Ethiopia hosted the presidents of Somalia and Kenya within days of each other as tensions resurfaced along Somaliland’s northern coast near Zeila, while Sudan’s war deepened further into what humanitarian agencies now describe as the world’s gravest humanitarian catastrophe. At the same time, drought warnings returned across the eastern Horn, reviving fears of another cycle of displacement and food insecurity.

Taken separately, each development may be construed as another episode in a region long accustomed to instability. But, taken together? Analysts say they point to something more consequential, that Ethiopia’s unresolved quest for reliable access to the Red Sea is no longer a dormant geopolitical concern, rather it is actively reshaping diplomatic alignments, security calculations, and humanitarian risks across the Horn of Africa.

“What has changed is not Ethiopia’s geography, but the pressure surrounding it,” said a Horn of Africa analyst speaking with The Reporter anonymously, as this week also saw Egypt stepping into the Red Sea equation with what seems to be full commitment.

The clearest signal indicating the Horn is undergoing a reordering and of the intensifications of the simmering pressures came not from Addis Ababa but from Cairo.

On December 25, The National, the UAE’s state-run daily newspaper based in Abu Dhabi, reported that Egypt had quietly concluded agreements to develop and upgrade two strategically located ports on the Red Sea: Assab in Eritrea and Doraleh in Djibouti.

Both ports lie near the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the southern gateway to the Red Sea and one of the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoints. According to sources cited by the paper, the agreements go beyond commercial upgrades and include the creation of berths capable of hosting warships, provisions for re-fuelling and resupplying Egypt’s southern fleet, as well as the option to deploy small but elite military contingents.

Egyptian officials reportedly view the deals as legitimizing an expanded military presence in both countries. Egyptian warships, sources say, are already frequent visitors.

For Ethiopia, the implications are immediate and uncomfortable. More than 90 percent of its maritime trade passes through Djibouti, particularly via Doraleh port.

A policy brief paper published last month by Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and authored by Mohammed Seid (PhD), an expert on the Middle East, reiterates that Ethiopia’s transition from a littoral to a landlocked state witnessed a fundamental shift from strategic autonomy to survival and this according to the paper has left the country to economic vulnerability, structural dependency and national security risk.

Analysts also contend that Egypt’s move this week inserts a rival strategic actor into Ethiopia’s most critical commercial artery at a time when relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa remain frozen over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Egypt has repeatedly framed Ethiopia’s dam as an existential threat to its water security and Cairo has consistently opposed any scenario in which landlocked states gain a territorial foothold on the Red Sea. Experts note that with negotiations over the GERD stalled for more than two years now, Cairo’s expanding Red Sea footprint signals a shift away from bilateral dam diplomacy and toward regional leverage. This broader contest over access, influence, and chokepoints now frames nearly every diplomatic interaction in the Horn.

Further south, reports emerged on December 16 of renewed tensions around Zeila, a historic port town on Somaliland’s northern coast near the Djibouti border. Somaliland-based media and regional security analysts spoke of heightened alert levels and diplomatic unease. Even as no formal Ethiopian military or commercial presence was announced, the response from Mogadishu was swift and unequivocal.

Somali officials reiterated their rejection of any unilateral arrangements involving Somaliland’s coastline, warning against actions that could undermine Somalia’s territorial sovereignty. The statements were familiar, but the timing was not accidental.

As of now there are no official documents or statements indicating that Zeila is Ethiopia’s primary commercial objective. That distinction still belongs to Berbera, Somaliland’s most developed port and the centerpiece of Ethiopia’s earlier memorandum of understanding with Somaliland authorities.

Yet Zeila’s symbolism appears potent. It sits at the intersection of unresolved regional fault lines: Somalia’s fragmented sovereignty, Somaliland’s long-standing bid for recognition, Djibouti’s strategic sensitivities, and Ethiopia’s determination to reduce its reliance on a single maritime corridor.

For Addis Ababa, the issue is existential rather than opportunistic. Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has been landlocked, depending overwhelmingly on Djibouti for maritime access. Every disruption of any kind including political, logistical, or financial has reinforced a consensus within Ethiopia’s security and economic establishment that redundancy is no longer optional.

As Costantinos Berhe (PhD), a seasoned economic and political analyst, put it, “There is nothing definitive or conclusively established at this point. We have not heard that the Somaliland project has been cancelled.”

He notes that although Somaliland is not a formally recognized state, it has existed independently for over 30 years and has demonstrated a relatively strong democratic system.

“Moreover, it has remained separate from Somalia itself,” he told The Reporter. “Therefore, the understanding [MoU]  Ethiopia reached with Somaliland does not appear to have been annulled. Certainly, Somalia has repeatedly lodged objections, but we have seen Ethiopia and Somalia engage in negotiations, even mediated as far as Turkey, and return to more peaceful engagement. So, dialogue appears to be what is needed, and it seems the government is pursuing that path”.

Within days of the Zeila reports, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud arrived in Addis Ababa on December 22, marking his fourth visit to Ethiopia in less than two years. Official statements highlighted cooperation on counterterrorism, security coordination, and regional stability. Absent from the communiqués but believed to be central to the visit was the Red Sea question.

Since Ethiopia signed its memorandum of understanding with Somaliland authorities two years ago, Somalia has increasingly framed Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as a political and sovereignty challenge rather than a neutral economic pursuit. While Addis Ababa insists it seeks access through lawful and negotiated means, Mogadishu fears that any normalization of Ethiopian port access via Somaliland could weaken Somalia’s already fragile federal authority.

An HoA analyst speaking with The Reporter was blunt in his assessment of the balance of control. “As for Hassan Sheikh [Mohamud], he has repeatedly come forward on this issue. First of all, Somalia does not control Somaliland, nor has it been able to control even its own capital city. So, at that level, this is how the situation stands.”

Diplomats familiar with the Addis talks describe the visit less as a breakthrough than as containment diplomacy, an effort by both sides to prevent escalation while their core disagreements remain unresolved. Experts note that Somalia needs Ethiopian military cooperation against Al-Shabaab and Ethiopia needs Somalia calm while it continues to explore strategic alternatives to Djibouti and in the wider Horn.

Analysts contend that the relationship of the two countries is increasingly defined by necessity rather than trust.

Just two days ahead of Hassan Sheikh’s visit, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) hosted Kenyan President William Ruto in Addis Ababa. Unlike Somalia, Kenya does not see Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions as a direct sovereignty challenge. Instead, Nairobi has positioned itself as a stabilizing buffer, offering cooperation through regional corridors and multilateral forums while quietly expanding its diplomatic footprint in the Horn.

Kenya’s interests appear to be pragmatic. Descalating Ethiopia–Somalia tensions risk spillover into its own security environment, particularly along its Somali border. At the same time, Kenya sees an opportunity to assert itself as a regional broker at a moment when Sudan has collapsed and Eritrea remains largely isolated.

Projects such as the Lamu Port–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, long delayed but never abandoned, regain relevance whenever Red Sea tensions intensify. While such corridors cannot replace direct maritime access, they provide Ethiopia with leverage—and Kenya with influence—in a region undergoing recalibration.

On the other hand If Somaliland represents Ethiopia’s most flexible maritime option, Eritrea remains its most sensitive one. Addis Ababa has openly stated its interest in access to the Assab port, a move that immediately raises historical and security alarms.

“A port is not merely about cargo transport,” Costantinos explained. “Ports involve industrial parks, special economic zones, and serve as hubs where we can produce and export significant volumes of goods.”

He added that the Red Sea’s volatility makes access a strategic insurance policy.

“Because the Red Sea region is perpetually volatile, such access would be something Ethiopia could use to safeguard its national interests,” said the expert.

Yet he stressed that there is no indication Ethiopia seeks this access through force.

“There is no indication at the governmental level that this would involve launching a war against the Eritrean government. Even now, it appears to be something Ethiopia seeks to pursue through peaceful means,” said Costantinos.

He stated that reports that Eritrea is mobilizing its population for war seem and remain unverified.

“But how true is that? That remains a questionable matter,” he asked.

Egypt’s decision to upgrade Assab, however, complicates the equation further, effectively inserting Cairo into a space Ethiopia once viewed as a potential bilateral negotiation.

Conversely, if Ethiopia’s eastern and southern diplomacy is driven by caution, its western frontier is shaped by absence. Sudan’s civil war has removed Khartoum as a regional actor altogether.

“Sudan is almost becoming among those referred to as a collapsed state,” said an analyst. “Because foreign powers have intervened there, I personally do not believe Sudan will return to peace anytime soon.”

He described a conflict sustained by external backing, looted gold, and an endless supply of weapons.

“As long as these two Sudanese warring parties continue to receive foreign support, they will not run out of weapons.”

For Ethiopia, the consequences extend beyond humanitarian concern. Sudan once represented a strategic counterweight, a neighbour with Red Sea access, agricultural potential, and diplomatic weight. According to the expert, that anchor is now gone, narrowing Ethiopia’s options just as its urgency grows.

Overlaying these geopolitical pressures is a worsening humanitarian reality. As diplomacy intensified in December, aid agencies warned of renewed drought conditions across eastern Ethiopia, Somalia, and northern Kenya.

“Climate shocks do not create geopolitical conflict, but they accelerate it. States under humanitarian strain have less tolerance for diplomatic ambiguity,” said the expert. “Aid competition hardens political positions. Fragile societies become less forgiving of perceived external threats.”

Somalia, Costantinos noted, has endured more than three decades of crisis. Sudan now ranks first globally in displacement and food insecurity. South Sudan, too, is sliding back toward conflict following the arrest of Vice President Riek Machar and other senior government officials this year.

“In the East African region, something could erupt at any time,” he warned. “However, it appears that governments are aware of this risk and are giving it serious consideration.”

Experts and analysts alike agree that what emerges from the final weeks of December in the Horn region is not a single turning point, but a pattern. Ethiopia’s geography, unchanged for more than three decades, has become newly intolerable under modern pressures including global supply disruptions, Red Sea militarization, regional state collapse, and climate stress.

Neighbors are adjusting accordingly. Somalia engages defensively. Kenya mediates strategically. Sudan disappears. Somaliland advances cautiously. Egypt tightens its maritime grip. And Ethiopia presses forward, aware that delay carries its own risks.

“The African Union and the United Nations Security Council should also be involved,” Costantinos argued, pointing to the limits of sub-regional mechanisms. “IGAD should now play a major role in bringing these governments together. The African Union and the United Nations Security Council should also be involved, especially since Eritrea has withdrawn from IGAD membership. It is possible Eritrea believes IGAD is biased toward Ethiopia because its leadership is Ethiopian.”

Experts speaking with The Reporter contend that the Horn of Africa is not being reshaped by grand treaties or summits, rather it is being reordered by pressures of the economic, environmental, and strategic kind. The Red Sea sits at the center of that pressure, not as a destination, but as a question Ethiopia can no longer afford to leave unanswered.

The Algiers Agreement, signed in December 2000, has largely been forgotten, and this week’s reminders come amid fears of a return to conflict as friction between Addis Ababa and Asmara continues to grow more heated.

Ethiopia’s advances towards securing maritime access have triggered alarm in Eritrea, with the administration of Isaias Afwerki accusing Addis Ababa of preparing to annex the port of Assab in its bid to gain a sea outlet. On the other hand, Ethiopia has accused Asmara of providing support to various armed groups and political factions in the country, including Fano militia in the Amhara region and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

The finger-pointing has escalated to the world stage in recent months, with foreign affairs officials from both countries crying foul at the UN on several occasions.

The tensions suggest that another war could be in the offing, leading observers to call for calm and suggest solutions for a peaceful ending to the saga. One analyst proposes a territory swap: the border town of Badme for the port of Assab.

However, a deeper look at relations between the two countries over the past three decades shows the situation is not nearly that simple.

Many political pundits consider the Algiers Agreement and Assab as cardinal mistakes that defined the TPLF-led Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which ruled Ethiopia until relatively recently.

They note the Algiers Agreement birthed the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission, which concluded a hotly disputed demarcation process in late 2007 without resolving the issues that had led the two countries to war in 1998.

In hindsight, analysts observe the border dispute, which revolved primarily around the small town of Badme, was not the real cause of the two-year war. They note the Ethiopian military did not advance into Eritrea during the conflict, arguing this was due to a degree of sympathy from the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

Pundits argue his strong belief in Eritrea’s secession and independence is rooted in family ties to the country, while others say the conflict was engineered by regional powers who had a vested interest in keeping Ethiopia landlocked.

The negotiations that led up to the Algiers Agreement have also come under scrutiny. Analysts argue EPRDF erroneously assented to the use of colonial-era treaties to demarcate the border. These treaties were enforced by Italy during the reign of Emperor Menelik II in 1900, 1906, and 1910.

Experts note the 1906 treaty in particular, which the Boundary Commission relied on, favored Eritrea, and argue the EPRDF made a grave mistake by omitting the use of other evidence and documents in the negotiations. They note that the treaties in question had been nullified by both Ethiopia and Italy by the mid-20th century and argue that factors like ethnography, local allegiances, trade routes, and political identity were disregarded during the process.

The Boundary Commission was eventually dissolved without completing the physical demarcation process as both Ethiopia and Eritrea continued to dispute its rulings.

More than two decades later, realities along the border have changed markedly, particularly over the past five years.

Today, Eritrean forces control large swathes of Ethiopian territory as a direct result of Asmara’s involvement in the two-year northern war, which ended in November 2022. Areas like Irob, Badme, Tahtay Adiabo, Zelambessa, and others remain under Eritrean military control.

Adding fuel to the fire, renewed tensions between the TPLF and the federal government have escalated the probability of war. Despite the historical enmity and the human rights violations the Eritrean military committed in Tigray during the latest war in the north, the TPLF has abruptly changed its stance and is currently forging an alliance with Asmara.

Some observers argue the Algiers Agreement is no longer binding as Eritrea breached its terms by crossing the border and occupying Ethiopian territory. Others say differently.

“Since the Boundary Commission did not demarcate the exact border, there is no border agreement for Eritrea to breach. Rather, Eritrea breached Ethiopia’s borders, not the border determined by the Commission,” said one researcher who has published a series of papers on the issue.

Nonetheless, experts say Ethiopia can provide sufficient justification for its claims over Assab.

Among them is Yacob Hailemariam (PhD), a former prosecutor of the UN Tribunal on War Crimes in Rwanda and member of the Nigeria-Cameroon Border Commission. Yacob has kept a close eye on developments on the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and is the author of the widely read Amharic-language book, ‘Assab: Whose is it?’

In a recent interview, Yacob explained why Ethiopia’s claims over the port are legitimate.

“Historically, Assab was never part of Eritrea. When Eritrea was formed, Assab was under Rubatino. The people of Assab are the people of Afar in Ethiopia. Assab was sold by an Afar landholder to an Italian. Emperor Menelik did not know about the sale at the time, due to [poor] connectivity. Menelik repeatedly announced to the world that Ethiopia is bounded by the Red Sea. There is nothing that relates Assab to Eritrea historically,” said Yacob.

The expert noted that several territorial agreements signed between Emperor Menelik and Italy have all been voided by the UN.

“Even Italy itself nullified the agreements after it lost the Second World War. Ethiopia also nullified the agreements,” said Yacob.

His book argues the Algiers Agreement is also void, with Yacob blaming TPLF and EPRDF for what he describes as a historic failure.

“There were many opportunities to include Assab as Ethiopian territory. The international community was also positive in supporting Ethiopia on this. But EPRDF officials, particularly Prime Minister Meles, were unwilling to do this. Meles was unwilling to retain Assab. This affinity towards Eritrea was nothing short of treason,” said Yacob. 

Hidden Hands: Assab, 2018, and TPLF’s fate

Documents from a UN Security Council Monitoring Group show reports of unusual military activity in and around Assab in 2016. At the time, the port was being used by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Eritrea for the transport of troops and equipment to Aden in the context of the conflict across the Red Sea in Yemen.

Reports from the time indicate the port was a source of concern for Israel, which feared Assab could fall under the control of the Iran-backed Houthis fighting a coalition of forces from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others with the backing of the US and Europe.

The reports suggest that Israel moved to encourage Eritrea to re-integrate with Ethiopia as a way to secure Assab. The port was a key agenda during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s 2016 visit to Ethiopia and PM Hailemariam Desalegn’s reciprocal visit to Israel the following year, according to the reports.

Israeli diplomats visited both Asmara and Addis Ababa in 2017, and a one-person delegation travelled from Israel to Mekelle on 24 December, 2017 for a meeting with senior officials in the regional capital.

While the visit to Mekelle was framed as a discussion over proposals for collaborations in research, documents and anecdotal sources reveal the key agenda was a political proposal for resetting relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, including the port of Assab.

Leaders of the TPLF refused the proposal, with the refusal, according to researchers, sealing the party’s fate.

Publications including ‘A Secret Deal to Conceal: The Eritrean Involvement in the Tigray War’ as well as ‘The Ximdo Gamble: TPLF–Eritrea Alliance and the Fragile Peace in Tigray and the Horn of Africa’ also reach the same conclusion.

Reports indicate that Israel’s dissatisfaction with the TPLF/EPRDF’s unwillingness to collaborate led Isaias Afwerki, an archenemy of the TPLF, to utter the phrase “game over, TPLF” in 2018, while other sources say he made the comment as far back as 2016.

The rest is history. The TPLF-led EPRDF was toppled in April 2018, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s ascent to power was characterized in its early days by the normalization of relations with Eritrea. In July 2018, the PM visited Asmara and signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship.

Two months later, Abiy and Isaias signed the Jeddah Agreement, marking the formal end of more than two decades of hostilities between their respective countries.

The reconciliation promised a new era of peace, holistic cooperation, and joint-development aspirations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and spurred a new wave of investment in the region.

In 2019, the EU and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) launched infrastructure projects linking Eritrean ports with the Ethiopian border. The EU Trust Fund for Africa immediately allocated the first tranche of a 20 million euro pledge to finance a road linking Assab with Ethiopia.

The normalization also earned PM Abiy a Nobel Peace Prize.

A few years later, the Eritrean military would serve as a key ally for the two-year war between the federal government and forces loyal to the TPLF.

The Deeper Entanglement

The war, and the cessation of hostilities agreement that ended it in November 2022, would ultimately undo the normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea—a process that observers criticized for lacking institutionalization from the outset.

The Pretoria Agreement was signed as a result of mounting international pressure surrounding the  conflict and reports of grave rights violations. Reports indicate the peace deal was ill-received in Asmara.

“Isaias was furious because Abiy signed the agreement. They had agreed to annihilate TPLF completely, but TPLF was saved by the peace deal. However, Abiy could not sustain the war due to its economic toll and the pressure from the international community,” said a seasoned geopolitical analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

Getachew Reda, who was among the signatories on the TPLF side and is currently an advisor to the PM, described the conditions leading up to the agreement in a recent article.

He argued the peace deal was the only option to save Tigray from “a near breakdown,” and revealed the 10-day negotiation process in Pretoria seemed hopeless before PM Abiy and Uhuru Kenyatta salvaged the situation.

“In the final hours, it was the federal side—negotiating from a stronger position—that nearly risked collapse,” stated Getachew, who also chairs Simret, a new political party that seeks to push TPLF out of political power in Tigray.

He explained Tigray was on the verge of collapse, and TPLF representatives went to Pretoria to sign a truce without any preconditions. While he praised the deal for saving Tigray, he argues the faltering implementation of its terms has “created space for spoilers and encouraged selective foot-dragging where cooperation from the federal side was required.”

Like other analysts, Getachew agrees the peace agreement’s exclusion of Eritrea continues to impact the post-war environment.

“Pretoria is largely silent on external actors, above all, Eritrea. Many Tigrayans—and a wide range of independent reports during the war—have alleged grave abuses by Eritrean forces, including killings and widespread sexual violence. Eritrea was not a party to the negotiations and did not sign the agreement. It has also shown no appetite for external scrutiny. No domestic Ethiopian process can credibly adjudicate crimes committed by a foreign military. That creates an accountability asymmetry that continues to poison the peace. Eritrea’s exclusion from Pretoria was not an oversight. It was a diplomatic necessity. Bringing Asmara into the room would have risked collapsing the talks. Leaving it out allowed the ceasefire to be signed. But the cost was obvious: a central actor in the war was left outside the peace architecture,” wrote Getachew.

Eritrean leaders have publicly criticized the agreement, framing it as an external plot and signaling resentment that it halted what they saw as a decisive final push.

A historical researcher and political analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously notes that while relations between TPLF and Shabia have been uneasy since they began as part of a mutual struggle against the Derg regime, the real source of the tension is Asmara’s nation-building aspirations and the obstacles that TPLF poses.

Decades after gaining statehood, Eritrea has largely been unable to embark on nation building, says the researcher.

“Eritrea still lacks the ingredients required for nation building and development. The first ingredient is the foundational history and fabric to bond together and brand the nation of Eritrea using its robust history and ‘ancientness.’ The history and civilization of both the people of Eritrea and Tigray is Axum. Axum is in Tigray. So, Eritrea needs Axum to succeed in its nation building. Eritrea tried to draw this from Adulis. But their efforts to bring the nation-building narrative to Adulis did not work because Adulis has neither the religious nor civilization fabric,” he told The Reporter.

The alternatives, according to the researcher, were to either destroy TPLF and integrate with Ethiopia, or to crush Tigray and claim Axum. Asmara opted for the second route.

“Immediately after the TPLF was crushed during the war, Eritrea took control of Axum. It also redrew its borders to include Axum, among other parts of Tigray, in Eritrea,” said the researcher. “Isaias’ plan was to make the TPLF politically irrelevant and use Tigray as an economic and cultural stepping stone for his nation building. Eritrea knows it cannot realize its nation building as well as achieve economic development without dependence on Ethiopia. The TPLF says to Eritrea ‘you can access Ethiopia only through TPLF.’ Eritrea wants to access Ethiopia directly, without the TPLF,” said the researcher.

Nonetheless, the TPLF (or part of it) is currently in the process of forming an alliance with Asmara.

“Now, after the federal  government failed to fully implement the Pretoria Agreement, and the Ethiopian government articulated its interest in sea access, Eritrea and TPLF are forming an alliance against it,” said the researcher.

The strange change in circumstances has been accompanied by increasingly fiery rhetoric between the federal government on one side, and the TPLF and Asmara on the other. And while fear that another war could erupt remain heightened, analysts and insiders who spoke to The Reporter do not believe a major conflict will break out.

“Isaias and Abiy would love to fight, but whether the war happens or not will be decided by foreign powers and not by Addis Ababa or Asmara,” said a military analyst, speaking anonymously.

He warned that if a war were to break out, it would almost certainly be fought in Tigray.

“Although Ethiopia wants Assab, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have a number of reasons not to fight in the lowlands. Eritrea relies on its mechanized forces, but its old USSR tanks and machines cannot function in the searing temperatures of the lowlands. So it prefers the bushy land along the Tigray border. Deploying a fleet of tanks to the lowland plains where there is no forest cover exposes it to Ethiopian drones. For Ethiopia, fighting in the lowlands of Assab leaves it open to a flank. Assab is far from Asmara, and fighting there cannot enable Ethiopia to access the political center of Eritrea. Tigray is closer, so Ethiopia may prefer to fight there; at least in northeastern Tigray,” the analyst told The Reporter.

What’s Next?

The statements issued by the AU, UN, and EU over the past week signal the international community’s growing concern about the potential for another war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Analysts contend the most serious concern at the moment lies with the TPLF and its frantic efforts to regain political footing both in Ethiopia and regionally, which they warn might spiral to a major conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Some argue the circumstances are more likely to result in minor clashes or engagements through proxies rather than a full-blown conflict.

“Eritrea is already supporting TPLF and Fano forces in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is also working on organizing forces against the Eritrean regime leveraging forces in the Afar region. The Afar ethnic group in Ethiopia is the same as in Assab. On top of these, the two countries might also lean on the Tsimdo forces,” said the military analyst.

Analysts like Costantinos Berhutesfa (PhD), however, worry about the lack of effort toward mediating a resolution between the two countries.

“The absence of a credible and assertive international community is eroding the venue for peaceful resolutions. I am worried about who will initiate credible and strong mediation and peaceful conflict resolution between Ethiopia and Eritrea, if the two countries edge to war with each other? I believe the reason the UN, AU, and EU are issuing statements now is likely because they see the likelihood of an upcoming conflict. The international community must step up, initiate strong mediation, secure peaceful resolution, and avert the possibility of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea,” urged Costantinos.

Eritrea’s willingness to take part in mediation appears to be growing thinner.

Last month, UN Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, Guang Cong, traveled to Asmara and held discussions with Isaias. The Eritrean president criticized the UN for failures in conflict resolution and decried what he sees as an absence of holistic underlying frameworks, unwarranted external interventions, and external influence in regional organizations.

Last week, Eritrea formally withdrew from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Over the past few months, Isaias has made official visits to Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, leading analysts to argue he is mobilizing support in the Arab world in case a war were to break out with Ethiopia.

Still, people like Getachew Reda contend there is little chance the tensions will boil over into open conflict. He argued the point during an intense interview on Aljazeera’s Head-to-Head program.

However, the military analyst says the outcome will ultimately be determined not by decisions made in Ethiopia and Eritrea, but in Egypt and Israel.

“Both Egypt and Israel have a growing interest in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Egypt is leveraging domestic forces in Ethiopia and regional forces in neighboring countries. Egypt intends to influence Ethiopia into turning focus away from developing the Abbay River. If Egypt prevails, this might drag Eritrea towards the Arab world. However, Israel has a strong interest in protecting the Red Sea from further infiltration of extremist presences. All in all, the outcome of the tension between Egypt and Israel will also decide the situation of Ethiopia and Eritrea. But the outcome of the tension between Egypt and Israel will be determined by who will get stronger backing from Washington,” he told The Reporter.

Regardless, another war would be devastating for both countries and the wider region, which is already burdened by conflict. Yacob urges both governments to look for a mutually beneficial solution.

“I don’t believe Ethiopia’s interest in Assab is a dead end. But accessing Assab must be peaceful, through negotiation. The ideal way would be for Ethiopia and Eritrea to install a special administration to co-manage Assab,” he said. “As long as Ethiopia has no port, Ethiopia’s existence is always in danger. At the same time, Eritrea needs Ethiopia to utilize its ports for its own development.”

The AU’s statement also urges both countries to opt for peace.

“As we mark this [Algiers Agreement] anniversary, the Chairperson calls upon Ethiopia and Eritrea to renew their commitment to the spirit of the Algiers Agreement, and to embrace dialogue, good neighborliness as the best path to durable good-neighbourliness. The stability of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, and the wellbeing of their peoples, depend on sustained efforts to strengthen trust, deepen cooperation, and prevent escalations that undermine collective security,” it reads.

Many assert the strategy marks Washington’s official acknowledgment that the era of unipolarism is at an end, and signals the Trump administration is attempting to find a footing to reassert the United States of America within a global geopolitical space characterized by multipolar competition.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a glimpse into how a particular administration seeks to position or assert itself and secure what that administration prioritizes as a national interest agenda. 

The NSS is often authored diagnosing grand agendas at hand, disclosing the scope of president’s decision making and setting out bureaucratic directions. Trump’s 2017 and 2025 strategies read like two very different administrations.

The 2017 document identified great power competition with Russia and China as the animating US foreign policy challenge, grounded in ‘principled realism’ that sought to advance US values and account for global power dynamics.

At the time, Trump designated Russia and China as “revisionist powers” seeking to “weaken US influence.” Last week, Washington signaled a departure from policy anchored in US-Europe ties and a change of focus towards seeking equal footing with Russia and China.

Trump’s new strategy landed with a bump across Europe and was welcomed with toasts in Beijing and Moscow. Saving the harshest critiques for Europe’s current trajectory, the 33-page grand strategy pushes commercial ties, strategic stability with Russia, and a strong US hand in Latin America.  

A political analyst argues the strategy is akin to Beijing’s preferred approach to foreign policy.

“The US is adopting China’s method, which is more about business, instead of the typical US foreign policy approach prioritizing democracy and liberal ideology,” said the analyst.

Regarding America’s core vital national interests, the NSS stipulates a number of new approaches. The Trump administration aims at ensuring the western hemisphere remains ‘reasonably stable’ and well governed, preventing mass migration to the US, and preventing ‘hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets.’

It seeks to keep foreign actors from inflicting damage on the American economy, maintain freedom of all “crucial sea lanes, and ensure that strategically important supply chains and critical mineral sources remain fully accessible to the United States.”

The strategy references the Monroe Doctrine—a 19th-century US policy in opposition to European colonization and interference in the Americas—as Washington appears to downgrade the role it sees Europe playing in the future of America’s power projection.

Strikingly, the new NSS legitimatizes Poland as capable of becoming a regional anchor state in Europe, potentially replacing Berlin.

Regarding Russia, the NSS notes that “significant US diplomatic engagement” will be required to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia with Europe. The NSS claims that European governments’ “subversion of democratic processes” is responsible for Europe not pursuing more actively an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

All in all, the strategy signals a major shift in US-Europe relations. It urges Europe to take primary responsibility for its own defense, downplays NATO expansion, and omits criticism of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Trump administration says it intends to enable Europe to “stand on its own feet and operate as a group of aligned sovereign nations” by preventing adversarial powers from gaining domineering influence in the continent. 

However, some observers say the document serves as a tool to forge an ideological bridge between Washington and some of the most extremist parties in Europe.

Trump’s plans also include preventing “an adversarial power” from usurping US primacy in the Middle East, including by securing oil and gas supplies and strategic chokepoints in the region.

To accomplish these goals, the document lays out that the Trump administration aims to avoid unnecessary military conflicts while bolstering US military, economic and diplomatic strength by pursuing pragmatic commercial, political and security arrangements with foreign partner countries. It intends to do so while adopting a “predisposition to non-interventionism,” including by avoiding imposing democratic or social change on foreign countries.

The NSS states that multiple factors that have led the United States historically to prioritize engagement in the Middle East are no longer present—namely, there being greater global diversification of energy supplies and sources, with the United States becoming a net energy exporter; and there being comparatively less competition by global superpowers for regional influence, with that competition having “given way to great power jockeying, in which the United States retains the most enviable position.”

The Trump administration predicts  the Middle East region will increasingly become a destination for international investment and in industries beyond oil and gas such as nuclear energy, AI, and defense technology. It also notes that US partners in the region may be collaborators for advancing other economic interests, such as securing critical supply chains or developing friendly and open markets in Africa.

The document states that the United States will depart from its “misguided experiment with hectoring these nations—especially the Gulf monarchies—into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government … we should encourage and applaud reform when and where it emerges organically, without trying to impose it from without.”

What Will it Mean for Ethiopia, Africa?

The NSS reiterates that the Trump administration will not prioritize the spreading of ideology and will instead look to partner with “select countries” in Africa to prevent conflict and foster improved economic ties. The Trump administration will seek both to improve existing trade relationships with African states while transitioning others from “a foreign aid paradigm to an investment and growth paradigm” to build on Africa’s significant natural resources and “latent economic potential.”

“For far too long, American policy in Africa has focused on providing, and later on spreading, liberal ideology. The United States should instead look to partner with select countries to ameliorate conflict, foster mutually beneficial trade relationships, and transition from a foreign aid paradigm to an investment and growth paradigm capable of harnessing Africa’s abundant natural resources and latent economic potential,” reads the document.

It explicitly states Washington’s potential role in crafting negotiated settlements to avert potential conflict between Ethiopia and its neighbors.

“Opportunities for engagement could include negotiating settlements to ongoing conflicts (e.g., DRC-Rwanda, Sudan), and preventing new ones (e.g., Ethiopia, Eritrea-Somalia), as well as action to amend our approach to aid and investment (e.g., the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act). And we must remain wary of resurgent Islamist terrorist activity in parts of Africa while avoiding any long-term American presence or commitments,” reads the NSS.

Ahead of the document’s publication, the Trump administration oversaw the signing of a peace accord between DRC and Rwanda last week. Analysts posit the move is tied to American interests in critical mineral deposits in DRC rather than a genuine desire to see peace in Africa.

They argue Washington’s rapprochement in Africa is geared towards sating America’s growing appetite for Africa’s critical minerals and warding off competition posed by China’s strong presence on the continent.

The NSS also highlights the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) as an example of legislation providing for robust US trade and economic ties to Africa, pledging to “amend our approach to trade and investment” with African countries. The NSS notes that as part of a broader strategy of transitioning from aid- to trade- and investment-focused ties with African states, the administration will immediately focus on critical mineral development and the energy sector, including US backed nuclear energy and natural gas.

Ethiopia has been excluded from AGOA, a preferential trade agreement that allows African countries to export a range of commodities to the US duty free, since January 2022. The Biden administration delisted the country amid allegations of abuses and rights violations committed during the two-year northern war.

The suspension has had a severe impact on foreign direct investment, particularly in industrial parks, and proven detrimental to the country’s efforts at industrialization. Trump’s new NSS could reverse this, and could also reset Washington’s rather cold relationship with PM Abiy Ahmed’s administration since the northern Ethiopia war.

However, how US interests in the Horn and Red Sea region will align with Ethiopia’s growing ambitions to secure sea access has become a point of discussion among analysts.

The strategy highlights Washington’s desire to secure the Red Sea shipping lane and hints at possibilities for a negotiated settlement between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. 

“This clearly indicates that Trump seeks a win-win settlement both for Ethiopia’s sea access national interest, and also to address the opposing positions of neighboring countries and Egypt. The question is, what can Ethiopia offer these countries in return if America is committed to the negotiated settlement?” asked one analyst, speaking anonymously.

He noted that doubts remain about the strength of the relationship between Addis Ababa and Washington, as well as how the US plans to handle Cairo’s strong position against Ethiopia’s interests.

Just two weeks ago, PM Abiy and General Dagvin Anderson, head of US military operations in Africa, discussed opportunities for enhanced joint cooperation to serve mutual interest, promote regional stability. Anderson also deliberated with Field Marshal Berhanu Jula on peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Just days before the NSS was launched, Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with PM Abiy over the phone, primarily on “shared commitment to regional stability and to building a foundation for peace in the Horn of Africa.”

The NSS and the recent engagements between Addis Ababa and Washington indicate the Trump administration’s immediate priority when it comes to Ethiopia is averting conflict.

The last major conflict in the country saw Kenya emerge as Washington’s preferred regional anchor state. The Biden administration designated Kenya as a ‘non-NATO ally of America,’ and President William Ruto appears to be enjoying a similarly warm relationship with the incumbent US president.

Just last week, Ruto signed a three billion dollar project dubbed the America First Global Strategy, which is the first of its kind since Trump scrapped USAID.

During his speech after the signing ceremony, Ruto praised Trump for his overtures towards Kenya and East Africa.

“We will be also participating in one of the most consequential and historic signing ceremonies in the next event on eastern DRC that will see stability, peace, and progress achieved as a result of the bringing together of the various teams and creating an ecosystem where our region, the East African region, we can unlock the potential that comes out of the peace and stability that we envisage, and encourage all actors that we work together towards the success of what President Trump has put together,” said Ruto.

The analyst observes that if the administration of Abiy Ahmed seeks to reinstate itself as a key US ally in the region, Ethiopia might have to abandon some of its ambitions.

“This means that eitherEthiopia will have to abandon its sea access interests, or the US has to commit itself to realize Ethiopia’s ambitions. But if Ethiopia continues pursuing its interest without the backing of America, Kenya will not only remain the regional anchor force, but also Trump’s enforcer,” he said.

In a lengthy statement released on Wednesday, December 3, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) said Egypt’s posture demonstrates an entrenched refusal to adapt to the political, demographic, and developmental realities that define the 21st-century Nile Basin.

The statement marks one of Addis Ababa’s most forceful public responses in recent months, or even years, and came following a string of increasingly direct warnings from senior Egyptian officials throughout 2025.

The strongly worded statement also signals a shift in tone from Ethiopia, which for months remained largely silent while Egypt intensified its diplomatic campaign at regional and global forums.

‎‎The Ministry’s latest message asserts that Ethiopia does not and will not seek “permission from any country” to use the waters of the Abbay basin (Blue Nile), insisting that Cairo’s repeated objections to the operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) are grounded in outdated assumptions of entitlement.

‎‎Analysts say Ethiopia has now disclosed its position, with the country seemingly reaching a breaking point in a long-simmering dispute. 

‎Although the two countries have verbally clashed for more than a decade over the construction of the GERD, Addis Ababa’s new statement suggests that the government views Cairo’s recent growing rhetoric as crossing a line.

For Ethiopia, the Ministry said, the pattern is no longer one of political disagreement but a clear “categorical rejection of dialogue,” deliberately designed to obstruct regional cooperation.

‎‎According to the statement, Egypt’s refusal to negotiate has now become “overt,” ending what Ethiopian officials say were “years of public performance” in which Cairo took part in talks but allegedly kept decision-makers from compromising or engaging in substantive talks.

The Foreign Ministry urged all concerned actors, a seemingly implicit reference to regional governments, the African Union, and major partners including the United States and EU, which have all put on an effort to get the two countries seat around the table previously, to denounce what it framed as Cairo’s dangerous shift toward militarized language.

‎‎MoFA’s unusually sharp tone comes after a year in which Egyptian officials repeatedly announced that Ethiopia’s operation of GERD constituted a threat to Egypt’s national security, regional stability, and even “the lives of millions.”

‎‎In recent months, Egypt’s position regarding Nile and GERD has been increasingly sharpening and a review of the nation’s official statements in 2025 reveals a steadily intensifying pattern.

In October, Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation issued its strongest public condemnation to date.

It accused Ethiopia of “reckless and irresponsible” management of GERD, alleging that sudden water releases had led to downstream flooding. The Ministry said Ethiopia’s actions represented a “direct threat to the lives and security of the peoples of the downstream states,” and warned that its patience was wearing thin.

The statement said Egypt “cannot ignore” such behavior, a phrase interpreted by regional analysts as an indication that Cairo was preparing the ground for stronger diplomatic or other means of posturing.

A month earlier, Egypt escalated the dispute to New York.

Its government submitted a formal letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), accusing Ethiopia of violating international law by continuing to fill and operate GERD without a trilateral agreement.

‎‎In the letter, Egypt asserted that it “will not allow Ethiopia to impose unilateral control over shared water resources,” vowing to “defend its existential interests” through “all measures permitted under the UN Charter” and the wording of the letter had raised an alarm among diplomatic circles given its potential implications.

Earlier, in July, Badr Abdelatty, Egypt’s foreign minister, issued another televised warning, declaring that Egypt “reserves the right to defend itself” against the effects of Ethiopia’s “unilateral” actions.

He accused Ethiopia of “endangering regional equilibrium” and warned of consequences should Addis Ababa continue operating GERD without what Cairo considers a binding agreement.

‎‎This too was preceded by a warning from the Egyptian Prime Minister pushing the “matter of existence” narrative.

‎‎A few weeks before the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s comments, Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly reiterated the long-standing message that the Nile is a “matter of existence for Egypt and not open to compromise.”

While not explicitly threatening, analysts widely viewed this repetition as part of a coordinated campaign to increase and intensify international pressure over the dispute.

‎‎However, after months of official threats, Ethiopia this week broke its silence over the matter.  Prior to the Ministry statement, Ethiopia had largely refrained from responding directly to these warnings. Officials in Addis Ababa had instead stressed their preference for African Union-led dialogue, technical cooperation, and collaboration between riparian countries.

Wednesday’s statement ended that restraint.

‎‎“The repeated threats show the failure of the Egyptian government to come to terms with the realities of the 21st century,” the Ministry stated, arguing that Egypt’s approach is “not compatible with contemporary international law, basin-wide cooperation norms, or the developmental needs of upstream countries.”

‎‎Ethiopia said some Egyptian officials “think they have a monopoly over the waters of the Nile” and rely on “colonial-era treaties” and concepts of “historical rights” that Ethiopia has never recognized.

‎‎Addis Ababa also accused Cairo of regional destabilization. ‎‎In one of the most striking parts of the statement, Ethiopia accused Egypt of undermining regional stability not only over the water dispute, but also through broader political strategies.

‎‎According to the Ministry, Egypt has sought to “engineer pliant, weak and fragmented client states” across the Horn of Africa, using “a campaign of destabilization focused on but not limited to Ethiopia.”

‎‎While the statement did not detail specific incidents, analysts who spoke with The Reporter note that Ethiopia has long suspected Egypt of supporting political factions or diplomatic alliances that could pressure Addis Ababa on Nile issues. Cairo has consistently denied such accusations.

‎‎“This misguided approach and effort is a failure of imagination and leadership,” the statement reads, calling Egypt’s tactics an “obsolete playbook that has never cowed Ethiopia.”

‎‎The East African nation reasserted its rights over the Abbay basin and central to Ethiopia’s message is the assertion that it contributes the vast majority of water that sustains the Nile.

‎‎The Ministry emphasized that Ethiopia contributes roughly 86 percent of the Nile’s total volume through the Abbay River. As such, it said, Ethiopia has “full sovereign rights to utilize water resources within its borders.”

‎‎“Ethiopia, like all other riparian states, has a right to utilize this natural resource,” the Ministry declared. Addis Ababa stressed that the principle of “equitable and reasonable utilization,” a cornerstone of modern international water laws, supports its position.

‎‎The Ministry underscored that Ethiopia “has no obligation to seek permission from anyone” to develop the water resources inside its territory.

Beyond the legal and political arguments, Ethiopia’s statement framed GERD as a regional development project rather than just a national one.

Ministry officials described GERD as an “embodiment of Africa’s self-reliance and progress,” repeating Ethiopia’s long-held argument that the dam provides substantial benefits to Egypt and Sudan through regulated water flow, reduced flooding, and hydropower integration opportunities.

‎‎Ethiopia also reiterated its stance that the dam is designed for electricity generation not for water diversion, an assurance Addis Ababa has provided since construction began more than a decade ago starting from the inception of the dam.

‎‎‎‎Despite its confrontational tone, the Ministry said Ethiopia remains open to dialogue, cooperation, and technical coordination “based on fairness and equity.” It insisted that the solution lies in “win-win outcomes” rather than confrontation.

‎‎However, the statement made equally clear that Ethiopia will not yield to coercive pressure.

‎‎Ethiopia says it will continue exercising its rights under international law, reject threats of force, and resist what it called Egypt’s attempts to impose unilateral veto power over upstream development.‎

‎“What the world needs, what Africa needs is more cooperation and dialogue, not confrontation and conflict,” the statement concluded.

‎‎Analysts who spoke with The Reporter noted that the escalating rhetoric has raised fears of renewed tension in an already fragile region.

Speaking anonymously, a Nile politics expert noted several potential consequences including increased diplomatic pressure, shifting regional alliances, risk of miscalculation, internal pressures in both countries, as well as implications for the African Union.

‎‎‎He stressed that Egypt’s referral of the issue to the UN Security Council signals its intent to internationalize the dispute. Ethiopia, however, has consistently argued that African-led mechanisms, not global bodies are the appropriate forum.

‎‎On the other hand, the expert explained how the recent disclosure of Ethiopia’s strong position might strengthen some shifting alliances.

‎‎”Horn of Africa states continue to navigate relations with both countries,” he said. “Ethiopia’s accusation that Egypt is seeking to influence regional politics could heighten mistrust and reshape alliances in the Red Sea and Nile Basin regions.”

‎‎According to analysts, while neither country has indicated imminent military action, the repeated use of existential and defensive rhetoric widens the margin for misunderstanding. Regional analysts also warn that messaging designed for domestic audiences can inadvertently raise regional tensions.

‎‎The simmering dispute between the two countries and ‎‎Ethiopia’s strong stance comes at a time of domestic reform and post-conflict stabilization, while Egypt continues to grapple with economic pressures and public concerns over water scarcity.

‎‎On the other end of the spectrum, experts state that the AU’s ability to re-energize trilateral talks may be tested once again. Previous rounds have stalled over sequencing, data exchange, and legal frameworks for long-term operation.

‎For now, Ethiopia’s latest statement marks a decisive moment in the evolution of the GERD dispute. After months of silence, Addis Ababa is signaling that Cairo’s rhetoric has crossed into territory it can no longer ignore.‎

‎But despite the sharpness of its tone, Ethiopia still frames cooperation as the path forward. Whether Egypt will shift from confrontation to negotiation and whether both countries can break years of mistrust still remains uncertain.‎

‎What is clear is that the Abbay, the Nile, and the Grand Renaissance Dam remain at the center of one of Africa’s most consequential geopolitical challenges. And as both states harden their rhetoric, the stakes in diplomacy, development, and regional stability continue to rise.

“This gavel of this G20 summit formally closes this summit and now moves on to the next president of the G20,” declared Ramaphosa. Tradition dictates the gavel should have been handed over to next year’s host, but the United States of America, under the leadership of Donald Trump, did not attend this year’s summit in South Africa.

Trump barred US officials from attending after claiming that South Africa’s black majority is persecuting its white minority, an accusation the South African government denies vehemently. Trump has even made comments implying that South Africa, the only African member of the bloc (barring the AU), should not be part of G20.

Aside from the US President’s latest controversial opinions, his administration’s absence was glaring, particularly in light of the pressing need to advance solutions for urgent global and regional issues.

Yet, South Africa did not back down from pushing global leaders at the summit to reach a consensus on these issues and making a major declaration at the end of the summit.

This year’s summit touched on a number of topics, chief among them were global debt injustice, Africa’s falling victim to an international financial architecture designed by wealthy countries, and why developed countries are reluctant to change the system.

The rising debt burden has become the fabled Stone of Sisyphus for the global south, as developing nations exert monumental effort to realize economic growth and social progress while grappling with the realities of mounting debt.

Global public debt levels have soared, reaching a record of USD 92 trillion, and are set to exceed USD 100 trillion by the end of the year. Developing countries face rising debt service costs as a result.

Africa in particular is spending up to USD 164 billion in debt servicing in 2024, with 25 out of 54 African economies spending more on interest payments than on health and food security.

The widening debt crisis largely emanates from a flawed international economic framework characterized by a rules-based system developed and historically dominated by developed countries that hold disproportionate voting power bases and influence in key decision-making processes, which do not favor Africa’s transformation and development needs. 

The existing global debt architecture, including the G20 Common Framework, is creditor-led and inadequate to solve Africa’s debt crisis, observers argue.

The G20, formed in 1999 by sovereign countries as well as the EU and AU as singular members, was intended to resolve major outstanding global problems.

The G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), known as the Common Framework (CF), was launched in November 2020 in the wake of mounting economic pressures amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.

Its purported aim is to strengthen the international debt architecture for the world’s poorest countries. The framework provides a support structure for official creditor coordination to facilitate timely, orderly, and durable debt treatment and to forge the principles of fair burden-sharing across official and private sector creditors.

Sub-Saharan Africa is facing a very challenging debt situation. In the last decade, debts owed by African governments to creditors have increased significantly. African external debt was more than a trillion dollars in 2024, compared to just half that in 2020.

According to the UN, globally, over two thirds of low-income countries (many of which are in Africa) are either in debt distress or at a high risk of it. According to an assessment by the IMF, the average total public debt ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa has almost doubled in just a decade—from 30 percent of GDP at the end of 2013 to almost 60 percent of GDP by end of 2024, and the ratio of interest payments to revenue has more than doubled since 2010.

More money is going into debt servicing than priority expenditures for many countries. About 3.4 billion people live in countries that spend more on public debt interest payments than on either education or health. Due to expensive borrowing and the proliferation of shocks— pandemics, Ukraine war, climate shocks—Sub-Saharan Africa is facing an unprecedented situation.

The G20 CF managed only a fraction of the outstanding debt. In Africa, the topic is acute: with the IMF warning that some 20 African countries were in or at high risk of debt distress.

In the past five years, just four countries requested the G20 Common Framework Debt Treatment. These are Zambia, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Chad. The process for each of these countries has suffered delays, often related to limited private sector participation.

Two of the four countries, Ghana (USD 9.3 billion) and Zambia (USD 4.3 billion), have secured debt relief while Ethiopia and Chad are left waiting.

The mechanism’s “very mixed track record” has led eligible low-income countries, including African states like Kenya and Sudan, to avoid applying and continue debt repayments.

Senegal emerged as a flashpoint after billions of dollars in undisclosed borrowing prompted the IMF to freeze a USD 1.8 billion program and triggered a sharp ratings downgrade.

Gabon has turned to liability-management deals to ease repayment pressure, including regional bond swaps worth about USD one billion. Mozambique has sought advisers for a restructuring, while Malawi’s debt levels are nearing 90 percent of GDP. IMF and WB warn African economies to maintain their debt-to-GDP ratio below 60 percent.

At the end of the G20 summit, participating world leaders issued a declaration that exposed the grim realities facing the debt-burdened developing world.

“We meet against the backdrop of rising geopolitical and geo-economic competition and instability, heightened conflicts and wars, deepening inequality, increasing global economic uncertainty and fragmentation. In the face of this challenging political and socio-economic environment, we underscore our belief in multilateral cooperation to collectively address shared challenges. We note with distress the immense human suffering and the adverse impact of wars and conflicts around the world,” reads the declaration.

It details that developing nations, especially in Africa, are facing huge deficits in financing basic public services and development finance, as their economies are drained by debt servicing.

“We are aware that over 600 million Africans have no access to electricity, with an average access rate of 40 percent for African countries being the lowest in the world and an estimated one billion people in Africa lack access to clean cooking. We are deeply alarmed that two million Africans lose their lives each year due to the absence of clean cooking fuels in households. While we welcome progress made in reducing hunger in the world, we are still alarmed that up to 720 million people continued to experience hunger in 2024 and that 2.6 billion people were unable to afford healthy diets. We commit to strengthen our efforts in the fight against illicit financial flows (IFFs) noting that at least USD 88 billion in outflows from Africa is lost every year, undermining domestic resource mobilization efforts,” reads the declaration.

Debt servicing costs have reached unprecedented levels, crowding out vital spending on health, education, climate adaptation, and other development priorities.

According to UNCTAD and the World Bank, public debt in developing countries surpassed USD 31 trillion in 2024, with debt service costs rising by over 10 percent in a single year. Governments are literally defaulting on development in order to honor their debt obligations.

Especially in Africa, reliance on domestic finance remains nascent, hindered by massive illicit financial outflow, which could otherwise bridge Africa’s underfinance, according to UNCTAD.

Ten years after the world embraced the Sustainable Development Goals, progress has stalled. Financing for development is shrinking, climate shocks are intensifying, and multilateral solidarity faces a historic test, as bullying, protectionism, and crude self-interest become the order of the day.

Meanwhile, the old development model has not delivered and is now being dismantled by many of its former supporters. Trade barriers are increasing, and the protections provided by a rules-based system, especially for the least developed countries, are being tested.

Instead of increasing funding, concessional flows are declining, and the broader promise of development finance remains out of reach. Private capital flows to Africa remain limited, volatile, overly expensive, and dominated by debt.

The G-20 Common Framework, which was envisaged to steer the process, has been slow in providing relief, and there is not a clear roadmap for countries. The journey for Ghana, Zambia, Ethiopia, and Chad has been complex and uncertain. The heterogeneous creditor landscape has led to the lack of a proper framework to assess comparability of treatment between creditors. Official creditors have favored maturity extensions with no principal reduction, while private creditors have tended to prefer upfront cash. There is insufficient consideration for debt relief via principal reductions.

Unfortunately, the Common Framework has not performed as expected.

Instead of meeting the huge investment gap, Africa is witnessing a dramatic scaling back of development cooperation, as major development partners turn inward and shift their focus to military spending. Moreover, hopes of development through trade and market access have been dealt a sharp blow by unilateral tariffs that undermine the rules based, multilateral trading system and penalise poor countries.

The USA’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act has lapsed, and the spectre of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism looms large.

Alongside these policy-induced income shocks, Africa and low- and middle-income countries generally face significant macroeconomic shocks. Commodity prices have fallen below their long-term trend, and the combination of slower growth and higher global interest rates has increased the risk of debt distress in many nations. Even for those not facing immediate risk of debt default, the rising burden of debt service payments is crowding out essential investments in economic and human development.

Amidst the failure of western instruments, China has emerged as the biggest lender and the largest bilateral creditor for Sub-Saharan Africa, lending more than USD 800 billion in the last two decades, eclipsing the Paris Club.

As part of its overseas push and the Belt and Road Initiative, China has provided loans for infrastructure, energy, transportation, and communications. It has a unique lending style, with many loans secured on commodity exports. Its loans in Africa peaked in 2016 and have since been on a declining path.

China now accounts for more than 10 percent of Su-Saharan African debt. Resource-rich countries such as Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo owe more than 40 percent of their debt to China. Beijing is also the major bilateral, non-Paris Club creditor to Ethiopia, accounting for 30 percent of total external debt.

China has a unique mix of official and private creditors. Its institutional architecture is different from Western countries. China has two major policy banks (China Development Bank (CDB) and China Eximbank), several large, state-owned commercial banks and an export credit and insurance agency, Sinosure.

Historically, China’s foreign lending was provided by CDB and China Eximbank, which are also public creditors. However, since 2015, more than 40 commercial creditors have become involved, including state-owned commercial banks, state-owned enterprises and private companies, and Sinosure.

State-owned commercial banks include the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Bank of China. This renders negotiations with the Chinese challenging for African governments and increases transaction costs of navigating the Chinese system.

According to the Boston University Global Development Policy (GDP) Center, China loaned about USD 160 billion to African countries between 2000 and 2016. China’s two global policy banks are rapidly becoming the largest sources of energy finance for governments around the world and eclipsing the multilateral development banks.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia requested debt treatment under the G20 CF in early 2021, when its debt-to-GDP ratio reached an all-time-high of around 53 percent.

Negotiations  between Addis Ababa and its creditors for the restructuring of USD 3.5 billion in debt, have since stalled, primarily due to the country’s deteriorating domestic political situation (Tigray armed conflict) and slow-moving discussions with the IMF on a financing program. Nevertheless, the country and its Official Creditors Committee (OCC) reached an agreement in principle on the main debt treatment parameters in late March 2025.

UNDP Ethiopia, which advises the government on debt management, points out that a debt haircut can free up fiscal space for Ethiopia’s SDG investments.

In September 2025, an IMF and WB joint assessment warned Ethiopia’s debt is unsustainable unless the country reaches an agreement with creditors. It highlights that Ethiopia’s repayment risks are aggravated by “bunching of debt service in the near to medium term” and by the sharp decline in external financing during and after the Tigray war.

The report warns that without successful restructuring and reforms, Ethiopia faces “both liquidity and solvency pressures,” as debt service obligations continue to outpace export revenues and government revenues. Stress tests show the economy remains highly vulnerable to export and depreciation shocks.

In October, Ethiopia’s negotiations with creditors for its outstanding USD one billion Eurobond collapsed.  As in Zambia’s case, the challenge is to find a solution that is acceptable to both private and official creditors.

In the case of Ethiopia, in February 2025, the Eurobond holders argued that since coffee and gold exports are strong, the country is facing a liquidity and not a solvency challenge. They had previously rejected an Ministry of Finance offer to pay USD 800 million or 80 percent of the Eurobond that was due in December 2024.

Following the unsuccessful negotiations to restructure the debt with creditors, Ethiopia is reportedly in talks with China to swap debts it owes Beijing into Yuan-denominated debt instead of the US Dollar.

A Way Forward for Africa?

Seeing the mainstream debt management instruments that have been in place for years are not effective, African leaders have come up with different proposals. These include reforming the G20 Common Framework, restructuring the existing mainstream international financial architecture, and introducing new and effective international and regional financing instruments that are based on the needs and voices of African countries.

Experts argue that the CF is a long, drawn-out process with an uncertain end and no interim relief, making it both challenging for participating countries and discouraging for other countries with serious debt problems. Another perspective argues that almost three years after the initial agreement on the Common Framework, there still is no model for an internationally coordinated restructuring that both delivers significant debt relief and includes the Chinese policy banks. It has also been unable to mediate between creditors and provide a minimum standard for debt relief requirements on private creditors.

According to Indermit Gill, chief economist for the World Bank, the CF has failed to provide a single dollar of new money. Jason Braganza from the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) has argued that the G20 CF is a creditor-led initiative with the objective of guaranteeing creditors get paid.

Given the slowness in debt restructuring, multilateral financing is increasingly used to repay private creditors. Amid such criticism, it is important to think of ways to reform the system.

Another layer of complexity has been the different mindsets and approaches among creditors. Paris Club and China prefer maturity extensions, while private creditors favor immediate cash flows with the possibility of debt write-downs, depending on the country’s case.

The AU Lomé Declaration on Debt, adopted in May 2025, resolved “to advocate for reforming the G20 Common Framework by setting up a universally accepted methodology for comparability of treatment, enhancing transparency and inclusivity amongst stakeholders during restructuring”.

The G20 Africa Expert Panel for the G20 Leaders’ Summit in South Africa, has issued a document dubbed ‘Growth, Debt and Development: Opportunities for a New African Partnership’ that stipulates a range of alternative mechanisms to resolve Africa’s debt complications.

“Some of our proposals offer immediate opportunities for progress, while others call for the sustained effort needed to achieve lasting transformation. The simplest and easiest actions seek to create a better environment for African infrastructure finance; while returns on investments in Africa often exceed those in developed economies, investors are deterred by regulatory barriers and distorted perceptions of risk,” reads the document.

The South African Presidency of the G20 offered an opportunity to build momentum behind a stronger African voice in global affairs. The Africa Expert Panel was appointed by the South African Minister of Finance to prepare an independent report for G20 leaders to advise on the collective actions needed to realize the global potential of Africa’s development.

The G20 is requested to help with several agendas, including swift action to reduce investment costs by increasing project transparency. Simple adjustments to global banking regulations could unlock more finance for infrastructure and development, according to the panel.

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) hold considerable power to shape borrowing costs and must be held accountable. Transparency in sovereign lending must involve both debtors and creditors, also requested by the panel. Given the IMF’s significance for financial stability and development on the African continent, and the continued absence of an effective African voice in the Fund, the panel suggests an independent review of the IMF.

African countries account for about 40 percent of IMF loan commitments and are subject to the conditions attached to those loans. A comprehensive Africa-focused review of the IMF can ask how the G20 can help to make it work better for the continent and the world, according to experts.

Over the life of the G20, there have been notable changes in the global financial architecture. New multilateral financial institutions have been established regionally, including a new wave of African multilateral finance agencies. Additionally, new entities have emerged at regional and cross-border levels to tackle financial stability challenges. These include the Chiang Mai Initiative, the BRICS’ Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the African Financial Stability Mechanism, and the African Monetary Fund.

These developments have occurred without careful review by the international community of their implications for the effectiveness and equity of the international financial system.

The panel urged that a new strategy for global development is essential.

Delivering key demands to G20 members, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed urged the bloc to strengthen the Compact with Africa 2.0 Trust Fund, expand guarantees, and blend finance to unlock private capital.

Furthermore, he urged the G20 to advance timely and profitable debt relief under the Common Framework, support deeper capital markets, improve credit ratings, and also champion African integration from AfCFTA to cross-border infrastructure and digital connectivity.

“It’s important that we find solutions and not just tinker at the margins,” said Trevor Manuel, former South African finance minister and chair of the G20 Africa Expert Panel.

‎Residents of the market town located in the southern part of Ethiopia, around 750 kilometers away from the nation’s capital, told The Reporter that the shock and fear slowly sneaked into their hearts when within days, two health workers, church leaders, and a police officer also died.

‎Each of them were reportedly linked by a chain of exposure that spread across Jinka General Hospital and surrounding communities. Heavy blood loss, severe hemorrhaging, and rapid deterioration marked the deadly pattern.

‎And yet, residents say that the families of the first victims were left to move around freely.

‎On November 12, the Ministry of Health confirmed that the country was facing its first recorded Marburg virus disease outbreak, a deadly hemorrhagic fever related to Ebola, known for fatality rates that range anywhere from 24 to 88 percent.

‎However, unlike previous epidemics such as COVID-19, cholera, or measles, this emerging outbreak arrives at a moment when Ethiopia’s health sector struggles with an increasingly fragile financing environment characterized by declining donor contributions, audit gaps, procurement backlogs, and mounting pressure from a healthcare workforce fatigued by low wages, high workloads, and years of layered crises.

‎Analysts contend that the question is no longer whether Ethiopia can diagnose Marburg, trace contacts, or deploy rapid response teams. Rather, it has evolved into whether the system can sustain the response and do so largely without the external financing that buffered previous health crises.

‎Speaking with The Reporter, a young farmer residing in Jinka, provided a chronology of events as they unfolded in the town’s hospital and surrounding neighborhoods. His name is being withheld for his safety.

‎“On November 7, the first person who died was an employee of a bank. Then, the doctors who treated him and other people from a church that had direct contact with the man also died,” he said. “A total of six people. First, the bank employee. Three people from the church. One police officer who lived in the same neighborhood as the first man, and another person.”

He described the atmosphere of fear that had gripped Jinka in the days preceding a statement from the Ministry of Health, confirming the disease and outlining steps to prevent infection.

‎“Almost everyone was silent and shaken,” he told The Reporter, “but since the Ministry made the statement so that we know about the issue, there hasn’t been anything unusual. But the fear was very real.”

‎The concern deepened as new cases emerged in Male, a neighboring district in South Omo Zone.

‎“Three people with the same problem have been admitted to Jinka Referral Hospital this week,” he said.

He says the most alarming failure was one of public health fundamentals.

‎“The wife, children, and close family of the first victims—they weren’t isolated as soon as the first person passed away. They were moving around the town. That has really worried us,” he told The Reporter.

‎The farmer underscores the level of worry.

‎“We have heard that the case has an incubation period of two to 21 days. If within that window they don’t show symptoms and go to hospitals, we worry that controlling the situation may become very difficult. At the very least, they should have been isolated so that any sign of symptoms could be quickly identified. That is what people in town are most worried about,” he said.

‎On November 12, Health Minister Mekdes Daba (MD) publicly confirmed the outbreak.

The Minister stated that the Marburg Virus Disease outbreak in Jinka town was confirmed through laboratory testing and that at the time of the press briefing, 17 individuals suspected to have the disease had undergone testing while another three had died.

‎The Minister also disclosed that 129 people who had close contact with the suspected cases are under self-isolation being closely monitored by medical professionals.

Mekdes underscored Ethiopia’s upgraded diagnostic capacity and said that a mobile laboratory with advanced diagnostic capacity, as well as rapid response teams, had been deployed to Jinka while emergency coordination centers had been established, and medical supplies were being distributed.

‎Mesay Hailu (PhD), head of the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI), also stated that screening at border points and key transit hubs was being strengthened.

‎The Ministry’s message issued earlier this week echoed one of readiness and rapid mobilization but the outbreak arrives as the country enters a new era of financial tightening.

Officials maintain that the country can and will contain the outbreak using its own means, but behind the scenes a more difficult truth looms. Donor and global funding is shrinking, and the Ministry itself came under parliamentary scrutiny for financial irregularities just last week.

‎Speaking with The Reporter anonymously on whether Ethiopia has the capacity to contain the outbreak amid reduced donor funding, a medical doctor and senior health-sector analyst who also has experience working in international aid organizations offered a cautiously optimistic assessment.

‎“The health sector’s budget this year has increased. Due to various emergency outbreaks in the past, the country has enough cumulative experience, and this has strengthened its readiness,” said the medical professional.

‎The Doctor maintains that Ethiopia has built a formidable preparedness system over the past decade.

‎“From health posts upward, there is daily reporting. Weekly and monthly reporting systems as well. In terms of preparedness, our country has a relatively strong system—stronger than some more developed countries,” he told The Reporter.

‎Still, he acknowledges global headwinds.

‎“Regarding the budget, it is true globally that health sector budgets are decreasing. Donors also have a tendency to reduce funding,” he said.

‎The analyst believes that while the fall in donor funding could weigh on Ethiopia’s health system, it will not affect the country’s ability to deal with the ongoing outbreak.

‎”Despite [the donor decline], in the current fiscal year the Ministry of Health’s budget increased. The funds allocated from the national treasury have increased. So even though there are budget challenges, Ethiopia still has preparedness, response capacity, experience, and a system that trains professionals for this type of work. So I don’t believe this will be a heavy burden on the country. Ethiopia has faced worse challenges and responded well. I do not believe this outbreak will overwhelm us,” he told The Reporter.

‎On the question of Marburg’s severity compared to COVID-19, he provides a sobering comparison.

‎“Scientifically, the fatality rate of Marburg varies from about 24 percent to more than 80 percent. COVID-19 had a fatality rate around one to five percent. Marburg is highly deadly, but its transmissibility is much lower,” he noted.

‎What worries him is not the lethality but the global political economy surrounding outbreaks.

‎“I do not expect significant external support. Countries invest in these issues mostly for their own global health security—not to rescue others,” he said.

‎The analyst contends that with declining donor flows, Ethiopia must rely more heavily on domestic systems.

‎“The system exists, the structure is in place… experience has accumulated from COVID, cholera, anthrax, measles, yellow fever,” he said.

‎But in a quarter-year performance review held earlier this month, Parliament appeared unconvinced by Ethiopia’s capacity to respond to health crises.

‎‎A week before the Marburg outbreak was confirmed by the Ministry, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Health confronted its officials over widespread concerns regarding audit irregularities, weakened disease surveillance, and gaps in emergency readiness.‎‎

Lawmakers opened with 7.24 billion Birr in unresolved audit findings, describing the volume as “evidence of systemic weaknesses.”‎‎

During the performance review, MPs asked pointedly, “What is being done to safeguard government and public resources and ensure operations follow the law and regulations?”

‎‎Officials responded that procurement during epidemic emergencies has generated documentation gaps, insisting the transactions were legitimate.

‎‎However, MPs expanded their scrutiny beyond finances.‎‎They pointed to weaknesses in epidemic preparedness. Committee members grilled health officials about slow responses and rising burdens in regard to epidemics and outbreaks.‎

MPs last week highlighted worrying trends in cholera outbreaks and regression in the fight against malaria, and questioned the health officials’ preparedness and ability to mount an effective response. ‎In response, EPHI chief Mesay outlined extensive preparedness measures, including vulnerability and risk assessments conducted in more than 1,300 woredas, and weekly surveillance and reporting for 36 priority diseases.

Despite this, analysts who spoke to The Reporter expressed uncertainty over whether Ethiopia could withstand a fast-moving, high-fatality outbreak if donor funding continues to decline. The Marburg outbreak has now become the first real-world test of that question.‎‎

Ethiopia grapples with this outbreak under a very different global financing climate than during COVID-19. At the height of the coronavirus pandemic, the country received extraordinary volumes of external support—vaccines, PPE, ventilators, test kits, and broad budget assistance that helped sustain the national response. That era has now visibly shifted dramatically.‎‎

For the current fiscal year, the Ministry of Health operates with a budget of almost 61 billion Birr, with 48 billion Birr set aside for capital spending. US global health funding is contracting, European donors have tightened their aid portfolios, and the Africa CDC is overstretched across simultaneous emergencies on the continent.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has so far released only USD 300,000 in emergency financing and analysts contend that though helpful, the amount is modest when contrasted with the multi-million-dollar inflows of previous crises. ‎‎

WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus stated that his organization is “collaborating closely with the Ministry of Health and the Ethiopian Public Health Institute,” but the global climate has unmistakably changed. ‎‎

‎‎On Wednesday, November 19, the Health Minister held discussions with US Ambassador Ervin Masinga on Ethiopia’s response to the Marburg virus.

The meeting reportedly focused on the country’s comprehensive and rapid intervention efforts in the southern region, with the Minister outlining the measures already deployed. ‎‎The Ambassador Masinga praised Ethiopia’s swift and coordinated response and stated that Washington is ready to provide the necessary support in preventing and controlling Marburg virus disease.

His reassurance stands out against the broader backdrop of global donor retrenchment offering a diplomatic signal of partnership even as international health financing becomes increasingly constrained. But, any substantial aid from the US has yet to come.

For many observers the implications are clear. Ethiopia will have to rely primarily on its own systems including domestic budget allocations, internal laboratory capacity, nationwide surveillance infrastructure, and local procurement mechanisms. ‎‎

On the other hand, health professionals argue that the country’s health budget is expanding on paper but still constrained in practice.‎‎

The ‎‎Ministry’s own reports indicate that medicine availability remains stuck at around 81 percent, still short of national targets. The Ethiopian Pharmaceutical Supply Agency (EPSA) reports that while 4,978 health facilities are now enrolled in digital supply contracts, 15 percent have not collected a single consignment of medicines despite submitting procurement requests valued at 25.5 billion Birr.

Revenue collection, meanwhile, stands at a mere five percent, far below what the system requires.‎‎For analysts these systemic gaps matter profoundly especially at a time when an outbreak like Marburg demands fast procurement, strict accountability, reliable supply chains, and immediate liquidity.‎

‎Despite the grim financial realities, officials contend that Ethiopia enters this outbreak with a list of advantages that would have been unimaginable 20 years ago.

‎The list includes domestic molecular testing capacity, a nationwide reporting system, rapid response infrastructure, post-COVID institutional memory and multi-layered coordination.

‎Still, residents of the town where the Marburg virus outbreak was first reported two weeks ago mention weaknesses compounding community enforcement, procurement gaps, and declining trust. ‎The testimony from the resident of Jinka reveals that despite strong systems, implementation gaps persist, and this raises questions about Ethiopia’s ability to withstand the Marburg outbreak or other potential future epidemics.

The analyst says the answer depends on three variables: containment, system resilience and financial sustainability.

‎“The system exists,” he says. “Experience has been accumulated. For politically sensitive health agendas, the government allocates its budget and responds before anything else.”

‎Whether that will hold true through a prolonged outbreak is the real test.

This contradiction of rising numbers but shallow impact dominated the Insurance Industry Workshop held this week under the theme ‘Growing the Market, Embracing Change.’ Regulators, CEOs, development partners, and regional experts used the two-day gathering to diagnose the sector’s most entrenched weaknesses and debate a roadmap toward a stronger, more resilient industry.

What emerged was a portrait of a sector that is expanding in size but not transforming fast enough to support Ethiopia’s economic ambitions. Despite accounting for most of the country’s economic production, agriculture remains largely out of touch with the insurance industry. The same holds true for MSMEs, the informal sector, and low-income households.

The discussions revealed a market constrained by regulatory delays, liquidity pressures, a narrow product mix, and an institutional environment still not equipped to drive real sectoral transformation.

Solomon Desta is a vice governor of the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), the regulatory body overseeing the insurance industry. He laid out the headline numbers during a short appearance at this week’s event.

General insurance premiums have risen to nearly 38 billion Birr, driven by higher asset valuations and a growing vehicle fleet, while life insurance premiums have also grown modestly to 2.7 billion Birr.

But the growth stops at the numbers. Penetration remains among the lowest on the continent, and the sector’s macroeconomic contribution is almost negligible.

“Insurance penetration in Ethiopia is well below one percent of GDP,” the Vice Governor said, highlighting the sector’s limited footprint in a country of over 120 million people.

The discussion on Tuesday also revolved around why penetration remains stubbornly low. A World Bank survey referenced at the workshop made one point clear: Ethiopians are not inherently opposed to insurance. The issue is exposure, or the lack of it.

“People do not have a negative perception of insurance,” one expert said. “If priced right and providing value, they are willing to try. So the question is why does penetration remain stagnant?”

Industry insiders argue that a narrow product mix, limited distribution channels, low financial literacy, and insufficient consumer-facing education are the attributing factors behind the sluggishness.

Virtually all of Ethiopia’s 18 insurers rely almost entirely on motor insurance because it is compulsory and relatively uncomplicated.

Yared Molla, president of the Association of Ethiopian Insurers, warned that the sector “remains dominated by a single class of business with very limited diversification.” Experts contend that the result of this is limited risk diversification and stifled innovation.

Unlike banks, which have managed to expand their business significantly using digital platforms in recent years, insurers have not yet tapped into technology as a way to expand their limited distribution channels. 

As one presenter noted, “There might be a website… but end-to-end remote sales, digital claims, and digital servicing are not yet fully entrenched”.

Analysts observe that agent networks and inclusive distribution channels also remain thin while financial literacy among the public is worryingly low, particularly outside major urban areas.

“A future-ready insurance industry is emerging. But we also know the realities, and the reality is that insurance penetration in Ethiopia is well below one percent of GDP and awareness is also low,” said Solomon. “Digital distribution is limited, and financial literacy gaps still persist. At the same time, broader reforms in the financial sector will reshape competition of capital, distribution and customer attention.”

Solomon’s views of underwhelming consumer-facing education were shared by industry insiders. Unlike banks, insurers invest minimal resources in engaging communities or explaining their products.

Regulatory architecture and long-running demands for an independent regulatory authority were also among the central topics of discussion this week.

For years, insurers have called for the establishment of a standalone insurance authority, alleging that regulators at the NBE are too preoccupied with banking to meet their needs.

While the government has expressed willingness to meet their demands and officials have claimed to be working on an amendment to the Insurance Business Proclamation for years, there has been little progress to show for it on the ground.

“Around the world, insurance has proven to be a cornerstone of economic resilience and a key pillar of inclusive insurance growth. Yet here at home, our industry continues to face significant and long-standing challenges that demand bold reflection and collective action. While the government’s initiative to establish an independent insurance regulator is an encouraging step, it is delayed,” said Yared.

Panelists observed that in terms of operational and market frictions, the Ethiopian regulatory environment is still characterized by structural barriers and that those barriers are “very much known” to those in the industry.

They believe a standalone regulator can modernize supervision, enforce market discipline, guide digital insurance implementation, strengthen consumer protection, ensure medical insurance alignment, and support product diversification.

However, the change they aspire to has not been reflected in the many pieces of legislation put forward by the NBE in recent years, including the Banking Business Proclamation issued in March this year.

“I was hoping when I went through it that there would be a specific mention of the establishment of a new independent insurance authority,” said one panelist, highlighting the high hopes insurers have held on to for the past several years. “When the law came out, I looked at it and I said ‘what’s happened?’”

Insurers believe the lack of an independent regulatory authority is holding back the industry’s growth in more ways than one.

“In 2024 the NBE issued a directive liberalizing the banking industry, and this liberalization is already occurring on the banking side. What we still need to see is that this then flows into the insurance space,” a panelist noted.

For this to happen, the Insurance Business Proclamation would have to be amended. In March, regulators announced the long-awaited amendment and an independent regulatory body were well on their way. 

However, the amendment has yet to appear, and insurers told The Reporter in April that they were unhappy with the lack of inclusion in the drafting process. This frustration was on display this week.

“There is a series of efforts that have been undertaken to move towards the promulgation of this particular piece of law. Nonetheless, it seems it’s still in the industry consultation stage. But the impetus behind it is to fix a number of frictions highlighted here,” said one panelist.

Insurers’ frustration with the NBE’s laws goes past the insurance proclamation. The new Banking Business Proclamation still upholds a provision prohibiting banks from providing any form of insurance or working with insurers engaging in insurance activities.

Insurers view this provision as an obstacle to their efforts at improving distribution.

The central bank’s decision to raise the minimum capital threshold for insurance firms by more than six fold in late 2022 has also been a source of pressure, according to industry insiders. They concede that capital reforms are necessary for stability, but say implementing them has been painful.

Only seven of the country’s 18 insurers meet the 400 million Birr capital threshold.

“This transition has been difficult and has exposed strain on liquidity,” a presenter noted.

Many firms were forced to prioritize capital raising rather than technology investments or product development, according to the presenter. Participants in this week’s workshop argued that regulators should consider extending the 2027 deadline for meeting the new capital requirements.

Also set for 2027 is the deadline for the industry’s transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 17 and adoption of a risk-based capital framework.

Insurers see risk-based capital (RBC) as a reform that could fundamentally reshape the industry. Unlike traditional solvency requirements, RBC evaluates the specific risks carried by each insurer.

One presenter described its core purpose, “Risk-based capital ensures that a company in the underwriting business is in a position to ensure policyholders are taken care of.”

According to experts, beyond stability, RBC enables insurers to invest in long-term public and private projects.

“Risk-based capital supports growth at the national level,” said one expert.

But implementation requires data, expertise, and systems that many Ethiopian insurers do not yet possess.

The workshop also touched on market distortion, the motor insurance trap, and the cutthroat competition that characterizes today’s insurance industry. Participants noted the industry is structurally distorted by its dependency on motor insurance, whose dominance they see as unhealthy to continued growth.

The president of the industry lobby group warned of “unethical competition… companies undercutting one another through unsustainable low premium rates” that erode profitability, threaten solvency, and risk fragmentation.

Another speaker pointed out the lack of a strategic alliance among insurers that could help pool expertise, share data, and drive innovation. Experts noted that in markets like Kenya and South Africa, industry alliances allow insurers to share loss data, expand actuarial capacity, and coordinate product development.

Ethiopia lacks such mechanisms.

The lack of progress in digital insurance, despite it being enshrined in the 2019 insurance proclamation, was another subject of discussion. Workshop participants observe that while Ethiopia legally recognizes digital insurance, the tools required to implement it—remote onboarding, e-signatures, digital contracting, and electronic claims management—do not yet exist.

“Without the tools, the industry is unable to operationalize the framework,” said one expert. This leaves insurers stuck in a hybrid system: digital in theory, paper-based in practice.

Still, the ecosystem is shifting, Mobile money is expanding, and insure-tech firms have grown from four in 2019 to eighteen today. For many industry insiders and keen observers, the digital appetite exists. What is missing is regulatory enablement.

Conversely, reports indicate that Ethiopia’s economy is vulnerable to climate shocks, inflation, and drought cycles yet the sectors most exposed to risk remain largely uninsured.

Industry insiders report nationwide agricultural insurance coverage is almost non-existent, and despite clear need, micro-insurance coverage remains limited. Most low-income households remain outside the formal insurance ecosystem and when it comes to capital market integration, insurers are not yet major investors in long-term assets.

The workshop earlier this week repeatedly underscored the need for stronger governance, better data, and technical capacity.

The NBE is enforcing stronger governance standards, including fit-and-proper requirements for board members and executives. But enforcement varies widely across firms.

Ethiopia lacks actuaries, risk managers, data scientists, claims specialists, and digital systems experts. These skills are essential for modern insurance operations, especially ahead of risk-based capital reforms.

Overall, the workshop highlighted that Ethiopia’s insurance sector is expanding in numbers but not in substance. Premiums are rising. New companies are emerging. Digital innovators are entering the market. Yet the sector remains shallow, fragmented, and weakly regulated.

Experts are in agreement that unless Ethiopia addresses its structural challenges—low penetration, regulatory delays, limited diversification, capacity gaps, digital immaturity, and capital strain—the sector’s contribution to GDP will remain negligible.

The conference’s closing reflections captured the urgency clearly.

Yared, who also serves as president of the African Insurance Organization, reminded participants that insurance is not a luxury; it is a key pillar of economic resilience.

“Our industry continues to face significant and longstanding challenges that demand bold reflection and collective action,” he said.

‎Two years of brutal war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had torn Ethiopia apart, reportedly leaving hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced.

‎The agreement, mediated under the African Union’s auspices, promised an end to the carnage and a gradual political normalization in the country’s north. ‎Now, three years later, that promise appears to be under severe strain.

From renewed accusations of border and administrative boundaries violations and not-so-hidden military mobilizations to mutual allegations of betrayal, the language between Mekelle and Addis Ababa has hardened accompanied by occasional disgruntled and discontented commentaries and responses from Asmara.

‎Many observers who spoke to The Reporter this week say a second round of war now appears inevitable—or may have just slowly reignited over the last few days.

‎Meanwhile, officials on both sides now speak in tones uncomfortably reminiscent of the months before war first broke out in 2020.

‎The latest flashpoint came from the Afar Regional State, where officials accused “TPLF forces” of crossing into their territory and opening an attack on pastoralist communities in an act they described as a “clear violation of the Pretoria Agreement.”

‎According to a statement from the Afar Region Communication Bureau, on Wednesday, November 5, 2025, TPLF fighters “crossed into the Afar Region through border areas in Zone Two, Megale Woreda, particularly in Tonsaa Kebele, as well as the Wara’a and Milki localities,” firing heavy weapons at innocent Afar pastoralists.

‎”While opening fire in Tonsa kebele, despite appeals from peace-loving Afar elders urging them to withdraw, the TPLF forces responded with defiance, saying ‘We will not turn back,’ and escalated the confrontation,” reads the statement from the regional administration.

Officials in Afar say they will defend themselves from external aggression as this week’s development rekindles fears of another cycle of bloodshed along Ethiopia’s most fragile front.

‎The federal government has yet to issue any official statements, but Getachew Reda, former Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) president and current advisor to the PM, weighed in via social media on Thursday.

In an X post, Getachew accused the TPLF, which he referred to as “those left behind,” of working to undermine the Pretoria agreement and argued that the federal government has so far turned a blind eye to the alleged machinations.

‎“They are now attempting to drag the federal government back into another conflict,” he wrote, describing such a move as “foolishness.”

‎Getachew went further, alleging that TPLF is executing a mission on behalf of Shaabiya (the Eritrean regime) and naming senior military leaders in Tigray, including General Fisseha Kidanu and General Yohannes Weldegiorgis (Medid), as central figures in the operation.

He characterized TPLF’s alleged plan to use the closure of the Afar route, an essential corridor that handles the vast majority of Ethiopia’s international trade, as a tool for negotiation as “sheer stupidity.”

‎Getachew also stressed that both Tigrayan forces (aka TDF) and those operating in Afar under the moniker ‘Tigray Peace Forces’ (TPF) have no interest whatsoever in engaging in conflict with the federal government.

The former TIA chief urged them to safeguard themselves from being used as tools in Eritrea’s political agenda, reiterating the importance of remaining independent from Asmara’s influence.

On Friday, the TIA, now led by Lt. General Tadesse Werede, denied that any attack had taken place in Afar.

“This accusation is entirely baseless,” reads a TIA statement. “There has been no violation of the Afar-Tigray border, from either side.”

The TIA had issued another statement decrying “recurring provocations by armed groups in Afar” and emphasizing its continued commitment to dialogue.

However, it also accused “war-mongering elements within the federal government” of undermining the peace process.

‎The exchange left the impression of an unraveling ceasefire, with each side accusing the other of provocation while insisting on its own restraint.

‎In a rare public appeal issued ahead of the reported Afar incident, General Migbey Haile, a TDF commander, called on forces opposed to war and seeking peace—as well as all Ethiopians—to stand with the army and the people of Tigray.

“We call on all entities in our surroundings who oppose war—whether Afar, Amhara, Agaw, or Eritrea—to stand with the army and the people of Tigray. We do this not to dwell on the past, but because we do not want it to be repeated,” he said.

‎He noted that the region lies along a strategic border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, emphasizing that issues related to sovereignty and war crimes must be addressed through legal means, while expressing readiness to work together for peace.

‎“If there is any force that says it will still continue to cause destruction, we tell them to please stop and restrain themselves,” the General noted.

‎In parallel, the TPLF has also issued a statement insisting that “the [Pretoria] agreement is being undermined” but not from its side.

‎In a communiqués issued last week, the TPLF, which was struck off the list of registered political parties by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) more than five months ago, responded to remarks made by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) during his address to Parliament on October 28.

In it, the TPLF argued that by reducing its legal status into a technical matter and “by acting in a way that renders the agreement meaningless through selective and arbitrary interpretation, the federal government continues to erode the essence of the agreement.”

“Although the peace agreement was signed between the federal government and the TPLF, some are attempting to portray it as an informal discussion among individuals rather than a formal institutional process. This was said in a parliament session conducted in the absence of Tigray’s representatives,” reads the statement.

Speaking about the peace agreement during his most recent parliamentary address, the Prime Minister cited an Amharic proverb:

“While the one who gave birth is still alive, the one who swaddled the baby says, ‘I am the mother.’”

The TPLF, in its counter statement, said this metaphor was symbolic of how the Ethiopian government views the Pretoria peace agreement “not as an instrument for peace but rather as a playing card being used to facilitate acts of genocide.”

‎The statement noted that when the agreement was signed, the individuals who represented Tigray—Getachew Reda, General Tsadkan Gebretensae, and Assefa Abraha—were all representatives assigned by the TPLF.

“The government was well aware that members of the delegation were not the actual owners or signatories of the agreement,” it reads.

‎“The truth,” the statement added, “is that the Prime Minister’s analogy stands inverted; it is he and his government who have turned the agreement into an orphan, stripping it of its mother.”

‎The TPLF argues that those individuals were not the architects of the agreement but were tasked with implementing it, adding that “the agreement, which sought to end a war that shocked the world and drew international attention, has been undermined, indicating that there has been no remorse or accountability for previous atrocities.”

‎The TPLF further warned that if the federal government fails to halt its preparations for another round of war, “the consequences will be dire in every direction,” urging “the responsible body” to act promptly to prevent further deterioration.

‎The TPLF alleges the federal government is mobilizing the military in neighboring regions and claims there is sufficient evidence that Addis Ababa is not committed to implementing the peace agreement.

The party appealed to “the African Union Panel, other guarantor bodies, and the international community—who have been repeatedly urged to review the implementation of the agreement—to recognize that the peace accord is at serious risk.”

‎In its latest statement, the TPLF once again called for an independent evaluation of the agreement’s implementation.

‎Meanwhile, as tensions and finger-pointing mounted over the past two weeks, the TIA cabinet issued its own warning about developments in western Tigray.

‎It stated that as per the agreement, an interim administration was established with the understanding that, over time, a legitimate government would be formed. However, The TIA cabinet alleges it is being sidelined under the pretext of returning IDPs to western Tigray.

‎While acknowledging that Pretoria had aimed to restore constitutional autonomy, ensure the safe return of displaced persons, reconstruct the region and revive regional governance, the TIA said many of those objectives “remain unaddressed.”

‎The TIA also called for the establishment of a joint framework for cooperation that would uphold the spirit of the peace agreement, stressing that there is no alternative to dialogue and sincerity.

‎It warned that any course of action outside this framework could bring further harm and destruction and that any attempt to deviate from the agreement would not be acceptable.

‎On a varying tone, TIA Deputy President Amanuel Assefa went further in an interview with regional state-affiliated Dimtsi Weyane Television, accusing “certain groups backed by the federal government” of attempting to “permanently alter the territorial and demographic composition of the region,” referring to western Tigray.

‎He alleged that “new settlers in Western Tigray” are being treated as rightful owners of homes, farmland, and businesses seized by force,” despite earlier understandings that displaced Tigrayans would return safely.

“After discussions between representatives of the federal government and TIA an agreement had initially been reached. According to that earlier understanding , those who had settled in the area would remain in place while the displaced residents were to return and, together with the local population, aim to gradually pave the way for a referendum,” said Amanuel.

‎However, the TIA Deputy alleges that this was later reversed.

‎”When the matter began to be discussed more openly, the federal government declared, ‘There is no such thing’” dismissing the issue altogether,” he said. ‎“Now, what was once agreed upon has been replaced by two new ‘options.’ The return of displaced people is no longer being implemented because the forces that seized the area have not withdrawn. The new settlers remain, and the imposed administrations have not been dissolved.”

He further accused certain unnamed groups of “betrayal,” accusing them of working with Addis Ababa to undermine and dismantle the region.

Amanuel claims the efforts are geared towards altering the region’s administrative and geographical structure, and changing its demographics in the long term.  

‎As tensions sharpened, the European Union and Norway, along with the embassies of 21 EU member states, released a joint statement marking the Pretoria Agreement’s third anniversary.

They praised progress in “the silencing of guns, resumption of basic services, and the beginning of reintegration,” but warned that sustaining peace “requires continued political will and inclusive dialogue.”

‎The communiqué urged both the federal government and the TPLF “to begin political dialogue without delay, well before the next national elections,” while reaffirming support for transitional justice mechanisms “centered on truth, accountability, and reconciliation.”

‎The timing was not accidental: the statement came amid deepening mistrust, mirrored in TPLF’s own anniversary declaration accusing Addis Ababa of “deliberate reluctance” and “manipulative delay” in implementing the accord.

‎The group claimed federal leaders were “preparing for a new round of war,” mobilizing militias near Tigray’s borders, and spreading “hate propaganda.”

The military establishment issued the sharpest speech yet in response to the developments.

‎Speaking in Bishoftu on October 24, Field Marshal Berhanu Jula, chief of general staff of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), delivered his most forceful warning since the signing of the Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

‎In a nationally televised speech marking the fifth anniversary of the attack on the Northern Command that sparked the last conflict, the Field Marshal accused the TPLF of engaging in conspiracies and plots over the last three years—actions he said were more than enough grounds to return to war.

‎“If we were a war-loving government, if we were a war-loving defense force,” Berhanu declared, “the conspiracies, acts, and plots that TPLF has committed after Pretoria would have been enough to go back to war.”

‎Observers note that the commemoration, held at the Bishoftu Air Force Training Center and attended by senior officers including Deputy Chief of Staff General Abebaw Tadesse, was as much a remembrance as it was a stark message.

Berhanu’s 40-minute speech, both historical and accusatory, signaled that patience within the military may be wearing thin.

‎The Field Marshal began by revisiting November 2020.

‎“The attack that was carried out five years ago was a betrayal and a disgrace,” he said, emphasizing that his words were directed at TPLF as an organization, “not at the people of Tigray.”

‎He went further, noting that even within TPLF, there were internal divisions.

‎“Even TPLF itself is not a monolith,” he said. “Sometimes things become collective and lead to consequences that harm the country.”

‎At the center of his speech was what he repeatedly described as a shadowy power structure within TPLF, which he called the ‘Gujile’ — a term he used to describe a conspiratorial core that, he claimed, has operated for decades.

‎“The act was carried out by a particular TPLF faction, which habitually engages in conspiracies,” Berhanu said. “As long as that power has not been uprooted, Ethiopia will not find peace.”

‎Without naming names, he alleged that this group’s influence stretches back half a century, linking it to the origins of TPLF and its founders.

‎Throughout the speech, the term betrayal was mentioned time and again.

‎“This force that was created inside Ethiopia is a spirit of betrayal, a force of betrayal,” he said. “Until this force is uprooted, Ethiopia will not have peace.”

The ‎Field Marshal went on to list what he described as TPLF’s post-Pretoria provocations including resuming military training, and reassembling demobilized combatants under the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) program.

‎“The conspiracies, the defiance, the acts — all these are enough to go back to war,” he repeated. “But in any war, it is the TPLF that loses and the people of Tigray will be the ones who suffer. We have already seen that in the last war.”

He also accused TPLF of forming new alliances with Eritrea’s ruling party in an unconstitutional and treasonous partnership he termed “Tsimdo.”

‎“To cross a border by itself is unconstitutional,” he said. “While crying out, ‘they [Eritrea] committed genocide against me [Tigray region],’ and at the same time saying, ‘Shaabiya is our friend, our ally; we will betray Ethiopia together, weaken Ethiopia together.’ That kind of thing is happening. This, in another form, is a manifestation of betrayal.”

‎Berhanu further alleged that TPLF had supplied “bullets and plans” to Fano, the Amhara armed group now locked in intermittent conflict with the federal government.

‎“In the past, on the Northern Wollo front, [TPLF] connected with Fano, entered the regional state, made plans, gave them leadership, and fought together. But we kept silent,” he said. “Because we are the government. We have responsibility. We do not respond to every provocation. But if it goes past the limit, then we will have no choice.”

‎Even as he issued repeated warnings, Berhanu insisted that the military remained restrained.

‎“We have seen all of this, and yet we did not return to war,” he said. “What they are doing now is harmful, but if war comes again, it will bring even greater harm. That is why we have chosen patience.”

‎Yet patience, he warned, has limits.

‎“No matter how much we are provoked, if attacked, if it becomes like the previous Northern Command, our defense will not cease. We alone cannot prevent war,” said Berhanu.

He reiterated that the Ethiopian government and its defense forces do not want another war. Yet their language left open the possibility, even the readiness, for one.

‎“We are not eager. We do not stir up war. We do not want war,” Berhanu said near the end of his address. “But if something crosses the line of our peace and our national interest, and crosses the border, then we must defend. That is what we have prepared and armed for.”

‎It was a sobering end to a fiery address—one that blended military commemoration with indictment, and signaled that beneath Ethiopia’s fragile post-war calm, the guns may not be too far from readiness.

‎‎Amid the escalating rhetoric, civil societies and opposition political parties in Tigray urge all sides not to return to conflict. Among those who champion a sustainable peace is the Tigray Independence Party (TIP).

It issued one of its strongest warnings yet in a statement marking the Pretoria anniversary this week.

TIP said growing tensions between the federal government and TPLF could “lead to a renewed cycle of war and destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.”‎‎

The party accused “a self-proclaimed military force that considers itself above the law” of working with TPLF and Eritrean forces to “provoke new conflict.” It urged the accord’s guarantors to pressure both sides to fully implement the peace deal.

TIP further criticized both the TPLF leadership and senior military figures in Tigray, saying they had “forced the people of Tigray to pay a heavy price.” It described Prime Minister Abiy’s remarks comparing the Tigray conflict with others as “pouring salt on a wound” and “a pretext to continue systemic ethnic cleansing.”‎‎

To TIP’s leaders, the core of the problem lies in legitimacy.

“Making the Pretoria Agreement effective,” reads the statement, “requires the establishment of a lawful, inclusive, and representative administration in the region.”‎‎

Observers and political analysts note that the statements marking Pretoria’s third anniversary, taken together, reveal a peace process losing coherence. Once-muted disputes over implementation have turned into mutual recriminations, regional actors are openly threatening to defend borders; and military leaders are speaking of betrayal and readiness for war

The TIA’s plea for dialogue and sincerity, the EU’s call for political will, and the army chief’s vow to defend sovereignty all point to a country edging back toward confrontation even as each insists it seeks peace.

‎‎Analysts note that beneath the rhetoric lies a structural impasse: Pretoria was a ceasefire agreement masquerading as a political settlement. Its silence on core constitutional and territorial questions, including the status of western Tigray, security arrangements, and the TPLF’s political recognition, have now floated back up to the surface.

Observers note that for the moment, Ethiopia’s northernmost region remains quiet, but the calm feels increasingly brittle. The peace that Pretoria promised still exists on paper. On the ground, it hangs by a thread.‎

Ethiopia watched in incredulity last week as the European Union and Egypt launched the second phase of a seven-year cooperation program in what that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described as a “deeply disappointing and problematic” move by Brussels to deepen its involvement in the long-running dispute over the use of Nile Waters.

The new Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021–2027 elevates Cairo as the EU’s primary partner in North Africa, linking European investment and migration policy to Egypt’s stability and energy infrastructure.

The updated programme, unveiled in Cairo earlier this week, includes additional billions of Euros in funding. Although it was presented as part of a broader regional vision linking North Africa and Europe through renewable energy, green hydrogen, and climate adaptation, its geographic scope has tilted heavily toward Egypt and touches sensitive Ethiopian interests, particularly water governance and energy trade.

A joint statement issued by Cairo and Brussels on October 24, 2025, echoed Egypt’s colonial and monopolistic claims on the Nile, with the EU appearing to take a clear position on the dispute with Ethiopia for the first time.

“Recognizing Egypt’s heavy reliance on the Nile River in a context of its water scarcity, the EU reiterates its support to Egypt’s water security and the compliance with international law, including concerning the Ethiopian Dam. The EU strongly encourages transboundary cooperation among riparian countries based on the principles of prior notification, cooperation and ‘do no harm,’” it reads.

The programme comes less than two months after Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, according to the Ethiopian embassy in Brussels, “shows a complete disregard for the views and interests of other riparian countries.”

The embassy noted that the River Nile, shared by eleven riparian countries, cannot be treated through a bilateral framework that ignores nearly half a billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa.

“It is regrettable that the EU decided to undermine Ethiopia in a bilateral platform with Egypt,” reads the embassy’s response, accusing Brussels of adopting a “biased and hostile position” contrary to the spirit of its long-standing partnership with Addis Ababa.

Analysts speaking with The Reporter say the deal, while framed as development cooperation, carries strategic undertones that could tilt regional influence in favor of Cairo at a sensitive moment in the Horn and Nile Basin politics.

The Ethiopian statement marked one of the country’s sharpest diplomatic responses toward the European Union in recent years. It said the EU’s position contradicted international water law, particularly the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization enshrined in the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) and the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).

 “The EU’s distorted take on international law is deplorable,” it reads, adding that the bloc’s statement runs counter to the very frameworks it has supported elsewhere in Africa.

The statement further noted that Europe’s approach ignored its own history as an observer in the African Union–facilitated negotiations on GERD—talks in which EU representatives had witnessed all parties’ concerns and interests firsthand.

A Horn affairs expert speaking with The Reporter anonymously echoed the country’s sentiments.

“What the bloc did last week was like shooting your own foot. The EU has long anchored itself as a strong ally of regional integration. How does siding with one and accusing the other about a matter of this magnitude cement its longstanding argument? It might not look like it from an outsider’s perspective but Ethiopia has many allies, especially in this continent,” the expert said.

Ethiopia’s government has spent more than a decade promoting its image as a driver of regional connectivity. GERD was marketed not merely as a national project, but as a continental one, a source of affordable electricity for the region and a symbol of African self-reliance.

The EU’s new deal with Egypt, however, pours fresh funds into Cairo’s National Water Resources Plan 2037 and irrigation modernization efforts, without reference to transboundary cooperation in the Nile Basin. For officials in Addis, this silence cuts deep.

“It is difficult to see how the EU can claim to support regional integration while financing projects that reinforce unilateral control of shared waters,” says an Ethiopian analyst who requested anonymity. “The same Europe that preaches partnership in Addis signs deals in Cairo that exclude upstream voices.”

This week, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appeared before Parliament and delivered an address that resonated far beyond domestic politics. The PM reiterated his administration’s “Two Waters” policy, which revolves around GERD and the Nile, maritime access, and resource sovereignty.

Abiy’s words offered a window into the country’s growing frustration.

“Our demand is not new or emotional,” he told lawmakers. “It is a question of national existence, a matter of survival.”

On maritime access, the Prime Minister reiterated that “the manner in which Ethiopia lost its access to the sea was illegal and unjust,” adding that “Ethiopia can no longer remain in the status quo of being a ‘geographical prisoner.’”

He insisted, however, that any resolution would be peaceful.

”We don’t believe that war and conflict are necessary to achieve this. That is why we have been waiting patiently for five years,” said Abiy.

Experts argue that the timing of the EU–Egypt deal appears to sharpen Ethiopia’s frustration over what officials describe as “selective engagement” by external actors.

While Egypt is portrayed as a stable partner in the Mediterranean, Ethiopia’s broader development agenda, they argue, continues to be viewed through a crisis lens.

Under MIP 2021–2027, the EU commits hundreds of millions of Euros between 2021 and 2024 to projects in green transition, water management, and economic resilience.

The plan positions Egypt as Europe’s anchor state for investment and migration control — a gateway for renewable energy trade, digital connectivity, and climate cooperation across the southern Mediterranean.

Some analysts argue that the EU issued the joint statement in an attempt to sideline Ethiopia or other riparian countries from shared resources as a result of Europe’s apparent conviction that only Egypt can offer the predictability, scale, and access it desires in a turbulent region.

To Ethiopian observers, that logic is precisely the problem. By prioritizing predictability over partnership, the EU risks alienating countries that are equally vital to Africa’s integration but less convenient to manage.

The deal’s omission of Nile Basin cooperation, in particular, is glaring. Ethiopia’s USD five billion GERD remains Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, designed to serve multiple countries through power exports.

Yet, in the EU’s water-governance portfolio for North Africa, Ethiopia is nowhere to be found.

“This is not simply a funding decision,” argues an Ethiopian water policy expert. “It’s a diplomatic statement that Europe’s engagement on transboundary resources stops at Egypt’s borders.”

The EU–Egypt partnership also extends to migration control. This is another area where Ethiopia feels its leverage slipping. The joint statement on migration and security places Cairo at the center of Europe’s southern containment strategy, tasking Egypt with managing irregular flows toward the Mediterranean.

Through this arrangement, the EU channels funding for border management, surveillance, and asylum-system development, which were priorities that once formed the core of EU cooperation with the Horn of Africa under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

For Ethiopia, the reallocation is tangible. Between 2016 and 2021, EU migration funding helped support reintegration programs, job creation for returnees, and local development projects in migration-prone areas like Amhara and Tigray. Those channels have since dried up.

“Europe is outsourcing migration control northward,” said the Horn affairs expert. “We used to be part of the conversation. Now Egypt is the conversation.”

The shift has strategic consequences. With the EU’s attention fixed on North Africa, the Horn’s voice in shaping migration policy is fading, just as irregular flows from Ethiopia and Sudan to Libya are surging, analysts contend.

Energy cooperation is another pillar where Ethiopia’s ambitions collide with the EU’s Cairo-centric vision. Under the MIP, Europe plans to invest in Egypt’s Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy, emphasizing renewables, hydrogen, and electricity interconnection with the Mediterranean.

Projects like the MEDUSA, a major high-capacity fiber optic initiative linking Southern Europe and North Africa, set to land in Port Said by 2027, epitomize this new alignment. Europe’s future energy corridor to Africa now runs through Egypt—not the Horn.

Ethiopia, meanwhile, has staked its economic future on becoming a renewable energy exporter, leveraging hydropower from the GERD and other dams. Officials had hoped the EU members would view the Horn as a key green-energy hub.

However, experts point out that the optics instead suggest that Europe is doubling down on existing trade corridors rather than building new ones across the continent.

“The EU talks about a green partnership with Africa, but its investments follow the same old geography, the Mediterranean first, Sub-Saharan Africa later,” said one analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

The irony is sharp. Ethiopia, whose entire development narrative rests on green growth and clean energy, now finds itself overlooked in favor of projects in Cairo.

Relations between Ethiopia and the European Union have been fragile since the northern conflict in 2020. Though ties improved after the Pretoria Agreement, tensions remain over humanitarian access, governance reforms, and accountability.

Following the peace agreement, there has been a “warming up” of relations, with high-level meetings between EU officials and the Ethiopian government. A significant development was the signing of a ‘Global Gateway’ Partnership Agreement in October 2025, which aims to boost cooperation and investment in key sectors.

While the EU suspended direct budget support to the Ethiopian government during the peak of the war, it continued humanitarian aid to the population. European aid to Ethiopia, once exceeding a billion Euros annually, has not fully recovered. Addis Ababa’s access to comparable funding mechanisms has diminished, particularly as the EU redirects attention to the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean.

Since the 2022 peace deal, the EU has gradually reinstated development financing, focusing on post-conflict reconstruction, health services, education, and food security. This includes a 240 million Euro grant under the 2024 Annual Action Programme (AAP-2024) in April 2025, and a 90 million Euro financing agreement for AAP-2025 in October 2025. These funds target development in areas such as agribusiness, digitalization, and the restoration of basic services in conflict-affected regions. 

Against this backdrop, the EU–Egypt partnership feels to many Ethiopians like a diplomatic downgrading. It contrasts sharply with the EU’s earlier role as a mediator and developmental ally during Ethiopia’s reform years between 2018 and 2020.

A senior foreign relations expert puts it bluntly: “Europe once said it wanted a strong, integrated Africa. Today, it is investing in a divided one.”

For many Ethiopians, at the heart of the matter also lies a contradiction between Europe’s rhetoric and its regional conduct. The EU’s New Agenda for the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbourhood frame the Union as a partner for African integration, inclusive growth, and shared prosperity.

Yet, the geographic concentration of funding being overwhelmingly in North Africa reinforces rather than bridges Africa’s north–south divide, according to observers.

In Ethiopia, this is seen as hypocrisy. Officials recall how European diplomats routinely call for “African solutions to African problems.” But when it comes to the Nile, Europe funds one side’s adaptation and leaves the other’s aspirations unaddressed.

“The EU’s credibility as a promoter of regional integration is at stake,” says a political expert speaking anonymously. “If integration only means connecting North Africa to Europe, then what is Africa’s role?”

For Addis Ababa, the EU’s move comes at a delicate time. Ethiopia is reasserting its regional leadership, expanding ties with the Gulf, and seeking new maritime and trade outlets through the Red Sea.

Abiy Ahmed’s recent parliamentary remarks capture the urgency of that quest.

“We did not build our maritime [capacity] to put it in a glass of water,” said the Prime Minister, as he held up a glass half-full of water in front of lawmakers.

Analysts note that the Prime Minister’s insistence on peaceful means is both a reassurance and a warning: Ethiopia will not abandon its pursuit of access to the sea, but it prefers diplomacy over confrontation.

Still, they contend that Ethiopia’s room for maneuver is narrowing. With Eritrea unyielding, Djibouti heavily commercialized, and Somalia entangled in its own crises, Ethiopia needs credible partners.

Europe, once viewed as a bridge to consensus, now appears aligned elsewhere.

The EU’s partnership with Egypt is also reshaping continental diplomacy. Foreign relations experts note that Egypt’s dual identity as both Arab and African allows it to operate in two arenas at once, a flexibility that Addis Ababa, despite hosting the African Union, cannot easily replicate.

“If Europe channels more investment and policy coordination through Egypt, the African Union itself could feel the ripple. Egypt’s influence within continental institutions may rise, while the Horn’s strategic weight could diminish,” said one analyst.

This dynamic is not lost on Ethiopian policymakers. Despite the strong language, the Ethiopian statement concluded on a constructive note, saying the country “looks forward to engaging the EU and its member states to rectify the gross and wrongful positions reflected in the ‘Joint Statement.’”

In diplomatic terms, analysts say that this suggests Ethiopia is not seeking confrontation but recalibration, a signal that dialogue remains open, provided Europe acknowledges Ethiopia’s rights and contributions.

Observers note this balanced assertiveness could mark a turning point in Ethiopia’s diplomacy with the EU, combining principled firmness with an invitation to reset the relationship.

As the EU–Egypt partnership deepens through 2027, Europe’s engagement with Africa appears increasingly defined by geography, migration, and security interests rather than shared development vision.

For Ethiopia, the challenge will be to navigate this changing landscape—protecting its interests on the Nile, maintaining strategic partnerships, and asserting its leadership within the African Union.

The Commission’s October 2025 report on freedom of movement published under the title ‘Urgent Actions Required to Ensure Full Exercise of Freedom of Movement’ documents a nationwide pattern of human rights violations — from arbitrary restrictions and road blockades to targeted violence by both state and non-state actors.

The report, released just months before the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) is expected to open voter registration, warns that continued restrictions on civilian mobility directly undermines people’s rights to freedom, protection, and property.

Political figures who spoke with The Reporter on the other hand state that failure to protect the right to free movement extends well beyond its territory and directly impacts their rights to political participation and raises questions about the credibility of the upcoming polls.

The EHRC statement, spanning multiple regions including Amhara, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella, documents severe impediments to free movement that “threaten citizens’ constitutional rights to security, livelihoods, and participation in national life”.

The findings included in the statement highlight widespread attacks and kidnapping of civilians, unlawful road closures and checkpoint controls, and curfews.

Among the most notable incidents verified by the Commission occurred in the Amhara region’s Central Gondar Zone. On July 19, 2025, in Chilga Woreda, armed Qemant groups reportedly intercepted a convoy of vehicles traveling with a government security escort. The assailants targeted the vehicles positioned at the rear of the convoy, stopping those en route from Gondar City toward Genda Wuha. According to the EHRC report, the attackers halted several cars near Wali Daba Kebele and abducted ten individuals — five drivers and five passengers. All abducted persons were later released following mediation efforts by local elders.

In Oromia, the Commission noted repeated attacks on civilians traveling along major routes. On June 4, 2025, in Arsi Zone, a passenger bus was ambushed by armed groups believed to be linked to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), leaving four civilians dead and one severely injured.

Through its on-site monitoring and investigation missions — particularly in the Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Oromia regions — the Commission has observed that the imposition of frequent and prolonged curfews, the presence of multiple armed actors, and the establishment of numerous checkpoints by both government security forces and non-state armed groups have severely restricted civilians’ freedom of movement.

These restrictions, coupled with recurring road closures, ambushes, property destruction, and displacement caused by clashes and security operations, have placed the right to free movement and personal security under significant threat.

The EHRC has also documented the continued disruption of civilian movement and transport networks in several parts of the Amhara region. It stated that the road linking Mekane Selam in South Wollo Zone with Merto Le-Mariam town in East Gojjam Zone has remained closed since March 2025, following government security orders related to ongoing instability.

Similarly, the Adet–Mota–Bichena route has been shut down since early July, with restrictions still in place at the time the report was published. These closures, EHRC said, have severely constrained the daily activities and mobility of residents.

The report further noted that between August 7 and 11, the Bahir Dar–Debre Markos highway was also blocked by armed local groups commonly referred to as Fano. The Commission reports that the disruption paralyzed transport and commerce in the area, effectively cutting off movement between the two major urban centers. It described how ordinary people faced travel interruptions and shortages of essential goods as a result of the road closures.

In its findings from Benishangul-Gumuz, the Commission reported that government security forces had detained individuals traveling from the Amhara region for work in and around Assosa town.

According to the report, ethnic Amhara travelers were stopped at checkpoints, while some were  taken to local police stations, and others were reportedly ordered to return to their places of origin.

The Commission argues these actions violated freedom of movement and equal treatment provisions, though local officials defended them as temporary security measures to prevent “illegal land encroachments” and to limit infiltration by armed groups associated with Fano but contend that these mechanisms are no longer being utilized.

The report also detailed a violent confrontation in Metemma Woreda of West Gondar Zone, where government security forces clashed with an armed Qemant group at a checkpoint in Meqa Kebele on June 23. The Commission reported that the fighting began after the armed group stopped vehicles carrying fuel, goods, and passengers in an attempt to collect tolls.

The ensuing clash resulted in several deaths among drivers and passengers, and at least three people were injured.

The Commission’s call is unequivocal: the government must “ensure full accountability for human rights violations and provide justice to victims.” The statement emphasizes that despite repeated commitments to peace and reform, regional and federal security institutions have failed to prevent or respond to abuses, allowing impunity to take root.

EHRC urged authorities at all levels — from federal to woreda administrations — to verify and halt unlawful detentions, checkpoints, and collective punishments.

“Authorities must ensure that movement restrictions are strictly necessary, proportionate, and time-bound,” the Commission warned, adding that many such measures have instead become tools of control that “intensify political tensions.”

The report cited an incident that took place in the Oromia Special Zone within the Amhara region, where a supposedly temporary curfew was imposed following the murder of an individual by unknown actors. Authorities in the area have prohibited the movement of people and vehicles after 4:00 PM, and the curfew has yet to be lifted.

The EHRC confirmed that the restrictions “negatively affected pregnant women, patients, and daily laborers,” causing what it described as “an unacceptable humanitarian and social impact.”

Observers note that the EHRC’s findings arrive at a politically sensitive moment. Ethiopia is expected to hold general elections in mid-2026 — the first since the end of the northern conflict and the reorganization of the Tigray regional interim administration (TIA).

Analysts warn that the patterns of movement restriction, arbitrary arrests, and ongoing insecurity could make free campaigning and voter registration nearly impossible in several regions.

“Freedom of movement is a prerequisite for any credible election,” said a political analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously. “If citizens cannot travel safely to polling stations or if political candidates cannot reach communities, then the integrity of the vote is compromised from the start.”

For opposition political voices, the EHRC’s documentation of arbitrary checkpoints, curfews, and militarization of civilian zones echoes past election-year crackdowns. The Commission explicitly calls for “urgent corrective measures” to restore mobility, warning that excessive restrictions “disproportionately affect civic and political rights.”

The NEBE, meanwhile, has yet to release a detailed security assessment ahead of voter registration, and opposition political figures who spoke to The Reporter observe that  coordination with regional administrations remains one of the election’s biggest logistical hurdles.

Opposition parties across the country share a deep sense of uncertainty over whether the next elections can be held under current conditions.

Mulatu Gemechu, deputy chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), told The Reporter that the atmosphere remains far from conducive for democratic participation.

“We have said this many times before — the issue of elections is still uncertain,” Mulatu said. “There is a security problem; there is no peace. That is why, for now, we have not made a decision on whether to participate in the coming election or not.”

He added that freedom of movement — a key element of any credible campaign — has effectively collapsed.

 “Right now, freedom of movement is restricted — not only for individuals to travel freely or campaign, but even the government cannot access certain areas where various armed groups are active and people are being detained,” he noted. “In such conditions, how can the voices of the people be heard properly?”

According to Mulatu, the continuation of armed conflict in multiple regions makes any notion of a national election “impractical and unjust.”

“Elections cannot take place in a situation of war. Lives are being lost, property destroyed — that is not right,” he said. “What should be done, therefore, is for both the government and the opposition to work toward peace and discuss what can bring lasting stability to this country.”

The OFC, he explained, has been unable to reopen its offices or conduct basic political training because of the restrictions.

“Our members are required to train and prepare — to educate the public about our political program, our policies, especially our political, economic, and social policies. People must know how we differ from the ruling party — what our alternative is. That requires an office, organization, and the ability to gather people in public spaces. None of that is currently possible,” said Mulatu.

In the north, similar frustrations are echoed by Salsay Woyane Tigray (SaWeT), an opposition political party that operates in Tigray Regional State.

Berhane Atsbeha, head of communications for the party, told The Reporter that mobility across and within Tigray remains perilous, raising serious doubts about the feasibility of fair elections.

 “You see, entering or leaving Tigray by car is still very difficult — there are risks in every direction,” Berhane said. “Even to move around or to campaign freely, there are many restrictions. Crimes are being committed; what we are witnessing are continuous violations of human rights. So, if these issues are not addressed in time, how can an election be held under such circumstances? That’s what this whole issue essentially points to.”

He added that within the region itself, communities remain physically isolated.

“For example, one cannot travel from the northwest to western Tigray. Within Tigray, movement from one district to another — say, from Endabaguna to May Tsebri — is impossible,” said Berhane.

He also stressed that the situation in the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions also remains unstable.

“Armed groups in the Amhara region, for instance, are still in conflict with the federal army, and that has its own implications. In this context, there is no free ground — soldiers are still stationed across Tigray, making freedom of movement, the right to work, and even the right to live safely uncertain. People’s very existence is at risk,” Berhane told The Reporter.

He noted that federal and Eritrean forces continue to control parts of Tigray, restricting civilians’ access to their land and livelihoods.

“Inside Tigray too, political activity is limited. The federal government and even the Eritrean forces, who continue to occupy parts of Tigray’s territory, make it impossible for people to move or work freely,” said Berhane.

He brought up the Irob community as an example.

“The Irob community — which lives not far from Adigrat — has not yet returned home. People can’t even enter Irob. Adigrat, one of the main zonal towns, is itself heavily restricted,” said Berhane. “So, under such conditions, when people are deprived of their natural and constitutional rights — freedom of movement, the right to work, and property ownership — how can we talk about fair elections? To claim that the country is stable or that it is ready for peaceful elections is unrealistic.”

Berhane and his party believe the Commission’s findings should be “taken seriously and strengthened,” arguing that the government’s reports of stability “do not reflect the lived reality on the ground.”

“Unless the government intends to repeat what happened in the sixth national election — when it ran alone and declared itself the winner — it is difficult to imagine how a genuine, credible election can be held. We want that to be strengthened and to create conditions where people can truly move, work, and vote freely,” said Berhane.

The EHRC report portrays a nation fragmented by mistrust and competing interests, often manifesting in violence.

In the Amhara region, Fano militias continue to exert de facto control over several areas, imposing illegal levies and disrupting transport. In Oromia Regional State, OLA insurgencies have created no-go zones where administrative control has collapsed.

These divisions have intensified ethnic profiling, with reports of passengers being targeted at checkpoints based on identity.

“The right to move freely within one’s country is foundational,” the report stresses.

Politicians have expressed their fear that continued insecurity will discourage voter turnout and deepen public cynicism about whether elections can produce change.

Beyond political implications, the report paints a disturbing picture of everyday life disrupted by insecurity. Farmers unable to transport goods, patients stranded en route to hospitals, and teachers prevented from reaching schools — all represent a silent erosion of normalcy.

The EHRC statement linked these violations to worsening economic conditions, warning that disrupted mobility exacerbates food insecurity, displacement, and unemployment, all of which may negatively impact people’s daily livelihood.

In its final recommendations, the EHRC urged federal and regional authorities to lift unlawful movement restrictions and curfews, investigate and prosecute those responsible for rights violations, guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian actors, strengthen oversight of local security forces and reaffirm Ethiopia’s commitment to constitutional freedoms.

“Prompt and coordinated action is essential to prohibit the occurrences of rights violations and ensure justice for victims,” the Commission concluded.

Experts and political figures agree that with less than a year before Ethiopia heads to the polls, the EHRC findings underscore a nation still struggling to reconcile its democratic aspirations with the realities of insecurity and division.

If unaddressed, the restrictions documented in the report risk reducing the 2026 elections to a symbolic event, devoid of genuine competition or participation, warn political figures who spoke to The Reporter.

But if the government acts decisively and moves to restore mobility, protect civilians, and ensure accountability, it could mark a turning point toward credible governance.

“The right to move freely is inseparable from the right to vote freely,” Berhane said.

Whether Ethiopia’s leaders heed that warning may determine not just the legitimacy of the next election, but the direction of the nation’s fragile democracy itself.