuclear plant to avoid accidents and incidents by continuously regulating pumps and pipelines would also be necessary.

The Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction agreements must be signed and agreed to. In other words, Ethiopia requires robust legal and regulatory frameworks for safety and non-proliferation concerns. It also needs a stable financing arrangement because nuclear technology requires millions and millions for its continuity. Grid distribution and grid capacity must also be determined.

What are the preconditions a country must fulfill before pursuing nuclear power?

The prerequisites are diverse and include a huge amount of money to establish the nuclear plant and to cover the continuous expenses. These are security, nuclear engineering, waste disposal, environmental protection, human capital, and political and economic stability. This means peace and regional security.

How significant is the agreement with the IAEA and Siemens for a linear accelerator (LINAC) device to provide cancer treatment at Tikur Anbessa Hospital? Can this device improve health services in Ethiopia?

The IAEA has provided medical linear accelerators (LINACs) to Tikur Anbessa Hospital. LINACs are commonly used in radiotherapy treatment globally. They are machines that use electricity to accelerate electrons and produce high-energy X-rays or electron beams, which are then used to destroy cancerous cells while minimizing damage to healthy tissue.

These instruments are highly essential and can be extremely useful for improving health services in Ethiopia. Let’s take this opportunity to discuss what we mean by human capital and why we say qualified human capital is required.

For instance, Tikur Anbessa will need at least three highly qualified experts to run the application of the LINAC. These include an oncologist (cancer specialist), a radiation dosimetrist, and a medical physicist.

If a patient is scheduled for radiation therapy using a LINAC, the radiation oncologist must collaborate with the radiation dosimetrist and a medical physicist to develop a treatment plan. This means that all three of these qualified professionals must double check the plan before treatment begins and implement quality assurance procedures to ensure that each treatment is delivered in the exact same manner. This demonstrates that for one treatment, three qualified personnel are essential.

Can nuclear technology improve the overall healthcare system in Ethiopia?

Adequate medical care, for instance, for cancer patients, everywhere in the country, is insufficient and in some cases completely absent. Therefore accessibility to medical care must be improved. Of course, nuclear diagnostics and radiotherapy can improve the situation but they cannot solve the entire problem. This is only possible by raising the standards of the entire health system through appropriate funding, health politics, government financial support, private funding, and [creating] qualified personnel in the country.

Very few African countries have the privilege to rely on nuclear energy to power their development. Why is this?

First, there are currently 434 nuclear power plants [NPPs] in operation around the globe, and only two are running in southern Africa. Some African countries may possess research reactors for scientific, medical, or engineering purposes. Despite the potential and interest in nuclear power in Sub-Saharan Africa, there remain significant challenges to adopting the technology on the continent. There are preconditions on the design, capacity, operation, and stability of nuclear power. For NPPs to operate in a safe, secure, and technically sound manner, these requirements must be carefully considered. But grid planners and system operators acknowledge the conditions are unsuitable in many African states. Other experts say that large-scale reactors with huge upfront investment requirements are likely to be unsuitable for capital-constrained African countries with small power grids.

Second, there are grid limitations.

According to the IAEA, a power grid should be about ten times the capacity of the nuclear plant to handle its integration, and few African Countries currently meet this requirement. Grid limitations are a significant reason why African countries struggle with nuclear power projects, as many national grids are not large enough to safely absorb the output of a traditional NPP. And in many African countries, proposed settings for nuclear plants are often very far away from big towns and densely populated areas. This means the grid systems required to supply energy will carry transmission costs, because of larger distances between significant population centers.

Third, there are financial constraints. Few African countries can afford nuclear power owing to the need for massive financial investment, limited grid capacity, and a lack of technical expertise and trained personnel. Safety concerns, nuclear waste management, and potential dependency on foreign suppliers are also factors that hinder nuclear power projects.

Fourth, according to the IAEA, there are 19 infrastructure issues, recognized worldwide, which governments must consider if they wish to establish a nuclear power plant. These include safeguards, funding, radioactive waste, and human resource development to mention a few. African countries have not fulfilled these requirements.

Fifth, many Sub-Saharan African countries cannot offer clear institutional and financial frameworks, including a distinct nuclear regulator.

Sixth is political and economic stability, safety concerns, and technical capacity. There are concerns about Africa’s safety culture in relation to nuclear power that have made the deployment of nuclear technology in some places a highly sensitive topic. Notably political instability in certain regions, which makes them susceptible to the threat of nuclear weapon proliferation or sabotage, and the lack of local expertise necessary to run the technological intricacies has brought Sub-Saharan Africa well within the ambit of this sensitivity.

Seventh is international finance institutions (IFIs). IFIs like the World Bank or African Development Bank do not appear to have a strong interest in investing in nuclear power. In fact, most large IFIs have policies against investing in nuclear power projects.

How much of an impact can nuclear power have on energy, health, agriculture, technology and overall development in developing countries?

Nuclear energy alone has never raised the standard of living in the developing world. There is a widespread belief that nuclear technology has the power to raise the standard of living in Africa. Poverty in Africa and elsewhere is complex in nature and depends on several factors. Even in highly industrialized countries, where nuclear power and other sophisticated technology are at home, poverty has grown enormously.

Therefore, Africa must promote democracy and good governance, and exercise economic liberty. It must also improve its agricultural economy and pricing for its mineral resources, and balanced ecological and environmental work programs are essential. Micro- and macroeconomic programs and the education, medical, and scientific sectors must be improved and developed.

Nuclear technology has to be coupled with all of these in order to raise the standard of living.

Is access to nuclear energy a political or purely developmental issue? Is the governance and regulation of nuclear energy fair?

Access to nuclear energy is a political as well as a developmental issue. These issues are intertwined, and difficult to distinguish.

A number of political factors also matter. Among them are government policies, public opinion, finance, technical expertise, geopolitics, concerns about nuclear proliferation, and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Regarding whether the governance of nuclear power is fair, I would say it isn’t. It is a complex question with no single answer, but I believe nuclear power is unbalanced globally.

For instance, industrialized countries or countries with the know-how can exceed uranium enrichment levels required for energy production while other countries are not allowed to enrich their Uranium because it would lead to the atomic bomb situation. We all accept the atomic bomb is dangerous and we should have the democracy to decide together to phase out uranium fission technology.

There are arguments about whether nuclear energy is clean energy or not. What do you have to say about this?

Pollution-free or really a zero-emission energy source? This question applies to environmental or ecological aspects, but the answer is no; nuclear is not pollution free.

Nuclear power is not pollution free although it produces virtually no greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide or methane during operation. Therefore, the technology has significant environmental benefits compared to fossil fuels because of the greenhouse effect. However, nuclear energy carries other pollution related concerns in the form of radioactive rays or radioactivity, which can be extremely dangerous.

In general, pollution can arise from the operation of a nuclear power plant in one of four forms. There are power plant emissions, radioactive waste, uranium mining, and uranium refining.

Uranium mining and refining include the generation of radioactive waste that requires safe long-term disposal.

Is nuclear energy renewable?

The answer is no. Nuclear energy is not a renewable resource because it relies on uranium, a finite and non-replenishing fuel source obtained from the earth. True renewable energies are wind and solar power, not nuclear. Once uranium  has undergone fission in a reactor, it is used up as a fuel and cannot be recovered or regenerated in a practical way, classifying it as a non-renewable resource similar to fossil fuels like coal and natural gas.

Could you describe the risks associated with nuclear waste?

Nuclear reactors produce radioactive waste as a byproduct that remains hazardous for thousands of years. Nuclear wastes are classified depending on the amount and concentration and radioactivity measured. The waste is then immobilized in glass and often disposed of in a deep geological repository site, which can be 500-700 meters deep.

Issues related to the transport of uranium from one place to another, as well as the storage and disposal of radioactive waste remain unsolved problems in nuclear technology. In most nuclear-powered countries, like here in Germany, future sites for nuclear waste disposal have not yet been identified despite the country utilizing nuclear power for almost 10 decades. In the European Union, until present, finding appropriate and secure nuclear sites is not possible because of the long half-life of the radioactive material.

The waste is harmful to human health and the environment. It can cause cancer and other serious diseases.

Do you think Ethiopia is capable of managing nuclear waste?

No, Ethiopia is not yet ready to manage nuclear waste disposal. And if accidents or incidents happen, which is the dark side of this technology as they have previously occurred several times, Ethiopia is not qualified to overcome the danger.

Sourcing uranium is another issue that goes past its purpose as a raw material and is often tied to diplomatic leverage and even political influence. Do you think Ethiopia can have consistent access to uranium to pursue its nuclear power projects?

Before we prophesize about Ethiopia’s future uranium technology, let us define the role of any country with excess uranium.

Generally, uranium serves as diplomatic leverage and as a source of political influence. Both have functions and it is obvious that these two roles are often intertwined. Because uranium is crucial for both civilian nuclear power and military application, the element is endowed with significant geopolitical power. Nations can use uranium enrichment to gain leverage during diplomatic negotiations. By threatening to increase the enrichment of their uranium stockpiles, a state can pressure the international community to offer concessions or ease sanctions. In other words, a nation’s control over uranium production or supply can be used to gain concessions in trade disputes or as a leverage against sanctions. For example: Iran has used its enriched uranium stockpile as a bargaining chip in talks with other countries.

As far as military technology is concerned, the ability to produce or deny nuclear weapons is a major factor in international security and uranium is the key component of this.

Through uranium production, Ethiopia will be more attractive to nuclear firms, like other African countries including Niger, Namibia, and South Africa. And like Kazakhstan, Russia, or Niger, major uranium producing countries, sufficient uranium production may enable Ethiopia to use it as a bargaining chip in terms of its economic development and political relationships.

Uranium consistency is a source of national pride and a symbol of scientific and geopolitical strength. This enhances the country’s bargaining position on the world stage and serves as a pillar of its strategic independence.

Overall, for Ethiopia to succeed in its pursuit of mixing nuclear energy into its development plans, what should be the priorities in the short and long term?

Ethiopia is blessed with enormous potential from solar, wind, geothermal and hydropower. These renewables can meet 75  percent of Ethiopia’s electricity demands by 2040 and hopefully 100 percent by 2050.

Currently, nuclear power is an extremely poor choice for Ethiopia. At present there is an overwhelming amount of peer-reviewed evidence from across the globe that widely distributed renewables, managed by smart grids and backed up by various forms of energy storage such as batteries and pumped storage, can meet the energy needs of growing economies like Ethiopia.

Nuclear power is catastrophically expensive to build, leading to higher electricity costs. Building nuclear power plants is a massive multi-billion dollar undertaking with long repayment periods. This makes financing a major hurdle for developing nations like Ethiopia. The global industry shows that some power plants can cost up to 40 billion dollars, and this refers only to construction costs. Supplementary funds are essential for other works and to run the power plant. In most cases, governments have to invest between five and 10 billion dollars, and the history of nuclear power funding shows that vendors push governments to raise taxation to cover these expenses.

The priorities for Ethiopian energy should be the diversification of energy supply sources. Ethiopia should diversify its energy program through non-nuclear methods using solar, wind, geothermal, hydropower, gas and oil.

To conclude, whether Ethiopia can afford to establish a nuclear power plant now or in the near future depends on its ability to overcome immense financial and technical hurdles.

The Pretoria Agreement, signed in November 2022, formally ended the hostilities and set out steps towards a return to peace, including disarmament, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), withdrawal of non-ENDF forces, and a program for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR).

Implementation, however, has been uneven: key provisions on DDR, transitional justice, and IDPs remain largely unfulfilled.

International monitors and rights groups continue to document the presence of non-ENDF and Eritrean forces in Tigray and to link that presence to delays in returns and security guarantees. In addition, since the agreement, internal political fractures within Tigray’s political leadership and recent clashes in border areas—notably reports of skirmishes in the neighboring Afar region, have raised fears of a return to war.

Local reports and analysts point to new military mobilizations, allegations of drone strikes, and rising hostile rhetoric from military and political actors. Reportedly, these combined failures of implementation and allegations of continuing external interference have raised tensions and left the Pretoria settlement vulnerable to collapse.

Amid these developments, opposition political figures in Tigray have renewed calls for all signatories to the Pretoria Agreement to fulfill their obligations and see out their responsibilities in making certain that the region does not slip back into a state of conflict.

Among them is Alula Hailu, who has served as chair of the Salsay Weyane Tigray (SaWeT) party since December 2023. Alula ventured into politics following a career in software engineering and in civil society.

He sees the recent developments in Tigray as detrimental to the region’s efforts to recover from the war, noting that the disruptions affect not only the wider community but also the political leadership, referring to the former and the current governing authority.

In a wide-ranging conversation with The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle, Alula discussed several key issues, including the Pretoria Agreement and its implementation, the recent clash involving the Afar region and questions of accountability, the unconstitutional relationship between the TPLF and the Eritrean government, and other critical matters. EXCERPTS:

The Reporter: Three years have passed since the signing of the Pretoria Agreement and several issues remain unresolved, including those related to the return of IDPs and DDR. However, there are now signs from both sides (the federal government and the TPLF) suggesting a possible return to conflict. As part of your party’s observations and if accountability is to be assigned, to whom should it first be directed?

Alula Hailu: With regard to the Pretoria Peace Agreement, assigning responsibility to only one party is not accurate, as both signatories have failed to fully implement the duties assigned to them under the accord. It is therefore necessary to assess their responsibilities separately and examine which side holds greater authority and obligations in delivering the expected outcomes. In this context, the federal government carries the primary responsibility for normalizing conditions in Tigray, restoring basic services, and undertaking related measures that serve as mechanisms for building confidence and trust. These are not tasks the federal government should claim credit for, as they are obligations clearly outlined in the agreement.

Under the agreement, the federal government is required to restore constitutional order in Tigray. This includes reestablishing basic services, ensuring the withdrawal of non-ENDF forces from the region, and facilitating the return of internally displaced persons in accordance with constitutional provisions. All these obligations derive from the same constitutional framework. In this regard, the federal government has not fully carried out its responsibilities. Assigning these tasks to other entities contradicts the agreement, which designates the federal government as the sole body responsible for their implementation based on the constitutional framework but has failed so far.

The return of displaced people cannot occur while other forces remain in areas constitutionally designated as part of Tigray. Many territorial claims raised over Tigray come from the constitutional order of the country, a process that has no clear endpoint. If pre-1995 boundaries were to be applied, there would be no regional states such as Oromia, Amhara, or Afar. Under such an approach, even Eritrea would not exist as a separate country. These considerations illustrate areas where the federal government has fallen short in meeting its obligations.

Similarly, the TPLF has not met its responsibilities. It is expected to monitor and ensure the federal government’s implementation of its duties, while the interim administration is also required to uphold institutional integrity. Gaps are visible within the Tigray forces, which were expected to participate in the DDR process but have instead continued with training activities and military parades, contributing to a war-like atmosphere. This undermines the agreement, as the same as the unconstitutional engagement with foreign actors.

However, the failure to establish an all-inclusive regional government in the region is a responsibility shared equally by both the federal government and the TPLF.

In a recent press statement, your party said that the federal government is preparing to open another round of war with Tigray and propagating the war agenda. On what basis did you reach this conclusion?

We do not raise concerns for the sake of formality. Regarding the TPLF and its displays of military parades and the statements made by its military personnel, we have repeatedly voiced our concerns to them. At the same time, it has been heard that the federal government has delivered its own war-related messages before Parliament, stating that any future conflict would be more destructive than the previous one, citing examples from Gaza and other places. This rhetoric, which suggests even greater devastation for the people of Tigray, amounts to direct threats that create fear among the population.

The federal government is not working to restore normalcy in the region through peaceful means, but instead appears to rely on coercive rhetoric against the public. Similarly, TPLF leaders cannot claim to seek peace while simultaneously conducting military training.

Reports indicate that Eritrean forces remain present and active in Tigray, while some of the region’s political and military leaders are said to maintain a relationship with Asmara. On the other hand, some prominent individuals from the TPLF faction are reportedly working with the federal government. Do these relationships truly exist? How might they affect the region’s political landscape and stability?

As a political party, we cannot provide definitive facts about who is working with whom, as we are not the source of such information. What we can do is analyze the publicly available narratives. For instance, there are reports of cross-border interactions with Eritrea conducted under the banner of ‘people-to-people relations,’ involving influential figures and propagandists from both sides. These activities occur without the knowledge of the federal government and are therefore in violation of both the Pretoria Peace Agreement and the country’s constitution. The federal government has also expressed concern about these developments.

As a party, we consider these actions unlawful and view them as long-standing behaviors embedded within both the TPLF and Shabia [the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front]. This pattern reflects a political system they have built over many years. Consistent with this behavior, the TPLF seeks to control cross-border communication and even relations among neighboring communities, reflecting its authoritarian nature. Shabia exhibits similar tendencies but in an even more controlling form. However, their political disputes and conflicts have contributed to separating people who share common ties.

It is up to the people on both sides to resist such controlling forces and reclaim their freedom, as recent developments appear to be taking place with the approval of both political groups. These unlawful interactions pose significant risks to the region, particularly to Tigray and its population, as Shabia seeks to use Tigray as a battleground rather than fostering genuine, people-centered engagement. It is important to recall that Shabia committed deliberate and strategic acts of genocide against the people of Tigray. For these reasons, we reject this unlawful cross-border engagement, which has been enabled by both the TPLF and Shabia.

Regarding relations involving other TPLF faction leaders and the federal government, we have no objection as long as those engagements are conducted in the name of the TPLF itself. However, we oppose any unconstitutional relationship carried out in the name of Tigray. If so, the purpose and nature of such engagements must be transparent and disclosed to the public.

Recent reports indicate that an entity referred to as the Tigray Peace Force (TPF) is present in Afar, where clashes allegedly took place last week. Some claim TPF is supported by the federal government, while others say the group is linked to the newly established Simret Party. How does your party view this issue?

As mentioned earlier, we do not have full clarity regarding each incident, and even if we had such information, we would not present it as verified fact. However, our party’s position on this matter is clear. Whether it is the TDF or the TPF, both forces defended Tigray and its people during the genocidal war. Their separation resulted from political maneuvering within the TPLF, in which political leaders and military officials split the force into two—one side attempting to seize power, while the other rejected the move and aligned itself with the group now known as the TPF.

When these two forces fight one another, it ultimately weakens Tigray and leads to the loss of its youth. This is why we oppose such actions and call on both groups to address their disagreements through dialogue and work toward a solution that benefits the region. We have consistently advocated for a lasting settlement between them and will continue to do so. We also believe they should refrain from engaging in conflict in Tigray, Afar, or anywhere else for that matter. Again, we urge them to resolve their differences peacefully and without the involvement of external actors.

If the federal government is involved behind the scenes, then national resources are being misused, and any such support must stop, as it only fuels further conflict and harms both the country and the wider region. The same principle applies to the Simret party. If the party possesses an armed force, then the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) should revoke its registration immediately. However, I consider this scenario unlikely, as I believe TPLF has promoted this narrative to use Simret as a scapegoat for its own political agenda.

Some political figures and activists from the region claim the federal government cannot intervene if fighting were to break out between Tigray and Afar as that would be construed as a violation of the  Pretoria Agreement. How much do you agree with this view? In cases of regional conflict, who should be held accountable?

I think the situation in Tigray should not be treated as normal, and this must be taken into account when analyzing the devastating war situations in the region. The other thing is that its military power is not comparable to other regions, as its forces are battle-tested and the DDR process has yet to be implemented. This is an undeniable fact. Achieving balance among regional states is therefore difficult without the full implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. At the same time, the federal government has deployed its own forces to the region and transferred the administration of 40 percent of Tigray’s territory to other regional states. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to view the federal government as maintaining a neutral position in conflicts between regional states.

For example, in the territorial issue between Tigray and Amhara, it is not Amhara forces occupying constitutionally recognized Tigrayan territory, but federal forces. If Tigray were to attempt to reclaim these areas by force, it would be the federal government that responds militarily to secure them.

For these reasons, I do not subscribe to the narrative that the federal government acts as a neutral actor in conflicts involving Tigray. Should clashes arise between Tigray and another regional state, the federal government is likely to align against Tigray rather than deescalate tensions. This makes it difficult to request the federal government to reduce the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, under the constitution, the federal government is obligated to remain neutral and address disputes among regional states impartially.

In a recent address, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) implied that the Pretoria Agreement was a deal made between individuals. How does your party interpret this statement? What effect could it have on the peace process?

I believe the federal government has been given an unchecked opportunity to do whatever it wants due to the weaknesses of Tigray’s leaders, who have created a favorable environment for the government to operate. However, linking the peace agreement to specific individuals who participated in the signing process does not align with international practice. It is also relevant to note the uncertainty regarding which faction of the TPLF represented the organization during the signing, as the party later split into two or three groups, with one faction losing its legal status.

This raises questions about who can legitimately be recognized as the TPLF. Nevertheless, this internal division does not give any other party the authority to select or replace those who signed the agreement. For this reason, I view the Prime Minister’s remarks as a political maneuver, as he does not have the legitimacy to determine which individuals represent the signatories to the peace accord.

Your party has repeatedly expressed its concerns about the current situation in Tigray. Beyond publishing party statements, what practical steps has your party taken?

As a party, we issue weekly press releases on the pressing issues affecting Tigray, as this is part of our core responsibility. Our primary message has been to encourage the public to pursue peace and reject calls for war. Recent reactions from the Tigrayan community, including some military personnel declining the call for military mobilization, reflect this growing sentiment. We believe our efforts have contributed to this shift. Through various media platforms, we work to expose the actions of the administration, raise awareness, and promote peaceful dialogue and negotiation. In addition, we initiated an effort three months ago to convene all stakeholders for a national symposium, and we continue to call on all parties—including the TPLF, the Simret party, and the interim president’s committee—to join in support of national unity. I hope we will reach something, somewhere in the future.